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ABSTRACT 
A comparison of the personality profiles of Gamblers 
Anonymous (GA) members, Bocial gamblers and non-gamblers on 
the 16 PF, EPQ and Rotter's I-E Scale showed only that GA 
members scored significantly higher than both social gamblers 
and non-gamblers on the Neuroticism Scale of the EPQ. 
Other factors considered to be influential in gambling 
decisions were investigated. There were no significant 
differences in the risk-taking behaviour of high compared to 
low locus of control subjects but the risk taken and the 
recall of gambling decisions by internals and externals were 
sensitive to information on luck. Although gambling was 
shown not to be a stimulus-bound activity in the traditional 
sense, the presence of gambling cues increased risk-taking in 
social gamblers but lowered risk-taking in non-gamblers. 
Reinforcement history, especially the ratio of the number of 
wins and losses, the immediately preceding outcomes and runs 
of wins and losses were shown to be influential in the 
staking behaviour and the confidence in gambling of both 
social gamblers and non-gamblers. 
Personality and situational factors did not adequately 
account for the differences in risk-taking decisions. 
Physiological variations altered risk-taking within criterion 
groups. Moreover, different forms of arousal were shown to 
have different effects on risk-taking behaviour of social 
gamblers and non-gamblers. Significant interactions between 
arousal, gambling cues and reinforcement history suggested 
that a diversity of variables are important in determining 
gambling decisions rather than simply being under the control 
of economic or personality factors. There is some evidence 
which suggests that differences in levels of arousal may be 
an important underlying factor in describing the differences 
between social gamblers and non-gamblers. 
The repertory grid technique was explored as a research 
tool departing from the traditional methods of enquiry into 
gambling. The overall finding was that social gamblers 
construed gambling as a positive activity while non-gamblers 
construed gambling negatively. 
Note to the reader 
In this thesis the terms compulsive gamblers and 
pathological gamblers are used interchangeably although it is 
acknowledged that the term pathological is preferred since 
the term compulsive implies a particular abnormality which 
need not necessarily be present in gamblers (see Moran, 1968; 
1970). 
Most of the experimental subjects in this study consist 
of social gamblers and these are people who do not experience 
problems in their gambling. Some of them may be regular 
punters but, generally, gambling constitutes a recreational 
act i vi ty. When the term gambler is used without 
qualification it should be taken to mean a person who 
gambles, including the occasional and problematic gambler. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly acknowledged that risks exist in many 
facets of life, While most people are content to cope with 
the social and physical risks there are others who 
deliberately seek out these risks. One interesting form of 
risk-taking which is not required in the individual's 
behavioural repertoire for survival is monetary risk-taking 
or gambl i ng. The stock market and other business ventures 
are excluded from this category since these are given the 
benefit of the doubt that they may be required for income 
earning purposes. Monetary risk-taking, whether for 
recreational purposes or that of need fulfillment, is a very 
widespread behaviour, even in societies where the activity is 
not enti rely legal (Herman, 1967; 1976a; Eadi ngton, 1976; 
Dickerson, 1984). 
For those people in whom gambling is a dominant feature 
of their lives, their persistence in the activity is 
impressive, but unfortunately, usually disastrous for the 
parti ci pant. Numerous studies have been carried out on 
people who are encountering problems associated with a 
preoccupation with gambling (see Loren2, 1983). However, 
those who enjoy gambling for purely recreational reasons are 
largely ignored. The interest in these people has mainly 
been concentrated on their decision-making and other 
cognitive processes under various measures of risk. More 
often than not, an average' population (without any 
reference to the level of gambling participation) consisting 
of college undergraduates provides the subjects. 
1 
Nevertheless, much information regarding gambling behaviour 
has been obtained from these laboratory studies and other 
sociological surveys (Tec, 1964; Downes, Davis, David 8. 
stone, 1976; Herman, 1976a). 
To begin with, social gamblers come from all walks of 
li fe. In most societies there are no political, social, 
religious or racial barriers to social or for that matter 
pathological gambling, with the exception of certain 
religions such as Islam which prohibit the activity, Other 
religions, in an effort to raise funds, seem to encourage it, 
the prime example being the Catholic Church. Although 
gambling takes place in most societies in some form or 
another the Chinese and the Jews have often been singled out 
as the greatest gamblers. Cohen (1960; 1964; 1972) in his 
studies on gambling, uncertainty and psychological 
probability, often cites interesting historical and mythical 
instances of strange gambling practices, Herman (1967), 
Downes et a1., (1976) and Li 8. Smith (1976) have shown that 
gambling is not restricted to any social class but the type 
of gambling preferred may be different within each class. On 
the whole, capitalist societies seem to dominate the world in 
per capita expenditure on gambling. The annual figures taken 
around the end of the 70' s show Australia heading the list at 
A$710, USA at A$440, New Zealand at A$210, UK at A$95 and 
Canada at A$87. Some of the figures may be misleading in the 
sense that they represent the 'turnover' (all the money 
wagered at a gambling event, including re investments) rather 
than the actual amount of money spent (Choice, 1979; 
Consumer, 1981). Even then the figures are high. 
Unfortunately, no figures are available from socialist 
countries, a comparison with which, would be interesting. 
2 
Herman (1976b) hypothesised that competitiveness and 
chance-taking may be stimulated by the political order, 
especially in one where there are grave discrepancies in the 
distribution of wealth. In summary, the gambler may belong 
to any political and social stratum and, in many respects, is 
no different from the next person in the street. 
Having decided who social gamblers might be we now turn 
to the question of where the gambling takes place. 
Horse-racing is a very popular 'sport' in many parts of the 
world. In New Zealand horse-race betting is the most common 
form of gambling followed by housie (bingo) and lotteries. 
The figures are very high and lh~ increase in the amount of 
money invested is rapid. Tables A and B below give the 
amount of money invested in the two major form of gambling in 
New Zealand in the last 10 years. 
3 
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Table A. The amount of money spent on lotteries 
and nett profit made from the sale of lotteries in 
New Zealand for the last 113 years. 
Year No. of draws Gross proceeds ($) Profi ts ($) 
1975 1 4, 8 e e. 13 13 13 1~ 2,96e,eee 
1976 2,691, €lee 
1977 16,e65,eeen 3,213,131313 
1978 65 21,21313, €lee 4,367,eee 
1979 813 39,2ee,eee 8,462,eee 
19813 86 57,7ee,eee 11,1339,131313 
1981 84 62, 25e, €lee 11,932,eee 
1982 5 5, 9 3 13, €lee 1~ 11,186,eee 
1983 62,215,eeen 12,443, eee 
1984 8 7, 9 1 13, 13 13 13 1~ 17,582, €lee 
'it. Figures are not available, there were 5e draws in 1974. 
The Golden Kiwi Jackpot changed from 5e cents to $1 in 1977 
and to $2 in 19813. These were the common ones which were on 
sal e all the time (a b 0 u t 4 3 i n 1 97 4 , 6 1 i n 1 9 7 8 , 7 1 i n 1 9 7 9 
and 72 in 19813) the rest were made up of $5, $113 and $2e 
lotteries which probably reached a peak in 1984. Although no 
figures were available the author estimated that there were 
about 11313 draws of lottery tickets in the 1983-1984 calender 
year. 
U The Report of the New Zealand Lottery board did not always 
include the gross proceeds but from the ones available the 
profits amounted to between 19.8 to 2e.6 percent of the gross 
proceeds. These estimated figures were arrived at by taking 
the profits as constituting 2e percent of the gross proceeds, 
hence the inconsistencies in years 1981 and 1983 (New Zealand 
House of Representatives Appendix to the Journals, 
1974-1984). 
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Table B. Amount of money invested in horse- and 
dog-racing in New Zealand in the last 10 years and 
the amount of profit derived from the races by the 
Totalisator Agency Board over the same period of time. 
Year Total ($) Profits ($)* 
(on- and off-course betting) 
1975 266,576,000 25,058,000 
1976 321,604,000 30,231,000 
1977 366,703,000 34,470,000 
1978 402,506,000 37,836,000 
1979 464,696,000 43,681,000 
1980 502,210,000 47,208,000 
1981 534,540,000 50,247,000 
1982 606, 04 T, 000 56,968,000 
1983 671,810,000 63,150,000 
1 984 729,534,000 68,576,000 
From the above figures it can be seen that in the last 
decade the amount of money invested in gambling increased 
from $281,376,000 to $817,444,000, nearly a 3 fold increase. 
Looking at it in terms of profits the amount increased from 
$28,018,000 to $88,158,000 more than 3 times the amount 10 
years ago. Keeping in mind that these figures represent only 
the two major gambling outlets the total amount of money 
wagered by a population of 3 million New Zealanders is an 
imposing figure. For this reason alone the study of gambling 
is well justified. 
A number of approaches have been taken to the study of 
gambling. Gambling has been interpeted in learning terms 
(Ferster & Ski nner, 1957; Ski nner, 1953; 1972; Levi tz, 1971; 
Knapp, 1976; Dickerson, 1977bi 1979). Most of these accounts 
have applied learning principles to specific features of each 
type of gambling activity with some success. The primary 
emphasis has been given to explaining the reinforcing 
attributes of money and identifying the various schedules of 
reinforcements which control gambling behaviour. An 
over-emphasis on monetary concerns may lower the credibility 
of the behavioural framework since, as will be discussed 
later, it is accepted that a number of other non-monetary 
factors seem to have powerful reinforcing qualities. 
As might be expected, psychoanalytical explanations of 
gambling (Lindner, 19513; Greenson, 1947; Freud, 1953, 
Bergler, 1957; Galdston, 19613; Halliday 8. Fuller, 1974), 
focussed on unresolved childhood conflicts. For many 
psychoanalytic authors, losing is the punishment that 
alleviates the guilt feelings associated with infantile 
sexual desires. Gambling is also frequently regarded as the 
functional equivalent of other addictions (Galdston, 1960; 
Adler, 1966; Adler 8. Coleman, 1969). Freud (1953) suggested 
that gambling is derived from the primal addiction, 
masturbation, while Halliday 8. Fuller (1974) described 
gambling as one of man's 'universal neuroses'. Need for 
approval, hence testing fate by taking chances in gambling, 
constitutes a major part in the psychoanalytic description of 
gambling (Lindner, 19513; Galdston, 19613). There are two 
major objections to these psychoanalytic explanations of 
gambli ng. Firstly, most of these explanations are 
speculative with little or no supporting data to back up the 
hypotheses. Secondly, as with scientific evaluations of 
psychoanalytic hypotheses, they have been considered to be 
untestable and irrefutable (Popper, 1963). 
In more recent times, phenomenological explanations of 
gambling began to find favour among investigators in the 
6 
gambling field (Livingston, 1974; Kusyszyn, 1976; 1977; 
Knowles, 1976; Campbell, 1976). Much of the theorising arose 
as a result of dissatisfaction with learning, and especially, 
clinical approaches towards gambling. The main contention 
from these authors is that, instead of viewing gambling as a 
sick and/or abnormal behaviour, it should be considered a 
normal activity for most people and that it provides a 
healthy outlet for daily frustrations. Furthermore, it 
serves the function of play and recreation and gives hope for 
wealth without the necessity of over-risking. Other 
psychological advantages of gambling include an increase in 
self-esteem, self-efficacy and self-worth associated with 
successful gambling. This author would like to speculate 
that through experience in gambling the individual may learn 
to have less attachment to money and, from a history of 
winning and losing as is typical of sports encounters, the 
individual may have an opportunity to acquire a more 
realistic attitude to life and greater tolerance towards 
failure. 
Gambling, like most other phenomena, has also been 
interpreted from a sociological perspective (Caillois, 1962; 
Devereux, 1968; Oldman, 1974; 1978; Herman, 1976a). Most of 
these accounts discussed the sociological functions provided 
by gambling in society (Herman, 1976a, b) or a subset of 
society (Zola, 1963). Similar to the phenomenological 
approach, these explanations have generally avoided labelling 
gambling activity as 'sick' but instead generally argue that 
gambling fulfills some form of social need for those who 
gamble. 
No single approach has been entirely satisfactory in 
accounting for all forms of gambling (Cornish, 1978). 
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Learning theories have generally ignored cognitive aspects 
involved in gambling and the individual differences in 
motivation for gambling but emphasised mainly the situational 
determinants of the initiation and maintenance of the 
gambling activity. All the remaining orientations tend to 
suffer from an over-inclusion of too many forms of gambling 
in the explanations, thus making unreasonable 
generalisations. Another major problem with most approaches 
is the difficulty in testing the hypothesis implied by the 
theories. This author asserts that most researchers would 
agree that different forms of gambling have different 
characteristics and require diverse strategies for success. 
Bearing this in mind, and the fact that factors initiating 
gambling activity need not necessarily be the same as those 
maintaining gambling acti vi ty (Cornish, 197B), any all 
encompassing theory of gambling behaviour will be likely to 
involve more than one causal factor. The present trend of 
research into gambling seems to suggest that a more eclectic 
approach is most frui tful (Anderson & Brown, 1984; Smi th & 
Preston, 1984; Wagenaar, Keren & Plei t-Kui per, 1984). There 
are, nevertheless, still many problems to overcome, the most 
obvious of which, pertains to the how, how much and why of 
the contribution of the various 'forces' influencing gambling 
behaviour. 
A number of researchers in gambling have concentrated 
more on the empirical demonstration of the 'risk-taking' 
propensity of individuals under conditions of varying 
probabilities of winning and losing and the amount of money 
to be won or lost. The simplest model for decision-making 
under risk is the' expected value' model where it is assumed 
that the decision-maker will choose between bets andwhether 
B 
to bet at all, by uBing the maximisation of expected gain as 
the cri terion (Edwards, 1955). The expected values for each 
alternative bet are calculated by multiplying the value of 
each of its outcomes by its probability of occurrence and 
summing these products over all the outcomes (Pruitt, 1962), 
The model is useful where the individual involved is 
primarily motivated by rational economic concerns and where 
all the objective values of the probabilities and payoffs are 
known, but these gambling parameters are frequently absent. 
Other weaknesses of the model include individuals accepting 
bets with a negative expected value even if this is the 
alternative to not gambling at all and subjects have been 
shown to ignore information on expected value even when given 
the opportunity and encouraged to use such information 
(Lichtenstein, Slovic & Zink, 1969). Prui tt (1962) showed 
that when expected value is held constant subjects may 
display preference for one bet over another. 
Mosteller & Hogee (1951) presented some evidence for an 
'expected utility' model which explained some of the 
discrepancies not dealt with by a simple expected value 
model. The monetary values of payoffs are replaced by the 
individual's evaluation of their utility. In traditional 
economic theory, successive increments of money take on a 
diminishing utility which implies that even in the case of 
'fair' bets the satisfaction to be gained from winning extra 
money should by definition be less than the satisfaction to 
be forfeited should the same amount be lost, emphasising the 
apparent irrationality of gambling (Cornish, 1978). 
Improvements were made to the original models by using 
subjective estimates of the parameters rather than the 
objective values. The' subjectively expected value' model 
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was proposed by Edwards (1955) to account for some 
inconsistencies in his earlier model. The most sophisticated 
model was that of the 'subjectively expected utility' model 
in which the utilities of the probabilities and payoffs were 
assigned subjective values (Rapoport & Wallsten, 1972). 
Overall, expectation theories have not had much success at 
providing explanations for many types of gambling but are 
adequate for simple forms of gambling such as lotteries 
(Weinstein & Deitch, 1974). The different types of gambling 
require different gambling behaviour and individual 
differences within the same type of gambling will probably 
make the search for a general rule of gambling quite 
difficult. Besides, factors other than economic are likely 
to playa large part under certain conditions. 
A number of investigators have identified some factors 
which influence the gambler's evaluation of probabilities and 
payoffs. Tversky & Kahneman (1974) described 3 major 
heuristics employed by people to assess and predict values, 
which under certain circumstances tend to lead to biases; 1. 
the representativeness heuristic, 2. the availability 
heuristic and, 3. the' adjustment from an anchor' heuristic. 
The perception of the amount of skill or chance involvement 
in the game has also been shown to have an effect in the 
assessment of the probabilities and payoffs of the gamble 
( And r i e sse n, 1 97 1) and the a mo u n t 0 f r i s k t a ken (L up fer & 
Jones, 1971; Littig, 1962>' A related bias appears in the 
amount of control the individual has on the outcome. 
Gamblers stake more money before the dice has been rolled 
than after the fall of the dice even though the results are 
unknown (Strickland, Lewicki & Kat2, 1966; Rothbart & Snyder, 
1970). Langer (1975) suggested that the presence of 
skill-related factors in chance situations may cue or 
encourage the individual to have an 'illusion of control' 
11 
In gambling situations, the illusion of control which results 
misleads the gambler about his/her chances of success, and 
the consequences of this deception will depend upon the 
extent to which skill (as opposed to chance) does, in fact, 
influence the outcomes. 
A series of studies in subjective probability by Teigen 
(1983a,b,c,d) illustrated some of the errors of human 
judgement in uncertain events. His results show that 
guessing behaviour is subject to grouping, anchoring and 
contextual effects. The major strategy in guessing seems to 
be an a voi dance of numbe rs wi t h promi ne nt, 'non- random' 
properties, which, at the same time, are highly available to 
the subjects, Most subjects prefer to be consistent rather 
than being' rational', making the final prediction is 
dependent upon the order in which decisions are made. Most 
subjects seem to have adopted a non-distributional conception 
of probability, that is, when more than 3 alternatives are 
available the probablities of all the events do not add up to 
uni ty. Confidence is closely related to perceived chance, 
but not to the subjective probability of the event in 
question, except when all outcomes are judged equally due to 
chance. The difference between the terms' chance' and 
'probability' used in this context is that, in common 
language, outcomes are sometimes sai d to be 'caused' by 
chance (Teigen, 1983d) while probability refers to the 
likelihood of an event occurring. Subjective and statistical 
conceptions of uncertainty have partially opposing 
connotations. 'An uncertain future' seems to be subjectively 
interpreted as an open future, wi th freedom of hope and 
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belief, rather than the statistically unreliable future, with 
restricted possibilities of prediction. Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff & Phillips (1982) concluded that the general 
finding of the 'calibration' of subjective probability 
estimates studies is that people tend to be over-confident, 
that is, they exaggerate their probabilities of being 
correct. These results and others from Kahneman, Slovic & 
Tversky (1982) and their associates on judgement under 
uncertainty have relevance to the present gambling research. 
However, the topic is too vast to be reviewed in this 
chapter. Many of these judgemental and statistical biases 
have effects on gambling decisions and these will be 
discussed along with the appropriate experiment. 
Another source of bias which is particularly relevant to 
gambling decisions can be referred to as the belief in luck 
or superstitions. The bulk of research in the area of luck 
has been carried out by Cohen and his associates. For 
example, their results show that the belief in the 
probability of occurrence of an outcome is increased or 
decreased depending on how lucky or unlucky a person feels 
respectively, compared to when the individual is feeling 
neither lucky nor unlucky. These are further influenced by 
the perceived difficulty of the task. In addition, a 
preference for relying on skill or chance when gambling is 
not absolute but is affected by the probability of success. 
Some of the belief in luck is transformed into superstitious 
practices gambling. Henslin (1972) described the 
superstitious ritual in which crap players engage in 
apparently trying to influence the fall of the dice. In 
Jahoda's (1970) analysis of superstition, he noted that the 
inveterate gambler is 'notoriously superstitious'. Luck and 
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superstition have been so closely associated with gambling in 
ordinary life that a description of those terms usually 
precede any discussion of gambling. Devereux (1968) further 
noted that in contemporary, rationally oriented societies, 
gambling appeals particularly to superstitious persons, and 
it is one of the few areas in which permissive attitudes 
towards superstition are tolerated. In spite of that, little 
attention has been given by the scientific community to those 
'forces' operating on the individual under conditions of 
r i s k, e s p e cia 11 y mo net a r y r i s k - t a kin g . 
In general, relatively little effort has been given to 
investigations concerning non-economic factors influencing 
decision-making under risk or other gambling situations. 
There have been two major theoretical approaches; one, a 
learning theory perspective, and secondly, an emphasis on 
personality characteristics. I n t e r ms 0 f per son ali t y, the 
bulk of the research has concentrated on compulsive or 
pathological gamblers. Locus of control, extraversion, 
neuroticism and impulsivity are some of the most common 
traits that have been investigated individually. The highest 
agreement, thus far, has been that compulsi ve gamblers are 
more external and score higher on the neuroticism scale. 
Other studies have yielded more conflicting or, at least, 
non-replicated results. The few learning theory 
interpretations of gambling have been consistent, which is 
expected since most accounts have been post hoc assignments 
of behavioural units to the different components of the 
gambling situation. A number of researchers have argued for 
the behavioural analysis of gambling behaviour (Dickerson, 
1977bj 1979; Knapp, 1976; Saunders 8. Wookey, 1980). Besides 
the treatment of compulsive gambling by aversive means 
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(Barker 8. Hiller, 1966; Goorney, 1968) other less physically 
painful methods have been employed with success (Fitchett 8. 
Sandford, 1976). Althoug~ the behavioural approach seems to 
be a more profitable one to take, the existence of individual 
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differences and their inf~uences on gambling cannot be denied 
(Cornish, 1978) and as Williams (1977) pointed out, the 
potential influence of such personality variables has yet to 
be investigated. 
The other maj or a pproac h to gambl i ng, whi c h probabl y 
belongs more to the study of decision-making, is the 
information processing model. These models seem able to 
integrate results from a wide variety of experiments 
(Lichtenstein et aI., 1969; Slovic 8. Lichtenstein, 1968a; 
Payne 8. Braunstein, 1971), The information processing model 
is relevant to gambling behaviour because of the emphasis on 
the importance of correctly identifying the sources of 
information actually used by the decision-maker. Quite often 
only restricted information is available and in many 
instances the gambler maY,be persuaded or misled into paying 
attention to one dimension rather than another. Information 
may also be presented in many ways, aurally versus visually 
or sequentially versus simultaneously. The inclusion of 
selective attention to particular risk dimensions and other 
stimuli will improve the descriptive and predictive power of 
the models. The study of the actual strategies employed by 
gamblers throws light on their perception and 
importance-beliefs. The determinants of these factors and 
the methods by which information processing techniques can be 
deliberately manipulated will further specify the importance 
of certain gambling parameters. 
There are a number of contentious issues which beset 
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many areas of gambling research. One which is common to most 
social investigations is the applicability of laboratory 
findings to real life. The bulk of research in monetary 
risk-taking has been carried out in the laboratory. In 
nearly all cases the stakes for betting and the range of 
gambling games that are available are severely limited. The 
restriction of stakes is an important constraint since quite 
a number of studies use the size of bets placed as a measure 
of risk-taking thereby introducing the possibility of biasing 
the re~ults. However, Lichtenstein 8. Slovic (1973) showed 
that the strategies employed by laboratory subjects are 
replicable in a casino setting. On the other hand, Anderson 
8. Brown (19~4) presented results which cast doubt that 
laboratory gambling could be used as a valid analogue of the 
real gambling situation. 
Are 1 ate d 0 b j e c t ion i s t hat, mo reo f ten t han not, the 
laboratory 'gambling' is treated as an isolated event which 
is hardly ever the case in real-life situations. The 
motivation for gambling may play an important part in 
determining the level of risk taken and the gambling 
strategies employed. This is especially serious when it is 
highly unlikely that motives for gambling for volunteer 
subjects (largely from a student population) are similar to 
those who visit the race-track or the betting office. 
Situational factors such as the range of physical and social 
cues which are normally present in a gambling scene are 
usually absent in laboratory settings. Otherwise, 
experimental risk-taking and gambling studies enjoy the same 
advantages as other controlled social research in the 
laboratory (Lewin, 1979). 
It was mentioned earlier that the majority of the few 
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studies on the characteristics of gamblers have concentrated 
on compulsive gamblers, and more often than not those 
subjects have been recruited from Gamblers Anonymous (GA). 
Dickerson (1984) has argued that no significant differences 
have been demonstrated between this group of problematic 
gamblers and other equally high frequency gamblers who do not 
see k t rea t me n t . Also there has not been any differences 
demonstrated between compulsive gamblers and social gamblers 
(Malkin, 1981, cited in Dickerson, 1984). As a deviation 
from the trend it was decided that it may be of theoretical 
interest to investigate the characteristics of social 
gamblers and people who enjoy gambling but do not 
over-indulge in the activity, A number of features have been 
ascribed to this group of social gamblers without much 
supporting evidence. A comparison of the performance of 
social gamblers versus non-gamblers has rarely been carried 
out. The most prominent model of the progression from a 
'normal' person to that of a compulsive gambler includes a 
phase where the individual may be described as a social 
gambler (Custer, 1982). Thus it is rather surprising that 
little effort has been devoted to research other than the 
final stages of compulsive gambling. It has also been quite 
fashionable to specify one or two underlying causes of the 
proclivity to gamble but in most instances these are merely 
speculations and conjectures. 
The major aim of the present thesis is to investigate 
the characteristics of social gamblers. For the most part, 
these gamblers are compared with non-gamblers rather than 
compulsive gamblers. A more detailed inquiry is directed 
towards a number of contradictory areas and other commonly 
cited but unsupported assertions. 
To begin with, an assessment of the personality 
characteristics is carried out on a group of compulsive 
gamblers, social gamblers and non-gamblers taken from an 
adult non-student population. The personality measures used 
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are slightly different from the usual trend of employing 
tests of specific traits in that the Cattell 16 Personality 
Factors is used which represent a non-clinical measurement of 
personali ty. The Eysenck Personality Inventory and the 
Rotter's Internal-External Locus of Control Questionnaire are 
also included to get a more complete picture and in an 
attempt to replicate previous results. A more detailed 
investigation of the locus of control construct follows the 
personality study. High and low scorers on the locus of 
control scale are compared on a number of risk-taking and 
gambling related dimensions. One of the main purposes of the 
exercise is to test the assumption of the riskiness preferred 
by internals and externals. 
A frequently stated characteristic of gamblers, that of 
their being easily influenced by external stimuli is examined 
from the perspective of gambling as a stimulus-bound 
behaviour. Gambling activities are rarely carried out in 
isolation from social or physical stimuli. One feature which 
has received some attention is the influence of the presence 
of other gambl ers (Bl ascovi c h, Veach 8. Gi ns burg, 1973; 
Blascovich 8. Ginsburg, 1974; Blascovich, Ginsburg 8. Howe, 
1976). Another concomitant feature, the importance of 
gambling cues in actual monetary risk-taking, is explored. 
This aspect of gambling has surprisingly been ignored 
considering that commercial enterprises have taken advantage 
of its effects for some time. Another inexplicable feature 
of gambling research is that very few investigators seem to 
acknowledge the fact that most gambling activity is 
sequential and that few people take less than 5 gambles 
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during a gambling bout. There are also contradicting reports 
on the importance of the outcome of previous bets on the 
staking behaviour of the next bet. Related to this, the 
reinforcement history, a feature that is hypothesised to be 
influential in determining the staking behaviour is assessed. 
Finally, as a prelude to testing for arousal as a basis for 
explaining the participation in gambling activities, two 
different kinds of arousal are introduced. This also allows 
a comparison of the potency of such arousal in gambling 
situations. 
The final empirical section of the thesis is devoted to 
examining a new technique in the study of gambling behaviour. 
In order to overcome the deficiencies of laboratory studies 
and the difficulties of field studies it is suggested that 
the cognitive aspects of gambling may be investigated by 
using the repertory grid technique. The versatility and 
applicability of the method is explored. Since luck and 
superstition have commanded such a prominent place in the 
gambling literature, an attempt is made to analyse their 
influence in gambling for those participating. 
In the concluding chapters the results of the 
experiments are then discussed in the context of the overall 
thesis and some suggestions for future research are provided. 
CHAPTER TWO 
PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF PATHOLOGICAL 
GAMBLERS, SOCI AL GAMBLERS AND NON-GAMBLERS 
Introduction 
The analysis of the gambler has been made the object of 
numerous studies by novelists and moralists and has served as 
a popular theme for the theatre, but empirical studies have 
been relatively scarce. Among the research carried out the 
emphasis has been on two aspects of individual differences in 
relation to gambling behaviour: 1. a basically 
hypothesis-free comparison of gamblers and non gamblers on a 
wide variety of personality and attitude measures and, 2. an 
examination of traits which might be expected to account for 
individual differences in their dispositions to gamble or 
decision-making in gambling (Cornish, 1978). While it is 
acknowledged that the attribution of the cause or maintenance 
of gambling to personality factors cannot be precisely 
determined it is, nevertheless, a useful starting point for 
the investigation of differences among criterion groups. 
In what was probably the first empirical study on the 
personality characteristics of gamblers, Hunter & Brunner 
(1928) administered the Bernreuter Personality Inventory and 
the Colgate Introversion-Extraversion Scale to a large number 
of avid college gamblers but found no common constellations. 
In another psychometric study, McGlothlin (1954) tested women 
poker players and showed that the gamblers scored better on 
the social, home and emotional sections of the Bell 
Adjustment Inventory than the norms for the general female 
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population. Those who scored poorly on the emotional section 
also tended to believe in luck and superstitions rather 
strongly but did not take more risks than the better adjusted 
individuals. Morris (1957) classified 29 avowed college 
gamblers into 3 categories; thrill, economic and other, using 
Gough, McCloskey and Meehl's Scale for dominance and social 
responsibility, the Gough Scale for psychological feminity 
and the Maslow, Hirsh, Stein and Honigman Test for 
security-insecurity. Gamblers were found to be more secure, 
dominant, masculine, but less responsible and exhibited a 
greater discrepancy between inner and outer selves. 
Probably due to the inception of Gambler's Anonymous 
(GA), a self-help organisation for pathological gamblers 
modelled after Alcoholics Anonymous, in 1957, later 
personality investigations have concentrated on pathological 
gamblers who are members of GA. Roston (1961) found that 
pathological gamblers are more hostile, aggressive, 
rebellious, socially alienated, magical in their thinking, 
less able to learn from experience, and show more obsessive 
and compulsive thinking on the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) and a slightly modified version 
of the Rotter Level of Aspiration Board. In addition, Moran 
(1979a) showed that pathological gamblers have higher 
external and neuroticism scores on the Social Reaction 
Inventory and the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI) 
compared to the norms of the respective tests. More 
recently, Dell, RU2icka 8. Palisi (1981> using the Millon 
Multiaxial Clinical Inventory (MMCI) revealed that GA 
members, in comparison with Millon's normative sample, are 
more gregarious, narcissistic, aggressive and drug abusive, 
but significantly less conforming and depressive. Wong 
(1980) found that GA members scored high on the extraversion 
scale of the EPI and were more external on the Social 
Reaction Inventory but were within the normal range for 
impulsivity. Malkin (1981, cited in Dickerson, 1984) found 
no differences between GA members and social gamblers on any 
measure in the Myers-Brigg Locus of Control Scale, Both 
Seager (1970) and Blaszczynski, McConaghy. Armstrong &. 
Allcock (1982) showed that compulsive gamblers scored higher 
than regular off-course bettors on the neuroticism scale of 
the EPI. 
In a study comparing the personality characteristics of 
heavy gamblers, light gamblers, non-gamblers and lottery 
players, Kusyszyn &. Rutter (1978) found that the two groups 
of gamblers take more risks than both non-gamblers and 
lottery players put together. The relationship between 
risk-taking and the other attributes measured including; 
effectance (Kusyszyn, 1976), hostility and aggression 
(Jackson, 1967; 1971) was the same for all the four groups. 
Kusyszyn &. Rubenstei n (1971) found that race track 
gamblers are significantly more external than the norms of 
the Rotter's I-E Scale. Using their Race Track Betting 
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Behaviour Questionnaire the authors were able to classify the 
gamblers into four sub-groups: 1. the rational gambler has a 
confident, practical, rational internally-controlled approach 
to gambl i ng, 2. the soc i al gambl er is care free and fun 
loving, bets on every race, believes in luck, and goes to the 
track to enjoy himself, 3, the pathological gambler attends 
races regularly, bets on every race, bets more money when 
losing in order to recover his losses and feels badly after 
having an unsuccessful day and is externally oriented and, 4. 
the systems gambler goes to the track to relax and bets 
according to a system without regard to luck. Kusyszyn & 
Rubenstein suggested that three of the four behaviour 
patterns are similar to those of the poker players described 
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by Martinez & LaFranchi (1969). The other major study on the 
personality of race-track gamblers was carried out by Conrad 
in 1979. A number of tests were used including; the Rotter's 
I-E Scale, Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale and the 
S-R Inventory of Anxiousness. His results indicated that the 
pathological gambler has a lower level of defensiveness than 
the social gambler, but exhibited a higher level of anxiety 
and race-track gamblers are more externally oriented than 
non- gambl e rs. 
The sparse research in this field has produced 
inconclusive and, at times, contrary results. The present 
study attempts to further explore and clarify the personality 
characteristics of pathological gamblers and social gamblers. 
As a variation to the usual procedure a standard non-clinical 
personality test- the Cattell's 16 Personality Factor 
Questionnaire (16 PF)- was used. The Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (EPQ) was included to assess its usefulness as 
a descriptive tool with respect to gamblers and whether 
Horan's (1970a) results could be replicated by using a 
shorter version of the EPI. The Rotter I-E Scale was used to 
examine the locus of control of gamblers and non-gamblers. 
In general, the previous results have indicated that gamblers 
are more defensive, hostile, aggressive and have a higher 
level of anxiety than non-gamblers. Gamblers also appear to 
believe more in luck and superstition and were shown to be 
externally oriented. 
If the disease conception of pathological gambling 
espoused by Gamblers Anonymous is accepted then one would 
expect the scores on most of the relevant scales to lie on a 
continuum with non-gamblers and GA members (pathological 
gamblers) situated at the extremes and social gamblers 
(social, non-problematic) in between. Thus, in line with 
previous research and the Questionnaires used in this study. 
GA members, and to a lesser degree social gamblers, were 
expected to be more tense (Q4), apprehensive (0), suspicious 
(L) and affected by feelings (e) compared with the control 
group of non-gamblers, as measured by the 16 PF. GA members 
and gamblers were also expected to score higher than 
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non gamblers on the P (insensitivity and hostility) and N 
(worrying) Scales on the EPQ, and on the Rotter I-E Scale the 
two groups of gamblers were expected to have a higher 
external score than non-gamblers. 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty male non-gamblers were recruited randomly from 
ten different suburban areas of Christchurch City to serve as 
control subjects, selected from every fiftieth home in the 
telephone directory. This non-gambler group was defined as 
those who bought only raffle or one dollar lottery tickets or 
had gambled less than once a year. Individuals who gambled 
at least once a week or wagered over an average of 10 percent 
of their weekly gross income were defined as gamblers. The 
gambler group was made up of 24 volunteers from a total of 32 
males, randomly approached during an ordinary race-track 
meeting. The third group consisted of a further 12 
pathological gamblers who were members of the Christchurch 
Gamblers Anonymous (GA members) including three recruited 
from members of the GA group in Wellington. This group 
consisted of self-admitted compulsive gamblers who had joined 
a self-help organisation to alleviate their gambling problem. 
Only male subjects were used since there was a notable 
absence of females in the GA groups approached and because 
the different orientations of gender towards gambling 
activities (Downes et al., 1976) might introduce further 
variance to the results. 
Tests 
Each subject was asked to complete five questionnaires. 
The Cattell 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) and the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) were used to explore possible 
personality differences between the three groups of subjects 
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and the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (I-E 
Scale) was used to determine locus of control. The problems 
associated with gambling were assessed by the Gamblers 
Anonymous Gambl i ng Ques t i onnai re (GAGQ, see A ppe ndi x 1) whi ch 
consists of a set of 20 questions similar to those in the 
Michigan Alcohol Screening Test. The extent of gambling 
participation was measured by a Gambling Behaviour 
Questionnaire (GBQ, see Appendix 2). The GA group was not 
required to fill in the GBQ since the major purpose of the 
questionnaire was to decide the allocation of the subjects 
into the respective groups and GA members automatically 
qualify as pathological gamblers. Furthermore, it was an 
attempt to avoid embarrassment since members of GA are 
required to abstain from gambling as part of their self-help 
therapy programme. 
Procedure 
All the non-gambler subjects were approached in their 
own homes and asked if they would take part in a gambling 
survey. Although both the gambler and pathological gambler 
groups were contacted elsewhere they were all tested 
individually in their own places of residence. The nature of 
the tasks was then explained. If the subjects expressed 
their willingness to participate they were presented with the 
two gambling questionnaires (GAGQ and GBQ), followed by the 
16 PF, EPQ and I-E Scale. Only about 25 percent of all the 
people solicited declined to participate. Six subjects 
completed the EPQ and I-E Scale without the author present 
and returned them by post. One non-gambler, six social 
gamblers and four pathological gamblers did not complete the 
16 PF and, five social gamblers and one pathological gambler 
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failed to complete the EPQ. 
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Results 
A t-test carried out on the GAGQ data to compare the 
extent of the problem experienced by gamblers and GA members 
due to their gambling activities was highly significant (t = 
6.36, df = 32, P = .001). The GAGQ scores were analysed 
separately since it was only relevant to gamblers and GA 
members. The mean number of positive responses to the 
questions for gamblers was 4.0 and 12.5 for pathological 
gamblers (seven positive responses or more to the 20 
questions is indicative of problematic gambling according to 
Gamblers Anonymous Organisation). As expec ted, GA membe rs 
felt that gambling was more problematic to them than 
gamblers. It should also be mentioned that in the course of 
about one and a half years attendence (fortnightly) at GA 
meetings the author observed that GA members, in their 
gambling days, gambled more heavily and frequently than the 
gamblers in this sample. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was carried 
out separately on the four scales (P, E, Nand L) of the EPQ, 
the 16 factors of the 16 PF and the Rotter I-E Scale. Each 
personality factor or scale was treated as a variable. The 
mean scores on each of the variable for the three groups of 
subjects are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. The mean scores of non-gamblers, gamblers and 
pathological gamblers on the 16 PF, EPQ and Rotter's 
I -E Scale. 
Factor 
A 
B 
C 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
L 
M 
N 
o 
Q1 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
P 
E 
N 
L 
R 
Description 
Reserved/Out-going 
Less/More intelligent 
Aff by feelings/Emot stable 
Humble/Assertive 
Sober/Happy-go-lucky 
Expedient/Conscientious 
Shy/Venturesome 
Tough-minded/Tender-minded 
Trusting/Suspicious 
Practical/Imaginative 
Forthright/Astute 
Self-assured/Apprehensive 
Conservative/Experimenting 
Group-dependent/Self-suff. 
Self-conflict/Controlled 
Relaxed/Tense 
Psychoticism 
Introversion/Extraversion 
Neuroticism 
Lie 
Rotter's I-E 
*N. Gam = Non-gamblers, 
S. Gam = Social gamblers, 
P. Gam = Pathological gamblers. 
*N. Gam S. Gam P. Gam 
5. 4 
7. 5 
5. 1 
5. 2 
5. 1 
5. e 
5. 4 
5. 1 
5. 1 
4. 9 
5. e 
5. 6 
6. 9 
6. 8 
6. 4 
5. 5 
3. 6 
12. 7 
6. 9 
7. 6 
8. 3 
6. 1 
7. 7 
4. 4 
5. 6 
6. 1 
5. 1 
4. 8 
5. e 
5. 4 
5. 8 
4. 7 
5. 4 
5. 5 
6. e 
5. 7 
6. 1 
3.9 
12. 3 
7. 7 
8. 9 
11 . 5 
5. 5 
6. 6 
5. 5 
4. 8 
5. 4 
5. e 
5. 6 
5. 4 
4. 8 
5. 6 
5. e 
6. 6 
5. 4 
6. e 
4. 9 
4. 5 
5. 6 
14. e 
12. 6 
5. 7 
8. 9 
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The MANOVA (output in Appendix 3) for the 16 PF data did 
not reveal any overall statistical significance using the 
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Wilk's multivariate test of significance, (F (32,54) == 1.19, 
p == 13.282 derived from Rao's (1973) formula of F test (Hull & 
Nie, 1981>. The overall KANOVA for the EPQ data showed a 
near significant result (F (8,88) = 1.95, p = 8.863) using 
the same criterion (output in Appendix 4). A ONEWAY ANOVA 
(Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner & Bent, 1975) of the I-E 
data also showed a near significant result F (2,46) == 2.99, P 
= 13.136, although not quite in the direction expected (output 
in Appendix 4). Non-gamblers and GA members have fairly 
similar scores with gamblers having the highest scores rather 
than the scores getting progressively higher from 
non-gamblers to gamblers to GA members (see Table 1). 
Fig. 1. The scores of non-gamblers, soclel gamblers 
lmd GA members on the N scale of the EPQ 
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The only significant result in the univariate F-tests 
was that GA members scored significantly higher on the N 
scale of the EPQ than both the gambler and non-gambler groups 
as shown in Figure 1. 
An analysis of the mean ages of the three groups of 
subjects did not reveal any significant differences as shown 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. The mean ages of non-gamblers, social 
gamblers and GA members. 
Age M 
SD 
Non-gamblers Social Gamblers GA members 
37.2 
16.2 
35. 6 
13. 3 
36.3 
11. 9 
The age data showed that even though there was a 
difference in the number of subjects in each group, the 
average ages of the subjects were relatively similar. 
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Discussion 
Overall, the three groups did not differ appreciably on 
most of the variables investigated, with one measure yielding 
a significant difference and another a near significant 
di fference. The three groups of GA members, gamblers and 
non-gamblers scored relatively similarly on the factors of 
the 16 PF in contrast with Carey's (1968) results which 
showed that compulsive gamblers can readily be differentiated 
from non-gamblers using the 16 PF. 
This group of GA members was not a representative sample 
of pathological gamblers. These individuals had taken the 
initiative to do something about their problem by joining a 
self-help group, although the motivation to do so might not 
have been entirely voluntary (Livingston, 1974). Most of the 
members in this sample had been involved with the GA group, 
either in its formation or propagation. Thus, the GA group 
consisted of people who were highly motivated to alleviate 
their gambling problem. This probably illustrates the bias 
when a sample is selected from a population receiving therapy 
especially one which is voluntary and autonomous. However, 
as long as generalisations are made with caution GA members 
are the most readily available source of pathological 
gamblers for study. 
As expected, GA members experienced significantly more 
problems than gamblers. This is hardly surprising given that 
the amount of involvement in gambling by GA members is 
considerably greater. The increased difficulties in the 
lives of GA members may be attributed to the greater 
frequency in gambling with high stakes. This inevitably 
resulted in an unpleasant state of endless worry over unpaid 
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bills, debts and the usual deteriorating marital relationship 
(Scodel, 1964; Goorney, 1968; Bolen & Boyd, 1968; Boyd & 
Bolen, 1970; Seager, 1970; Pokorny, 1972; Li vi ngston, 1974). 
Thus, a high N score on the EPQ by GA members is not too 
surprising. This result parallels Horan's (1970a) study of 
the personality variables associated with pathological 
gamblers interpreted in terms of Eysenck's theoretical 
framework. The personal and interpersonal problems 
associated with heavy gambling may be one reason that GA 
members have consistently been shown to have a high 
neuroticism score (Blaszczynski, 1982; Seager, 1970). It is 
interesting to note that social gamblers and non-gamblers had 
fairly similar group means on the N scale. This major 
deviation from the rest of the significant results may 
provide a relevant finding of some importance. The 
relationship suggests that coping strategies may be at fault 
rather than personality disorders. It is reasonable to infer 
that although social gamblers may experience problems due to 
their gambling activities they seem to cope successfully in 
the main. Oldman (1974) asserted that the particular 
mechanism whereby one reaches a crises point is a consequence 
not of personality defect but of a defective relationship 
between a strategy of play an the one hand and a way of 
managing one's finances on the other. Thus, the clinical 
implications seem to indicate that interventions in the 
cognitive and behavioural area may prove productive. 
An expected feature that gamblers have a higher external 
score than non-gamblers is not supported by the present data. 
The research on this aspect of personality has provided 
ambiguous results and further work will be carried out in 
this area. However, as Conrad (1979) suggested, di fferences 
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in characteristics observed could have arisen from varied 
methodologies and measuring techniques employed by individual 
investigators. The di verse samples of gambler groups, and 
particularly the criterion used for determining the gambler 
samples, used by different researchers is another possible 
explanation for the observed discrepancies. Furthermore, 
this lack of agreement in the measure traits may be due to 
the observation that even within a group of pathological 
gamblers there exists subgroups of individuals exhibiting 
di fferent attri butes (Moran, 197Bb). 
GA members, gamblers and non-gamblers did not appear to 
be separated on a continuum, at least in terms of the tests 
used in this study. The results failed to indicate any trend 
showing that GA members and non gamblers are always placed at 
the extremes of the relevant characteristics measured as 
would be predicted by the disease model of pathological 
gambling (Gambler's Anonymous, 1974). No clear progression 
of the severity of the characteristics was observed. This 
finding casts some doubt on the notion that pathological 
gambling is a disease. Given the relatively small number of 
subjects in each group, especially GA members, one may be a 
little hesitant in disclaiming such a pervasive conception. 
Another reason for caution is that the tests used are not 
clinical in nature so clinical interpretions should be 
guarded. At a speculative level, it has implications not 
just for treatment practices in pathological gambling but 
also for alcoholism since, in the main, the paradigm of 
pathological gambling has been modelled on alcoholism. It 
may be convenient to comply with the disease conception but 
the fact that no psychoactive agentis involved in 
pathological gambling must surely differentiate it from other 
forms of addiction. Perhaps, a new pa radi gm coul d eme rge as 
a result of the study of psychological addiction which does 
not include the confounding effects of external psychoactive 
agents. Gambling and jogging provide excellent examples for 
such research. 
The existence of personality factors associated with 
pathological gambling could be treated as being either the 
consequence or the cause of the aberrant behaviour. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to identify the characteristics 
that are associated for treatment and heuristic purposes. 
Much research in this area is required before any firm 
conclusions can be drawn. The use of varied test 
instruments, although making comparisons difficult, will 
provide a convergence of the true nature of the personality 
of gamblers, provide that strict sampling procedures are 
followed. 
The present findings indicate that non-clinical 
personality tests such as the 16 PF do not differentiate 
between groups of 'normals' (non-gamblers), non-problematic, 
social gamblers and pathological gamblers. There was a near 
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significant difference between gamblers and both non-gamblers 
and GA members in terms of the I-E scores. The only 
significant difference between the three groups was on the N 
scale of the EPQ, showing that GA members are greater 
'worriers' than the other two groups. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GENDER, LOCUS OF 
CONTROL, LUCK, REINFORCEMENT AND GAMBLING. 
Introduction 
Studies on risk-taking and gambling in the laboratory 
have mainly concentrated on the stimulus features of gambling 
including: probabilities, variances, expected and subjective 
expected values and utilities, and risks of gambles (Edwards, 
1953, 1954a, b, c; 1955; Coombs & Pruitt, 1960; Lichtenstein, 
1 965; T ve r sky, 1 967; Wall a c h & Win g, 1 968; S job erg, 1 968; 
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; Slovic, 1969a, b; Lichtenstein et 
a1., 1969; Lindman, 1971; Payne & Braunstein, 1971; Nygren, 
1977; Hatano & Inagaki, 1977; Coombs, Donnell & Kirk, 1978; 
Aschenbrenner, 1978; Montgomery & Adelbratt 1982). Small 
amounts of money or chips that are later exchanged for money 
usually constitute the stakes in the gamble. The behavioural 
indices associated with these experiments frequently involve 
subjects· assessment of the worth of the given gambles in 
terms of the choice of pairs or sets of gambles selected. 
The bidding price for the more attractive gamble or the 
selling price for the unattractive gambles have also been 
ways of determining their value. 
It is generally agreed that predictive behaviour on any 
given trial is a function of results of the preceding trials 
(Jarvik, 1951; Nicks, 1959; Anderson, 1968; Anderson & 
( 
Whalen, 1960). In the same vein, \Myers & Fort (1963) were I 
able to show that choice behaviour is largely a function ofl 
i 
expectancies generated by the preceding pattern of events 
--j 
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(responses as well as stimuli). This suggests that the 
memory of previous circumstances may play an important role 
in decision-making. In a gambling situation, Gilovich (1983) 
showed that his subjects, in a recall task three weeks later, 
were able to remember their' losses' better than their 
'wins'~ The relationship between sequential behaviour and 
/ 
the recall of other parameters of gambling: the amount of 
money staked and the amount won or lost has yet to be 
studied. The effect of the outcomes of gambles, such as the 
hands that were dealt in poker and blackjack, the numbers 
that turned up on throws of dice, and the like, is another 
unexplored area. It has been found that the level of arousal 
has consequences for recall in learning and memory 
experiments (Walker, 1967; Folkard, 1980; Folkard & Monk, 
1980). Such studies have been reviewed in Eysenck (1977) and 
they generally support the hypothesis that a heightened 
arousal is detrimental to short term retention. It is 
considered that this framework may be useful in understanding 
the nature of the cognitive processes involved in gambling 
behaviour. (Gambling may be conceptualized as a process which 
produces fluctuations in the basal level of arousal. Events 
such as the number of wins and losses encountered and the 
degree of uncertainty in the situation may bring about a 
change in the level of arousal which alters the perception 
and attribution of previous event~~ 
I 
A number of other factors have been studied in relation 
to gambling behaviour. The results of sex differences and 
locus of control research in a gambling context have 
generally proved inconclusive. The notion of luck was 
thoroughly analysed by Cohen and his associates in the late 
sixties but their investigations did not extend to the role 
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which luck plays in gambling. This would be a logical 
progression from Cohen's research in light of the frequent 
associations of luck to gamblers and gambling behaviour. The 
rest of this section will involve a review of the major 
studies of these factors in a gambling context. 
Sex differences 
Studies of sex differences in choice behaviour have 
generally concentrated on the preference for skill or chance 
activities by males and females (Schneider, 1968; Deaux, 
White 8. Farris, 1975; Karabenick 8. Eddy. 1979; Karabenick, 
Sweeney, 8. Penrose, 1983). Schneider (1968) showed that 
males who scored as more external on a forced-choice 
revision of the internal-external locus of control scale' 
tended to prefer chance activities on the masculine and 
neutral skill activities when provided with previously 
categorised masculine, feminine and neutral chance/skill 
activities. For females, this relationship held only for the 
neutral and feminine activities. In both field and 
laboratory studies, Deaux et a!., (1975) found that males 
compared to females, showed a preference for games requiring 
skill and persisted longer at these games, while females 
preferred to select games in which the outcomes were largely 
determined by luck. 
Karabenick 8. Eddy (1979) concluded that, in general, 
females are more conservative and males more risky under 
chance conditions. Pursuing the same line of research, 
Karabenick et a!. I (1983) clarified the original findings. 
Men's skill preferences were higher than women's on a 
masculine task and women preferred skill more than did men on 
a femi ni ne task. Furt hermore I ski 11 vers us c hanc e 
3B 
preferences were likely to vary with changing conditions, 
thus it cannot be concluded that the differential preferences 
represent generalisable gender characteristics. I twas 
proposed that skill-chance preferences were primarily a 
function of the expectation of success on skill tasks, that 
is, skill tasks were more likely to be selected when 
expectations of success were high and when failure is 
expected, chance tasks were preferred. 
Research on sex differences in risk-taking is sparse. 
Kass (1964), in a study of decision-making behaviour in 
children aged 6, Band 10, found that boys chose the low and 
intermediate probabilities of payoff significantly more than 
girls. A similar result was obtained by Slovic (1966) with 
children aged 6 to16, that is, boys were bolder than girls. 
However, Kopfstein (1973) failed to replicate Slovic' s result 
with his 9-year old subjects and Jamieson (1969) did not find 
any significant sex differences on risk-taking behaviour in 
his 10 to 12-year olds. 
In the adult population, males in sexually homogeneous 
groups took more risks than females (Wallach, Kogan 8. Bern, 
1964; Bauer 8. Turner, 1969; Guttentag 8. Freed, 1971) whereas 
no differences between the sexes were reported in other 
studies using similar samples (Wallach, Kogan 8. Bern, 1962; 
Prui t t 8. Teger, 1969). At present, the results of available 
psychological research on sex differences in risk-taking 
remain equivocal. 
Sociological surveys by Downes et a1., (1976) on a 
cross-section of British society indicated a number of 
interesting sex differences. For example, in terms of 
regular participation, in comparison with women, twice the 
number of men bet on football pools, eight and a half times 
the number of men go to betting shops, men are 23 times more 
likely to bet privately, and about 16 times more men than 
women take part in pub games. On the other hand, in bingo, 
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women and men participate equally, although it is commonly 
thought that bingo sessions are frequented mainly by females. 
Three times as many women indulge in casino gaming than men 
but with generally lower stakes than men. Moreover, on the 
other side of the Atlantic, Herman noted that slot machine 
gamblers are disproportionally made up of persons who are 
poor, women, older, and small stake bettors. Shapiro (1982) 
also observed that there are more women playing slot machines 
than men but the relationship is reversed for the game of 
craps. Thus, it is clear that differences in gender 
preference in gambling activities exist. However, it must be 
remembered that the data were obtained from a survey and any 
causal inferences should be made with caution. Plausible 
sociological explanations have been suggested to account for 
the findings, including; the role of educational attainment, 
pursuit of hobbies, social class, work experience and the 
like (Downes et al., 1976). 
It may also be interpreted that the amount of 
participation in the various forms of gambling is 
differentiated along sex roles in the traditional family. 
The relatively higher number of females indulging in 
'cheaper' gambling activities such as betting on football 
pools or bingo may reflect an aspect of the familial system, 
that is, the man as the income earner and the woman as the 
house-keeper. Not controlling the income decreases the 
a c c e sst 0 mo n e Y lit s dis t rib uti 0 nan d ex pen d i t u re, res u It i n g 
in limited funds and possibly less choice in gambling 
activities. The gap in the occupational status and wealth 
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between the sexes has narrowed considerably in recent years 
and could very well alter the gambling patterns. 
In general, studies have indicated that males tend to 
take greater risks than females. Males also appear to prefer 
skill tasks and females prefer chance tasks. A number of 
variables seem to be influential in the choice of tasks 
including; gender appropriateness of the tasks, expectationsi 
1 
\ 
of success and failure, social class, educational attainment l, 
and motivation (Atkinson, 1957; Littig, 1963) of the 
participants. These factors should be noted in the design 
and interpretation of risk-taking and gambling experiments. 
The use of the concept of luck in the literature often 
refers to a chance situation on a skill-chance continuum. 
This is an interesting notion of luck which will be discussed 
in a later section along with a review of the generalised 
expectancy for the internal and external control of 
reinforcement construct. The primary aim of this section is 
to examine the extent to which personal characteristics may 
be associated with a conception of luck embodying divine 
properties. The notion of luck or fate customarily 
accompanies discussions on gamblers and gambling. 
Psychoanalysts are no exception. Bergler (1958) affi rmed 
that, 
The gambler is apparently the last optimist; he is a 
creature totally unmoved by experience.. .. There is 
nothing more tragic than the gambler who has lost his 
last dollar and is still convinced that he will • surelyf 
wi n a fort une, if onl y he can get hold of the money to 
tide him through this temporary run of bad luck. Every 
gambler gives the impression of a man who has signed a 
contract with fate, stipulating that persistence must be 
rewarded. 
41 
Bergler (1958) himself seemed to accept that luck is not 
merely a belief, stating that, "Without luck, success, is 
impossible. But luck alone is not enough. Only the 
combination of luck-pIus-personal initiative spells success." 
Bergler further asserted that the man who is a failure will 
lay heavy stress on the element of luck when he is forced to 
concede a competitor's success. As an anonymous writer put 
it, "Good luck is the lazy man's estimate of a worker's 
success." (cited in Bergler, 1958). 
In his analyses of gambling, Greenson (1947) noted that 
neurotic gambling has two crucial components: (1) The 
neurotic gambler feels happy and hopes each time he will be 
rewarded, despite all intellectualisation to the contrary 
and, (2) The neurotic gambler is impelled to test his luck or 
fate. Consciously or unconsciously, he believes in his right 
to ask fate for special privileges, he mistakes his strong 
yearnings for omnipotence for the feeling that he is, in fact 
omni potent. Greenson added that luck and fate are derived 
from mother and/or father images. 
Veblen (1899) asserted that, 
The chief factor. in the gambling habit is the belief in 
luck; and this belief is apparently traceable, at least 
. in its elements, to a stage in human evolution antedating 
the predatory culture .... In its simplest form the 
belief in luck is the instinctive sense of an inscrutable 
telelogical propensity in objects or situations. 
Cohen (1960) also acknowledged that the concept of luck 
is more basic or 'primi ti ve' than the practice of gambling. 
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He went on to suggest that, 
all our decisions and predictions are guided or governed, 
implicitly if not explicitly, by what we imagine luck or 
unluck might bring and not merely on cold-blooded 
calculations ... what we imagine might happen if we were 
lucky or unlucky would shape our belief in the outcome 
that would occur if we were neither particularly lucky 
nor particularly unlucky. Furthermore, realistic and 
unrealistic expectations could coexist in mutual 
interaction. 
In a series of empirical studies on luck, Cohen and his 
associates uncovered some illuminating results. According to 
Cohen & Christensen (1970), our reliance on luck seems to 
vary inversely with the level of our performance, achievement 
or good fortune. As things get worse we are apt to 'coerce' 
them to improve, by a reliance on luck or by an omnipotence 
of wi sh. In earlier experiments, Cohen (1960) showed that 
our expectation of success is determined firstly by the 
difficulty of the task. The luck aspect plays only a 
secondary role: when the task seems very easy we believe we 
shall nearly always succeed, however unlucky we are. In 
contrast, when the task seems extraordinarily difficult we 
think we shall always fail however fortunate we might be. At 
intermediate degrees of subjective difficulty, we tend more 
toward the point of maximum uncertainty of success, and our 
lucky or unlucky estimates then depart more and more from 
realistic ones. When the lucky or unlucky estimates for 
difficult tasks are similar, the corresponding realistic 
estimates will also be similar. However, luck or unluck are 
not thought of as affecting performance symmetrically about a 
realistic average. The decrement expected to occur as a 
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result of unluck is three times as great as the increment 
luck is expected to bring; the discrepancy is nearly as great 
between the increment due to 'very lucky' and the decrement 
due to 'very unlucky'. 
There also seems to be a sex difference in the belief in 
luck. In a survey of 200 Training College students and 
Grammar School boys aged about 15, more women students felt 
lucky than their male counterparts in a chance task, for 12 
percent of females compared with 7 percent of the males 
believed that they would draw the winning ticket (Cohen, 
1960) . 
I n are c en t stu d y, T e i g en (1 983 d) demo n s t rat edt hat 
economic factors like cost, profit and loss, are central for 
the assessment of good and bad luck. Contrary to 
expectation, the probability of success did not appear to be 
of any importance whatsoever. Teigen suggested that luck may 
not be related to degrees of probability at all, but to 
amount of chance, that is, to the degree the individual 
himself is unable to control or predict the 'lucky' or the 
'unlucky' outcomes. 
The idea of luck is ubiquitous but is by no means 
simple, in that it means different things to different people 
(Cohen, 1960). Luck also seems to assert varying influences 
under a variety of circumstances. The belief in luck and its 
potency is most prevalent under chance conditions and other 
situations of uncertainty. This may help explain why luck is 
so commonly accepted as an integral part of gambling in the 
Ii terature. 
Locus of control 
When a reinforcement is percieved by the subject as 
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following some action of his own but not entirely 
contingent upon his actions, then, in our (Western) 
culture it is typically perceived as a result of luck, 
chance, fate, as under the control of powerful others, or 
as unpredictable because of the great complexity of 
forces surrounding him. When the event is interpreted in 
this way by an individual, we labelled this a belief in 
external control. If a person perceives that the event 
is contingent upon his behaviour or his relatively 
permanent characteristics, we have termed this a belief 
in internal control. 
Rotter (1966). 
For the sake of brevity the former will be referred to 
as external and the latter as internal but it should be noted 
that the control refers to that of the expectancy of 
reinforcement as effected by the individual's behaviour. 
Following Rotter (1966), research into the construct of 
a locus of control of generalised expectancy of reinforcement 
has been extensive. Hence, the present discussion will be 
limited to the relationship of the construct with information 
utilisation, choice and preference in skill/chance tasks, and 
ri sk-taki ng. In an early study, Phares (1957) found that the 
expectancy of control influences the way individuals behave. 
Changes in the numbers of poker chips wagered were 
significantly greater when subjects received skill than when 
they received chance instructions. There was more shifting 
of expectancies among skill-instructed subjects, but 
chance-instructed subjects tended to make more 'unusual 
shifts', that is, subjects given chance directions responded 
as if each success reduced a finite supply of luck and after 
failure the likelihood of success increased. James 8. Rotter 
(1958) confirmed Phare's findings that perception of control 
predicted the manner in which people would respond to their 
performance outcomes. 
In terms of the relationship between locus of control 
and the desire for information, Seeman & Evans (1962) showed 
that internals avail themselves of information, even if it 
has negative consequences for themselves, more than do 
externals. It has been assumed that internals believe that 
they can act on their own behalf and therefore require more 
information, while externals more readily accept dependency 
on more competent others and thus have less need for 
information. In another study, Phares (1968) compared 
internals and externals in their use of information for 
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decision-making. He concluded that internals make better use 
of information than externals in spite of the fact that both 
might have equivalent funds of information. Williams & Stack 
(1972) and DuCette & Wolk (1973) have found evidence that 
internals are quicker at extracting cues that will facilitate 
the making of accurate judgements than are externals. They 
were also able to show that the former are capable of better 
recall of performances and are more likely to make better use 
of information for drawing estimates of their subsequent 
performances than are the latter. 
To summarise, most research supports the assumed 
relationship between locus of control and cognitive activity. 
Whether the focus has been on attention, deliberation, 
inquisitiveness or utilisation of information, internals have 
more often been found to be active and alert individuals than 
are externals. 
There have been a number of studies investigating the 
relationship between risk-taking behaviour and locus of 
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control but only a few have emphasised economic or actual 
gambling in relation to the construct. For example, high and 
low scorers in locus of control did not yield significant 
differences in an ethical risk-taking task (Krauss & 
Blanchard, 1970). With risk-taking under novel conditions 
(Newman, 1977) and using Kogan and Wallach problems (Baron, 
1968), results indicated that externals were more 
conservative in the former study and more daring in the 
latter study. Using a board-game (Jeopardy) and a card-game 
where the outcomes were perceived to depend on skill and 
chance respectively, Lupfer & Jones (1971) found that 
decisions made under a skill orientation were marked by a 
higher mean level of risk and a less variable pattern of risk 
than decisions made under a chance situation. 
Li verant & Scodel (1960) proposed that internally 
controlled persons were conceptualised as persons who attempt 
to maintain control in chance-dominated situations by a 
cautious and planned selection of probabilities, whereas 
externally controlled persons decide according to 'hunches' 
or previous outcomes. In a dice gambling game the main 
difference between internals and externals was that internals 
chose significantly more intermediate and fewer low 
probability bets than externals. Significantly more 
internals than externals never selected an extreme high or 
low probability bet, the amount of money wagered on safe as 
against risky bets was significantly greater for internals, 
and there was a tendency for internals to be less variable in 
the choice of alternatives. In other words, in a chance 
situation internals are more conservative. 
Several studies have indicated that people are Willingl 
i 
to take greater risks when they feel that they have controlJ 
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over the outcomes of their decisions (skill orientation) than 
when they feel that the outcomes of their decisions are due 
to forces beyond their control (chance orientation). Cohen 
(19613) provided illustrations of a variety of contexts in 
which subjects preferred risk-taking situations where the 
possibility of control existed. Littig (1962), using a 
pinball machine, and Strickland et a1., (1966) using dice, 
also obtained results which suggested that a skill 
orientation may lead to greater risk-taking than a chance 
(,orientation. However, in an analysis of subjects' economic 
decisions, Higbee & Streufert (1969) noted that those 
subjects who perceived that conditions in the simulated 
environment were due to their decisions tended to take fewer 
risks than subjects who perceived that conditions were due to 
forces beyond their control. 
In summary, in risk-taking research, the results appear 
inconclusive as to whether internals or externals take more 
ri sks. The situation is further confounded by the 
observation that both internals and externals respond 
differently to skill or chance activities (Rotter & Mulry, 
1 965; J a me s , 1 957 cit e din L e f c 0 u r t , 1 976; J u 1 ian & Kat z , 
1968; Leftcourt, Lewis & Si 1 verman, 1968; Lefcourt & Telegdi, 
1971>. In general, it is accepted that under chance 
conditions externals are more daring and under skill 
conditions internals take more risks. The finding that 
internals become more conservative under chance conditions 
while at the same time externals taking slightly greater 
risks under chance compared to skill conditions may tend to 
exaggerate the difference in the risk-taking propensity 
between internals and externals. 
Rationale for the use of locus of control scales. 
Most of the scales in the assessment of the locus of 
control (examples, James' I E Scale, Rotter's I-E Scale, 
Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale, and others- see 
Lefcourt, 1976) are intended as a very broad measure of 
generalised expectancies. As such, Rotter (1975) suggested 
that the I-E scales allow for more accurate behavioural 
predictions in psychological situations which are novel 
and/or ambiguous for the individual. Monetary risk-taking 
behaviour as a dependent variable is used to assess the 
relationship of a particular construct of uncertainty and 
that of locus of control. 
Research on recall in relation to risk-taking and locus 
of control is sparse and the influence of memory in 
risk-taking has so far been neglected. It is proposed that 
information concerning the financial situation and luck 
status of individuals during a gambling session is likely to 
bias betting and perhaps recall behaviour as well. Thi sis 
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especially pertinent in sequential gambling which is probably 
more typical of gambling outside the laboratory. 
A survey of the literature reveals a great number of 
inconsistencies and unanswered questions. There are many 
variables that seem to be important in influencing gambling 
behaviour. An attempt was made in this experiment to 
determine the relationship between gender, locus of control, 
effects of luck information and recall of certain aspects of 
the gambling event, as well as the risk attached to such 
gambles. It was hypothesised that: 
1. In line with previous research and social expectation 
males will take more risks than females. 
2. In a predominantly chance-determined gambling task 
externals will take more risks than internals. 
3. Subjects will take more risks under a favourable schedule 
of reinforcement than under an unfavourable schedule. 
4. When informed of their luck subjects will take more risks 
when told to expect good luck and fewer when bad luck is 
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forecast. Under ordinary luck condition (what is expected on 
a usual day) no change in risk-taking behaviour will be 
expected whether the subjects are informed or not (These two 
hypotheses were formulated on the assumption that subjects 
try to maximise their wins). 
5. No difference in recall is predicted between males and 
females. 
6. Internals are predicted to have better recall than 
externals since they have been shown to be more attentive and 
to utilise information more efficiently. 
7. Recall of gambling events will be better under poor 
reinforcement conditions. Gilovich (1983) showed that 
subjects remembered losses better, at least in the long term, 
and made the assumption that aversive events (losses) were 
more salient and thus better retained in memory. 
8. Information on luck will increase the saliency of the 
outcome which should promote greater retention of the events 
occurring in the gambling session resulting in more accurate 
recall. 
Method 
Subjects 
The Rotter's I-E Scale was administered to 56 psychology 
undergraduates during laboratory sessions as a survey on the 
attitudes of students. The students were informed, on 
completion of the questionnaire, that they might be 
approached later to participate in a gambling experiment. 
After scoring the questionnaires, subjects who scored 
high were put into one group and subjects who scored low into 
another group. Within each group 7 males and 7 females were 
matched as closely as possible on the I-E scores. To sharpen 
the differentiation between the high scorers and the low 
scorers, only the 28 students who scored in the extremes were 
included. Although there was an overall tendency for the 
male students to score lower than female students on the I-E 
scale it was possible to obtain two sexually homogeneous 
groups in terms of I-E scores. The mean age for the whole 
sample of 28 was 19.7, ranging from 18 to 23 years. The mean 
I-E score for the 7 low females (LF) was 8.6 and 15.7 for the 
high females (HF). The mean score for the 7 low males (LM) 
was 8.4 and 15.1 for the 7 high males (HH). 
Experimental manipulations 
Four independent variables were introduced in the 
ex per i me n t : (1) g end e r 0 f the sub j e c t s , (2) 1 0 c u s 0 f con t r 0 1 , 
(3) fortune - neutral, good and bad and, (4) availability of 
i nforma ti on - informed of ordi nary, good and bad 1 uck, and 
not informed. 
Subjects were grouped into high or low locus of control 
and gender with equal numbers in each cell. They were then 
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presented with 7 blocks of 15 gambling trials each. The 
number of reinforcements or payoffs resulting from the bets 
was varied systematicallY on the 7 blocks of trials (see 
Appendix 5). These schedules of reinforcements will be 
referred to, from here on, as the fortune conditions. On 
'neutral' fortune conditions subjects received 8 payoffs, 11 
payoffs on good fortune conditions and 6 payoffs 
characterised the bad fortune conditions. 
On the first 3 blocks of trials subjects were not told 
anything but on the next 4 blocks of trials subjects were 
instructed that they may experience ordinary, bad, good, and 
bad luck respectively. Table 3 depicts a summary of the 
experimental manipulations. 
Tabl e 3. Summary of the e xpe rime nt al mani pul a t ions of 
the payoffs and the luck information presented. 
Blocks of 15 Number of payoffs Luck information 
trials in each block 
1 8 
2 1 1 > not informed 
3 6 
4 8 
5 8 ( REJECTED) 
6 1 1 > informed 
7 6 
Condition 5 is the condition in which subjects were 
informed that they may experience bad luck when in actual 
fact they were given reinforcements which constituted an 
ordinary luck condition. Although condition 5 was presented 
to every subject it was excluded from all analyses since it 
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was felt later that one misinformed condition was inadequate 
for making valid statistical comparisons. The inclusion of 
condition 5 also preserved the order of presentation of the 
conditions such that the 7 subjects in each of the 4 sex by 
locus of control cells were randomly assigned to start the 
experiment in one of the 7 different payoff blocks. 
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To reiterate, fortune refers to the reinforcement or 
payoffs received and luck is only relevant when subjects were 
informed, that is, conditions 4, 6 and 7. 
Procedure 
Subjects took part in the experiment in a room 2m by 3m 
in size. The first experimenter, seated on the the same side 
of the screen as the subject, provided him/her with all of 
the instructions and presented the stimulus information for 
the gambl es. 
Subjects were informed that they would be given $2 to 
gamble in a dice game and that they could keep the balance at 
the end of the game. They were asked to treat the situation 
as they would if they were actually gambling. Subjects were 
also told that a choice of two numbers ranging from 1 to 6 
would be called out from which they have to choose one. For 
each trial the subjects were required to choose a bet from a 
given pair with a constant 4-cent difference (Appendix 6). 
Subjects were instructed to recall the followi.ng 
information after every block of 15 trials: 
1. The a mo u n t the y s t a ked g i vi n g the tot a 1 0 f the fir s t , 
second, and third group of 5 trials (Appendix 7), 
2. The amount of money they won or lost for the whole 15 
trials totalled up (Appendix 8), 
3. Their choice of numbers on each trial and, 
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4. The number of times each die number turned up. 
A set of 3 dice were shaken and' thrown' for each trial. 
The rolls of the dice were predetermined and were randomly 
generated by a TRS-8S micro-processor. All subjects were 
given the same set of 3 numbers except when they were 
supposed to strike a 'win' I in which case the second 
experimenter, behind the screen, would arrange the die or 
dice (since the subject could have one or more wins on each 
trial), to show the numbers that were supposedly thrown 
(Appendix 5 and 6). The throwing of the dice was simulated 
by shaking and throwing a second set of dice behind the 
screen. The pace of the experiment was such that the second 
experimenter could arrange and present the dice without the 
subjects suspecting that the dice were being manipulated. 
Three dice were then shown to the subjects for approximately 
3 seconds and a 'win' or 'loss' would be called out by the 
experimenter organising the dice. Before 4 of the 7 blocks 
of 15 trials subjects were given additional information -
that they may experience some patches of good, bad or 
ordinary luck - according to the experimental information 
conditions. For the other blocks of trials the subjects were 
simply told nothing. At the conclusion of the gambling 
trials subjects were verbally presented with 6 questions 
regarding certain features of the gambling session (Appendix 
9) • 
Results 
The results were analysed by a 2 (locus of control -
low, high) x 2 (sex - male, female) x 3 (fortune - neutral, 
good, bad) x 2 (i nforma t ion - i nforme d ordi nar y, good, bad 
and not informed) analysis of variance for repeated measures. 
Risk-taking 
In this experiment risk was defined as the number of 
higher bets chosen out of the two given bets in each trial. 
In analyses of the risk-taking measure the most prominent 
effect resulted from the fortune manipulation. A summary of 
the group means of the higher stakes chosen or risk-taking is 
given in Tables 4 and the ANOVA summary table is available in 
Appendix 10. 
Table 4. Group means of the higher stakes chosen by 
subjects under the various experimental condi ti ons. 
Locus of control High High Low Low 
Sex Females Males Females Males 
Information Fortune 
Yes Neutral 6. 14 8. 00 7. 57 8. 71 
Yes Good 5. 43 6. 57 6. 86 9. 71 
Yes Bad 5. 71 8. 14 7.00 8. 42 
No Neutral 6. 86 7. 86 8. 71 10. 43 
No Good 5. 43 7. 43 9. 14 9.29 
No Bad 5, 43 6, 00 4, 14 5. 43 
The highest amount of risk was taken under conditions of 
both neutral and good fortunes compared to significantly more 
conservative betting made under bad fortune F( 2, 48) = 10.5, 
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p == e. eee2. The situation is further clarified by the 
s i g n i f i can tin t era c t ion 0 f for tun e by i n for ma t ion F ( 2, 48) == 
5.9, P = e.0eS, as shown in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2. The amount of risk taken under the neutra1._good 
and bad l;1ayoff conditions when sUbjects were 
informed thet they mey eXQerlence ordinery,_good 
or bed luck, or when not informed about their luck. 
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The graphs show that when subjects were not informed, an 
equivalent amount of risk was taken in all three fortune 
condi t ions. However, when informed that they were going to 
experience different luck circumstances subjects increased 
the number of high bets when told they might experience good 
luck and decreased the number of high bets when told they 
might experience bad luck. 
There was a trend for males (mean = 8.1) to choose 
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higher stakes than females (mean = 6.3) but the difference is 
not significant. In terms of the overall success for the 
whole gambling session none of the four criterion groups 
performed any better than the others. The overall mean 
balance at the end of the sessions was $1.72 and the means 
associ ate d wi t h the groups were: H H == $1·7 13 I L H == $ 1 , 7 9, H F == 
$1,64, LF == $1.73, 
The only locus of control manipulation that produced a 
significant effect in the experiment is in the fortune by 
locus interaction (Figure 3), 
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Fig. 3. The amount of risk token under the neutrol,_good 
and bod p-oyoff conditions by internals and externals. 
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Externals, on the whole, were unaffected by the 
different fortunes they were encountering as shown by the 
fairly uniform willingness to take risks under the varying 
reinforcement schedules. In contrast, internals varied their 
risk-taking according to the differential fortunes, taking 
more risks under neutral and good fortune and exhibiting 
restraint under bad fortune conditions. 
Recall 
Several analyses of variance for repeated measures were 
performed to assess the effects of the experimental 
manipulations on recall. A number of indices were available 
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and it was decided that the following would be most relevant. 
These included the stimulus and response aspects of gambling, 
that is, input into and outcomes of gambling. In the context 
of this experiment these translate into the recall, for each 
block of 15 trials, of: 
1. The numbers chosen by the subjects, 
2. The most and least frequently occurring number, 
3. Estimation accuracy of the amount of money staked and, 
4. The estimation accuracy of the amount of money won or lost 
during the gambling session. 
1. The numbers chosen by subjects to place their 
bets on. 
In this ANOYA the data for the winning and losing trials 
are separated to test for any effect of wins and losses on 
the recall accuracy. The group means are presented in Table 
5 below and the results of the ANOYA are available in 
Appendix 11. 
Table 5. Group means of the accuracy of recall of 
the numbers chosen by subjects to place their bets 
on (in percentages). 
Locus of control 
Females 
High High 
Female Hale 
Low Low 
Female Hale 
H 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
F 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
54. 1 
59. 1 
54. 3 
59. 3 
45. 9 
62. 9 
76. 1 
513. 3 
65. 7 
46. 8 
46. 6 
62. 9 
62. 13 
38. 9 
47. 1 
513. 3 
59. 1 
57. 1 
71. 4 
613. 8 
65.7 
59.3 
513.3 
54. 3 
58. 9 
57.13 
48. 6 
57. 3 
61 . 1 
63. 9 
64. 3 
52. 1 
71 . 4 
43. 13 
62.6 
65. 7 
W (1 = winning trials, 2 = losing trials) 
63. 6 
42. 8 
61. 4 
53. 8 
65. 3 
64. 3 
52. 4 
55. 7 
57. 1 
49. 1 
46.6 
62.9 
I - (1 informed of luck status, 2 = not informed of 
luck status) 
F - (1 = neutral fortune, 2 = good fortune, 3 = bad 
fortune) 
The fortune main effect was statistically significant 
F( 2, 48) = 4.6, P == 13.132 (The percentage of correct recall 
were, neutral = 57%, good == 53%, and bad = 613%). Subjects 
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were able to recall more accurately the numbers they had 
chosen when experiencing bad payoffs and recall for the 
numbers was worst when encountering favourable payoffs. The 
percentage of numbers correctly recalled was in between these 
two extremes under conditions of neutral reinforcement. 
The r e was, howe ve r , a s i g n i f i can t for tun e by i n for rna t ion 
interaction F( 2, 48) :: 5.19, P = 0.01, shown in Figure 4. 
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Whether subjects were told that they would experience 
good or bad luck did not seem to affect their recall 
accuracy. Instead, a significant result stemmed mainly from 
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the normal luck condition. Simply being told that they might 
experience ordinary luck decreased the recall accuracy. 
2. The most and least frequently occurring number. 
The next analysis looked at the accuracy of the recall 
of the number that appeared most frequently. Group means of 
the data are presented below in Table 6 with the ANOVA 
summary in Appendix 12. 
Table 6. The mean recall accuracy" of the most 
frequentlY occurring number. 
Locus of control High High Low Low 
Sex Female Male Female Male 
Information Fortune 
Yes Neutral -0.7 -3. 0 -4. 0 -2.6 
Yes Good -1. 6 -3. 4 -4.6 -2.4 
Yes Bad -3. 6 -4.3 -3,3 -3. 9 
No Neutral - 4. 1 -3. 9 -2. 7 -3. 9 
No Good -4. 7 -6. 1 -3.6 -2. 4 
No Bad -2. 9 -5. 6 -3.5 -1. 6 
*The mean recall accuracy was obtained from the mean 
occasions of actual appearances of each individual number of 
the dice thrown subtracted from the mean estimated occasions 
of the dice numbers that turned up. A negative number 
indicates under-estimation. (A number of FORTRAN programs 
were required to transformed the data before they could be 
analysed by the BMD statistical package.) 
It is interesting to note that subjects under-estimated 
the number of times the most frequently occurring number 
appeared in all the different conditions. The results with 
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the recall data of the number which appeared most frequently 
showed that a significant difference in the interaction of 
information by locus of control F(1, 24) = 8.6, P = 0.007. 
The interaction is depicted in Figure 5. 
Fig. 5. Recell of the most frequently occurring number in the 
gembles by internels end externels when informed of 
ordinary, good or bad luck and when they were not 
informed of their luck. 
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The interaction shows that high I-E scorers 
significantly under-estimated the number of the die that 
turned up most frequently when they were informed but 
performed equally well when they were not informed of any 
possible variation of luck. None of the other manipulations 
produced any significant effects. 
The next analysis involved the recall of the least 
frequently occurring number. Table 7 below gives the means 
of the 4 criterion groups in the different conditions and an 
ANOVA summary table is included in Appendix 13. 
61 
Table 7. The mean recall accuracy of the least 
frequently occurring n umbe r. 
Locus of control High High Low Low 
Sex Female Hale Female Male 
Information Fortune 
Yes Neutral 1 . 7 1 . 4 3. 6 4.6 
Yes Good 3. 3 2. 7 4. 7 3. 9 
Yes Bad 3. 2 1 . 9 3. 6 4. 1 
No Neutral 13.5 2. 1 4.13 3. 4 
No Good 2. 3 4. 4 4. 1 3. 7 
No Bad 3. 5 3. 9 3. 1 4. 13 
All the values in the table are positive which means 
that, as opposed to the previous table, subjects, when 
required to recall the least frequently occurring number, 
over-estimated in every condition. A significant locus main 
effect was present F( 1, 23) = 9.5, P = 13.13135. Internals 
(mean = 3.9) recalled the least occurring number 
significantly better than externals (mean = 2.6). 
3. The accuracy of estimation of the amount of money 
staked. 
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The following two analyses deal with the recall of means 
of gambl i ng. The first analysis looks at the estimation 
accuracy of the amount of money staked. The means of the 
groups are presented in Table 8 and the associated ANOVA 
summary table is available in Appendix 14. 
Table 8. The mean estimation accuracy of the amount 
of money staked. '" 
Locus of control 
Sex 
Information Fortune 
Yes Neutral 
Yes Good 
Yes Bad 
No Neutral 
No Good 
No Bad 
High High 
Female Male 
25.6 13. 2 
20. 7 7. 8 
33. 3 17. 4 
31. 0 16. 4 
25. 0 6. 0 
28. 0 7. 2 
Low 
Femal e 
-7. 0 
0. 7 
23. 7 
-2. 8 
9. 0 
28. 5 
Low 
Male 
-1. 5 
-5. 5 
8.0 
5. 2 
9. 7 
1 . 7 
"'The values in the table are derived from subtracting the 
mean estimated from the mean actual amount of money staked. 
Positive values, in this case, denote under-estimation and 
negative values represent over-estimation. 
"''''Due to faulty entry of the information by 8 sUbjects: 4HF, 
2HM, 1 LM and 1 HM, the results from this analysis should be 
treated with caution. 
The analysis of variance shows that internals (mean = 
5.8) were significantly more accurate than externals (mean 
19.3) in estimating the amount of money staked F( 1, 24) = 
4.7, p = 0.04. 
4. The estimation accuracy the amount of money 
won/lost during the gambling session. 
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The final analysis on the recall data is on the accuracy 
in estimating the amount of money won/lost during the 
gambling session. The group means of the estimation accuracy 
are shown in Table 9 and the corresponding ANOVA summary can 
be found in Appendix 15. 
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Table 9. The accuracy of subjects' estimation of the 
amount of money won/lost during the gambling session. 
Locus of control High High Low Low 
Sex Female Male Female Male 
Information Fortune 
Yes Neutral -12.6 36. 6 12. 7 -5.6 
Yes Good -57.6 26. 1 -34.7 -26. 3 
Yes Bad 9. 3 25.9 5. 0 -5. 3 
No Neutral -23. 0 -1 8. 1 - 21. 7 -32. 1 
No Good -50.0 -22. 0 -17.9 -31.0 
No Bad -9. 6 17. 7 -7.4 5. 1 
The figures in the table represent the subjects' mean 
estimate subtracted from the actual amount of money won/lost. 
A positive value denotes an under-estimation and a negative 
value denotes an over estimation. 
Several significant effects were detected in the ANOVA 
of the above data. The fortune main effect shows that 
subjects, when given favourable payoffs, largely 
over estimated their performance in terms of their wins and 
losses F(2, 48) = 17.9, P = 13.1313131. Subjects in the neutral 
and bad fortune conditions were relatively accurate in 
estimating the outcomes of their gambling. The other 
significant main effect resulting from the ANOVA was 
information F( 1, 24) = 5.5, p = 13.133. Subjects informed of 
their luck tended to be less accurate, displaying greater 
over-estimation, while they only slightly over-estimated when 
not informed. There is also a significant fortune by 
information interaction F( 2, 48) = 5.2, p = 13.13139. The 
interaction shows that information of luck status did not 
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affect the subjects' estimation when they were encountering a 
poor payoff schedule but influenced the subjects towards 
over-estimation under neutral and favourable payoff schedules 
( Fi gure 6). 
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It can also be seen that a good reinforcement schedule 
by itself, without luck information, is enough to induce an 
over-estimation in the amount of money won or lost. 
Interpreting the results another way, information on luck has 
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the greatest effect when subjects were experiencing a neutral 
rei n for c e me n t s c he d u 1 e, t hat is, w hen sub j e c t sen co u n t e r 
roughly an equal number of wins and losses. Under such 
conditions of maximum uncertainty subjects exhibited a bias 
towards over estimation. 
The final significant relationship derived from this 
ANOVA was a sex by locus interaction F( 1, 24) = 4.5, p = 0.04 
(Figure 7). 
Fig. 7. Accurecy of estimetion for the 2 sexes: The meen of the 
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External males appear to estimate the outcomes of their 
gambles most accurately. Both internal males and females are 
biased towards over-estimation with the external females 
being the most inaccurate group, over-estimating twice as 
much as the internals. 
Post-experimental questionnaire survey. 
The final set of analyses involve data from the 
post-experimental questionnaire (Appendix 9), A chi square 
analysis of the nominal data (on questions 3 and 4) did not 
reveal any significant difference (Appendix 16 and 17). An 
analysis of variance of the remaining data yielded one 
significant result (Appendix 18). Table 10 below shows the 
group means of the subjects· ratings of being lucky or 
unlucky during the game. 
Table 10. Subj ect s' mean ratings of being lucky or 
unlucky during the gambling session. 
Sex 
Male Female 
Locus of High 5. 0 3, 1 
control Low 5. 0 3. 8 
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Males rated themselves differently from females in terms 
of thinking that they were lucky or unlucky F( 1, 27) = 12.5, 
P = 0.002. Hales rated themselves as having about average 
luck (5.0), whereas females appeared to feel disadvantaged, 
in terms of being unlucky. giving an average rating of 3.5. 
Discussion 
Risk-taking 
There was little difference in the risk taken under 
neutral or good reinforcement conditions although the number 
of high stakes chosen was greatest in the neutral fortune 
condition. It is difficult to explain why under neutral 
conditions, that is, payoffs about 50 percent of the time 
(which approximates the usual situation under chance 
conditions), subjects took the most risks compared to the 
other two conditions. The interaction between fortune and 
information sheds some light on the situation. It is clear 
that when subjects were not informed they were not inclined 
to be risky or conservative and took roughly an equivalent 
amount of risk in all three fortune conditions even though 
there was nearly twice the number of payoffs in the good 
compared to the bad fortune conditions. When informed that 
they were going to experience luck circumstances, subjects 
responded to the information by increasing or decreasing 
their number of high bets accordingly to maximise winnings. 
The shift in risk-taking was most obvious when subjects were 
informed of impending bad luck. One possible reason is that 
the perception of the influence of bad luck is not equivalent 
to that of good luck. The present result provides support 
for Cohen's (1960) finding that the decrement expected to 
occur as a result of bad luck is three times as great as the 
increment which good luck is expected to bring. 
One is still left with the question of why people are 
influenced by information on luck. Subjects were only told 
t ha t they mi ght expect to expe r i e nce good, bad, or ordi nary 
1 u c k. I non e sen s e , sub j e c t s ma y be be h a vi n g rat i on a 11 yin 
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maximising their winnings by using whatever information 
available. Perhaps in a situation of uncertainty, such as 
gambling, subjects are willing to utilise any available 
information to aid in their decision making. However, it 
must be remembered that the information concerned the 
possible presence of luck which is only an intangible entity. 
Thus, it appears that, similar to reactions in situations in 
learned helplessness (Abramson, Seligman 8. Teasdale, 1979), 
individuals can be made to become quite gullible by the 
introduction of an atmosphere of uncertainty. Although it 
might seem unethical this observed effect may be fruitfully 
incorporated into certain counselling procedures. 
The observed influences of luck instructions may be 
merely an example of experimenter demand characteristics 
(Orne, 1962). Cohen's (1960) series of experiments produced 
evidence which contradicted this position and showed that the 
belief in luck and its powers is very real and pervasive as 
indicated by the many instances of superstitious behaviours 
in everyday life. 
It seems that the various strategies adopted by the 
criterion groups did not affect the final outcome of the 
gambling session, that is, the end result of gambling was a 
fairly uniform loss of between 21 to 36 cents across all 
subjects. This lends some support to the assertions that 
psychological factors are also important in making gambling 
decisions. 
Internals, in this experiment, showed greater 
risk-taking tendencies and responded more appropriately (in 
terms of maximising wins) to the differing fortune conditions 
by risking more under neutral and good payoff schedules and 
displaying conservatism under poor payoff schedules. 
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Externals were conservative in all conditions relative to the 
internals. Indirectly this is contrary to results which 
indicated that high risk-takers (gamblers) are externally 
orientated (Moran, 1978a; Conrad, 1978). However, Slovic 
(1964) speculated that the internally controlled person might 
become more ego involved in risk-taking contexts than his 
externally controlled counterpart. Stri ckland et a1., (1966) 
hypothesised that the person who sees himself as 'master of 
his fate' might well employ this disposition in a gambling 
situation. I nstead of pl ayi ng a caut i ous game, he s houl d be 
more likely to try and outwit it, that is, commit the 
gambler's fallacy and be generally less consistently 
conservative. Likewise, the person who sees general outcomes 
as determined by factors outside his or her own control might 
well take the most conservative path in the hope that fate 
might not be too unkind. 
Evidence for the higher risk taken by internals was 
shown by internals choosing the higher stakes under neutral 
fortune condition in which there was no apparent advantage in 
doi ng so. Higher risk-taking responses under the good payoff 
condition could indicate that internals were able to work out 
that they were enjoying a favourable circumstance and 
capitalised on it. In other words, there is support that 
internals were more attentive to the environmental cues and 
are more interactive with them (Phares, 1968; Williams 8. 
Stack, 1972; DuCette 8. Wolk, 1973). 
Recall 
1. The numbers chosen by subjects to place their bets 
The recall of the numbers subjects had chosen to place 
their bets on was best when the payoff schedule was bad, 
worst when subjects were encountering favourable payoff 
schedules and in the neutral fortune condition the recall 
accuracy fell in between these two. This observation 
supports Gilovich's (1983) finding that losses in gambling 
are better remembered. Subjects' better recall under the 
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poor payoff schedule may be explained by the assertion that 
in order that losses be kept in check subjects had to be more 
attentive to the on-going gambling process. 
Information regarding luck status of the situation only 
affected subjects under the neutral fortune condition. The 
non-informed condition may be thought of as having the most 
uncertainty. It is suggested that subjects cope with such an 
arousing predicament by attempting to learn more about the 
state of affairs. The lower level of recall for the informed 
group indicates that the information given reduces the 
uncertainty of the situation thus lowering the arousal 
experienced. Information improves the recall of the numbers 
chosen under conditions which are more obviously favourable 
or unf a voura bl e. 
2. The most and least frequently occurring number. 
Externals who were informed of their luck expectations 
stood out as the group which under-estimated most compared to 
informed internals and both uninformed internals and 
externals. It seems that when externals, who already 
believed in a control of forces outside themselves, were told 
to expect a possible experience of luck they feel even more 
helpless and thus attend less to the environmental cues, in 
this instance, the number of times a particular number of the 
die that appeared. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that internals are more 
accurate at recall tasks than externals, internals showed 
greater over-estimation for the least frequently occurring 
number compared to externals. The saliency of the number 
that appeared least often is proposed to explain the 
di fference. Being more interactive with the world internals 
would find rare occurrences of a number more salient than 
externals, who have been shown in an earlier analysis, to be 
less responsive to environmental cues when gambling. 
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Hornseth (ci ted in Dale, 1959) and Attneave (1953) found 
that when people observed randomly generated events of 
different kinds and were afterwards required to report on the 
frequency with which each kind of event occurred, they tended 
to over-estimate the frequency of occurrence of infrequent 
events and under-estimate that of comparatively frequent 
ones. In a more recent study, Snyder (1978) concluded that 
both race-track betting public and expert handicappers 
under-estimate the chances of favourites while 
over-estimating the chances of success of the longer-odds 
horses. Good evidence of under and over estimation of 
frequently and infrequently occurring events can be seen from 
Tables 6 and 7 respectively. The present results also show 
that it is not a simple case of people tending to over or 
under-estimate occurrences that are determined in part by 
chance factors, but that internals tend to over-estimate the 
occurrences of low frequency events more than externals 
whereas both internals and externals are more prone to 
under-estimate the occurrences of high frequency events. 
Further research is required to clarify the relationship 
between the probability of occurrences and the accuracy of 
estimation of those events. 
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3. Estimation accuracy of the amount of money 
staked. 
As far as the estimation of the amount of money staked 
is concerned internals were more accurate than externals. 
Internals, with an assumed personal control over the 
situation, presumably would try to gather as much information 
as they can from the environment and act on the basis of 
those cues including keeping a better track of their bets. 
This would result in a smaller discrepancy between the actual 
amount of money staked and the estimates of the amount 
staked. Externals, on the other hand, did not take much 
notice of what they bet since they had resigned themselves to 
the influences of fate and chance. 
4. The estimation accuracy of the amount of money 
won/lost during the gambling session. 
Subjects informed of their luck status were less 
accurate, displaying greater oVer-estimation. Once again it 
may be that the uninformed group, faced with greater 
uncertainty, was forced to attend to the available cues which 
resulted in more exact estimation. Another possible 
explanation arises from the research on the illusion of 
control. When people are more certain of a future event they 7 
could experience an illusion of control (Lan~er, 1975; Langerj 
This perceived control might have reduced the & Roth, 1975). 
informed group's need for close attention to on-going events, 
eventuating in faulty appraisals of their performance. 
In the good and bad payoff conditions one can speculate 
that with greater deviations from the average chance returns 
(about 50 percent> from their bets, subjects tended to be 
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more wary of their performance. These unusual shifts from 
'normality' may warrant greater attention since if things get 
'too bad' subjects stand to lose an appreciable amount of 
money and if things 'go their way' then subjects are able to 
win a sUbstantial sum. Of the two eventualities, losing is a 
more worrisome prospect and this was reflected in the 
accuracy of the estimation- implying closer attention to the 
financial situation. Under good fortune conditions subjects 
appeared to be overcome by their success and probably exhibit 
'nonchalance' towards their available money in hand resulting 
in substantial over-estimation of the outcomes of their 
gambli ng. 
In both the good and bad fortune conditions the winning 
and losing experiences overshadowed the influences of luck 
information. The effect of no information or higher 
uncertainty induced a need for information. This provides a 
reasonable explanation for the over-estimation produced by 
the introduction of information in the neutral condition. 
The relatively accurate estimation of the uninformed group 
can be attributed to the maximum uncertainty of the 
situation, that is, no notification of the luck status and an 
even probability of winning and losing in the gambles. 
An interesting result is obtained in terms of sex 
difference and locus of control. External males recorded the 
most accurate estimation while both internal males and 
females over-estimated with external females over-estimating 
even more. With respect to age trends in the sex differences 
surveyed, Maccoby 8. Jacklin (1975) found that there is a 
tendency for young women of college age to lack confidence in 
their ability to do well on a new task, and feeling that they 
have less control over their own fates compared to their male 
counterparts. These trends are not seen among younger or 
older females. The authors suggested that this may be a 
result of the 'dating and mating game' where females 
traditionally playa more passive role and that this is a 
period of life where masculinity and femininity become most 
defined. These cultural stereotypes are prevalent in 
everyday interactions and their portrayal are widespread in 
the mass media. While this may explain the poorer 
performance of the female subjects the behaviour of external 
males is inconsistent with the locus of control data. 
Another possible explanation refers to the greater exposure 
of gambling experience for males than females which may 
account for the more accurate estimation by the external 
males (a possible association with gamblers who are assumed 
to perform better in gambling related activities). Both the 
better performance of internal males and females may be 
attributed to internals having superior recall and 
information utilisation to that of externals. 
The post-experimental survey, 
In the post-experimental questionnaire survey females 
thought they were more unlucky than males who thought that 
they were neither lucky nor unlucky. Since most subjects 
lost about an eighth of their given money females may be 
considered to be more influenced by an overall loss in the 
gambling session and that females felt that the gods were 
against them. Cohen (1960) found that the belief in being 
lucky was about 12 percent for females and 7 percent for 
males when asked before drawing a winning raffle ticket. 
This could reflect a general heavier reliance on luck by 
females which was again demonstrated in the present 
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experiment. On this occasion, however, it was an attribution 
of bad luck to account for the misfortune on the part of the 
females. 
Although subjects were not advised of their actual 
balance until the questionnaire was completed, the estimated 
amount of money won/loss after each block of 15 trials and 
informal post-experimental questionning revealed that every 
subject thought that he or she had lost between a quarter to 
half the original money. This may represent a tendency for 
individuals to become pessimistic under unfavourable 
situations and to over-rate their misfortune. 
One criticism of this experiment may be that of 
boredom-induced shifts of choices made by subjects during the 
session. Coombs & Pruitt (1960) showed that preferences 
among bets in a choice task were orderly under tedious 
experimental conditions. In addition, Slovic, Lichtenstein & 
Edwards (1965) suggested that shorter experimental sessions, 
individual administration and real gambling help prevent 
boredom-induced distortions in preferences. These 
recommendations were taken into account in the design of this 
experiment although the number of trials in each block could 
perhaps be reduced. The high degree of subject participation 
and subject-experimenter interaction provided a further 
improvement. The frequent breaks in gambling between blocks 
on 15 trials should markedly cut down boredom generated by 
the experimental situation. Post-experimental questionning 
revealed that two subjects felt a little suspicious about the 
randomness of the die-throws towards the end of the session. 
Only two subjects indicated any sign of boredom thereby 
signifying the relative success of the safe guards employed. 
A number of ANOVAs were performed on a sUbstantial 
77 
amount of data. In some sets of analyses only one out of 17 
experimental effects produced a significant F ratio. Some of 
these results should be treated with caution since at a 
conservative level one significant result out of twenty may 
be expected to have arisen from chance factors alone. I none 
of the ANOVAs the result of the estimation of the amount of 
money staked should be treated with reservation since the 
data of 8 out of 28 subjects had to be discarded due to 
errors made by subjects in entering the data onto the 
recording sheets. 
A discussion of the hypotheses. 
Overall the analyses of the data yielded a number of 
significant results. Females, in the present study, tended 
to be more conservative than their male counterparts but the 
difference was not statistically significant. Thus, 
hypothesis is not supported. The literature on sex 
differences in terms of risk-taking has focussed on a young 
population, that is, early teens and younger. The available 
research on university age, young adults have used mainly 
questionnaires on risk-taking which do not involve actual 
monetary risk-taking. Thus, these results may not be 
generalisable to the gambling behaviour of university 
students among whom there is no gender difference in 
ri sk-taki ng. The only significant difference between gender 
was the rating of being lucky or unlucky. It was asserted 
that females seemingly attributed their lack of success in 
the gambling session to bad luck whereas luck did not appear 
to be important for the males. The reason for the greater 
attribution to luck for unsuccessful gambling by females but 
not by males is unclear. This may reflect a feature of the 
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differences in attitudes and expectations in the Western 
socialisation process. 
Contrary to hypothesis 2, internals took significantly 
more risks than externals supporting Slovic' s (1964) 
speculation that internals become more daring in risk-taking 
contexts and try to outwit the gambling situation Strickland 
eta!.,1966}. The two studies (Moran, 1970a; Conrad, 1978) 
which showed that gamblers display an external orientation 
used gamblers as subjects which was not the case in this 
e x per i me n t . Furthermore, the higher risk-taking and an 
external locus of control relationship is not necessarily 
transitive. 
Hypothesis 3 which states that subjects will take more 
risks under a favourable schedule of reinforcement than under 
an unfavourable schedule of reinforcement was supported. 
However, the results indicated that it may be more accurate 
to state that a low number of payoffs encouraged conservatism 
rather than high number of payoffs stimulating greater 
risk-taking. In light of this finding it is proposed that 
losing money is a more important variable in determining 
shifts in risk-taking than winning. Further studies are 
required to confirm this proposition. 
Information on the qualities of luck was also important 
in changing risk-taking behaviour. Bad luck was found to 
exert a greater decrement in riskiness than the increment 
effected by good luck which supports Cohen's (1960) finding. 
There is an important difference between this experiment and 
Cohen's study. In his study there was no real difference 
between the lucky and unlucky situations and subjects were 
merely asked how they felt they would perform under those 
influences. In the present experiment, subjects did 
experience fewer payoffs when they were informed of possible 
bad luck and a greater number of payoffs when informed of 
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possible good luck. The fact that subjects in the uninformed 
conditions did not alter their risk-taking under the various 
fortune conditions highlighted the potency of information on 
the qualities of luck thereby supporting hypothesis 4 (luck 
will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter). 
In a review of sex differences, Maccoby 8. Jacklin (1975) 
found that neither sex is more susceptible to simple 
conditioning, or excels in simple paired associations or 
o the r for ms 0 f 'r 0 t e ' 1 ear n i n g. Similarly, no difference in 
recall was found between male and female subjects as 
predicted in hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 6 was generally supported. As far as the 
recall of die numbers was concerned both internals and 
externals were prone to error. Internals tended to 
over-estimate the episodes of the least frequently occurring 
number while both internals and externals tended to 
under-estimate the appearances of the most frequently 
occurring number. Generally, taking the estimation data into 
account, internals performed better than externals in the 
recall and estimation tasks. This was argued to be a result 
of the internal's closer attention to the environmental cues 
and greater interaction with them whereas externals appeared 
unimpressed and unmoved by the same stimuli. 
There was also reasonable support for hypothesis 7. 
Recall was generally best after poor payoff conditions, the 
necessity to be more wary of the consequences of the gambles 
was suggested as a possible explanation. Gilovich (1983) 
showed that subjects remembered losses better, at least in 
the long term. He suggested that aversive events (losses) 
were more salient and thus better retained in memory. 
Luck information only affected recall in the neutral 
fortune condition and did not bias recall in either the good 
or bad fortune conditions. 
predicted by hypothesis 8. 
This result was contrary to that 
Subjects informed of ordinary 
luck exhibited poorer recall rather than the better recall 
that was expected. It was proposed that the ordinary luck 
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information provided lowered the uncertainty of the situation 
which decreased the need for subjects to attend to the 
on-going gambling process resulting in poorer recall. 
Another trend that emerged from the results was that in 
situations of high uncertainty and where the outcome of the 
behaviour was of significance then information such as the 
possible influences of ordinary, good or bad luck decreases 
the accuracy of recall, probably by distracting the 
attentional process from the available cues. Put another 
way, uncertainty promotes attention and thus improves recall. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GAMBLING AS STIMULUS-BOUND BEHAVIOUR? 
Introduction 
It has been demonstrated that the eating behaviour of 
overweight individuals is under external rather than internal 
control (Schachter & Gross, 1968; Nisbett, 1968a; 1968b; 
Goldman, Jaffa & Schachter, 1968). When external food cues 
are potent, the obese eat considerably more than do normals, 
while they eat less if food cues are weak or entirely absent 
(Ross, 1969). From such experiments it was suggested that, 
in the obese, eating behaviour is stimulus-bound. 
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The concept of stimulus-binding stimulated the idea that 
responsiveness to external cues in the obese might not simply 
be limited to eating behaviour. Rodin, Herman & Schachter 
(1972) tested subjects on tasks requiring them to attend to, 
or process, a variety of external stimuli. The obese were 
found to have a shorter choice reaction time, shorter 
tachistoscopic recognition thresholds and better immediate 
recall for items presented briefly on a slide (Rodin, 1973; 
Schachter & Rodin, 1974; Rodin, 1975), Since then a number 
of studies have looked at the relationship between obesity 
and externality (Rodin & Slochower, 1976; Rodin, Slochower & 
Fleming, 1977j Rodin, 1978a, 1978bj Nail, Levy, Russin & 
Crandall, 1981; Stager, 1981; I sbtsky & Whi te, 1981). 
Although on a number of occasions it has been shown that 
obese individuals performed better in various cognitive 
tasks, it is reiterated repeatedly by Rodin (1978a, 1978b, 
1981a, 1981b) that the notion of externality is too 
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simplistic to account for all the observed findings. studies 
by Rodin and her colleagues failed to show reliable 
overweight/normal weight differences consistently from 
subject population to subject population or even from study 
to study in the same population (Rodin. 1975; Rodin, 
Moskowi tz 8. Bray, 1976; Rodi n et a1., 1977). 
Rodin (1981a) pointed out that not all overweight 
individuals are externally responsive and not all 
normal-weight individuals are internally sensitive. Indeed, 
various studies have shown that there are people in all 
weight categories who are highly responsive to external cues 
(Levitz, 1975; Nisbett 8. Temoshok, 1976; Price 8. Grinker, 
1973; Rodin et a!., 1977). The major problem in the use of 
the internal-external distinction to explain differences 
between obese and normal-weight individuals is that there are 
no clear measures of internal sensitivity. This is partly 
because it has not been possible to identify unequivocally 
the conditioned stimuli for hunger and satiation. 
However, the concept of stimulus-binding may still prove 
to be of heuristic value when employed in a different 
context. In a number of pUblications on the treatment and 
description of compulsive gambling (Seager, Pokorny 8. Black, 
1966; Goorney, 1968; Gambler's Anonymous, 1974; Li vi ngston, 
1974), the role of external stimuli which initiate a chain of 
actions leading to the individual engaging in gambling has 
often been stressed (Knapp, 1976; Dickerson, 1984). It may 
not be too far-fetched to suggest that the phenomenon of a 
heightened responsiveness to gambling cues such as racing 
commentaries, racing pages of periodicals, the sight of 
betting-shops, playing cards, dice and the like, is 
characteristic of gamblers. Some of these situational 
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factors have also been identified as those which provide 
reinforcements to gamblers encouraging and 'training' them to 
greater involvement (Dickerson, 1984; Cornish, 1978). .Thi s 
implied external responsiveness is evidenced by frequent 
warnings to affected gamblers to avoid such enticements 
(Livingston, 1974). 
Since the effect of increased external responsiveness 
appears to be so pervasive it is suggested that gamblers as a 
group are more externally responsive to certain stimuli in a 
manner similar to the obese. Furthermore, the externality 
concept is more applicable to gambling than to obesity since 
it is not necessary to acknowledge the existence of an 
internal sensivity in gam~lers. An experiment was thus 
devised to test the hypothesis that gamblers are more 
externally responsive than non-gamblers. 
Method 
Subjects 
Fifty undergraduate volunteers from the Psychology and 
Economics Departments of the University of Canterbury 
completed a questionnaire (Appendix 2) to assess the extent 
of their gambling activities. Thirteen subjects who gambled 
at least once a week and wagered over $6 per week were 
classified as gamblers. Twenty-three individuals who only 
purchased raffle tickets or gambled less than once a year 
made up the non-gambler group. The mean age of the gamblers 
was 22.5 years rangi ng from 18 to 25 and the mean age of the 
non gamblers was 21 which. ranged from 18 to 34 years. The 
two samples consisted of 24 males and 12 females. In the 
gambler group there were 5 females and 8 males while the 
non-gambler group was made up of 7 females and 16 males. 
Tests 
1. Item recall 
A cardboard box measuring 40 x 25 x 7 cm was used to 
hold an assortment of 20 articles of approximately similar 
sizes including: 
1. a pencil 11 . a small pai r of scissors 
2. a ball-point pen 12. a big rubber band 
3. a ruler 13. a gate key 
4. a tooth brush 14. a box of matches 
5. a big paper clip 15. a pack of cards 
6. a pencil sharpener 16. a tea-spoon 
7. a comb 17. a piece of chalk 
8. a nail cutter 18. a stapler 
9. a table tennis ball 19. a bottle-opener 
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10. an eraser 20. a bottle of glue 
2. Letter identification 
This test comprised letters of the English alphabets 
which were randomly arranged in a 30 x 30 letter matrix 
(Appendix 19). 
3. Difference detection 
A set of two perfectly matching pictures with the 
exception of 10 minor details made up the third test. Two 
different sets of such pictures were used in the experiment 
(Appendix 20 and 21). 
Procedure 
All subjects were tested individually in a big and 
otherwise empty classroom. Subjects were told that they were 
participating in a series of short experiments on perception 
after which they had to complete a repertory grid. (Appendix 
22 The grid results will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Post experimental questioning of the subjects did not 
indicate any interference of the externality experiments on 
the grid completion or vice versa. 
will be treated as independent.) 
Henceforth, these studies 
Initially, subjects were informed that a box containing 
a number of items commonly encountered in daily living would 
be placed before them. They would be given 20 seconds to 
view the contents of the box after which it will be taken 
away. The task of the subjects was to try and recall as many 
items as they could. Subjects were given 6 minutes to list 
the items they thought were present in the box. All subjects 
gave up within the time allocated. The total number of 
articles correctly remembered constituted the score for each 
subject (Maximum score: 20). 
Next the lis~ random alphabets was presented to the 
subject. Subjects were asked to scan through the list 
quickly and circle all the F's printed. The score for each 
subject was the number of F's circled within a two minute 
period (Maximum score = 36). 
Finally the first set of two matching pictures were 
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presented. Subjects were told that there were 10 differences 
between the two apparently identical pictures. Their task 
was to indicate as many differences as they could detect 
within 40 seconds. The same procedure was followed for th& 
second set of pictures. The score was the total number of 
differences located in the two sets of pictures (Maximum 
score = 20). 
The time interval that was allowed for each task was 
determined in the pilot studies. The criterion for the 
amount of time given to perform each task was about 10 to 30 
seconds less than what was required for most of the subjects 
in the pilot studies to complete the tasks. This was done to 
ensure a good differentiation among the performances of the 
subjects. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied to the data 
treating both gambler/ non-gambler and sex as independent 
vari abIes. The means of the gambler and non-gambler groups 
are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. The mean performance of gamblers and 
non-gamblers in the three tests of externality. 
Tasks Gamblers Non-gamblers 
Males Females Males Females 
Item recall 13. 4 11 . 6 11 . (3 11. 9 
L.etter identification 27. 3 28. (3 24. 1 26. 5 
Difference detection 12. 6 12. 4 11. (3 11. 6 
The ANOVA of the externality data (Appendix 23) showed 
no significant difference between gamblers and non-gamblers. 
There was also no significant gender difference,. 
several possible reasons to account for this. 
There are 
1. Sampling problems - the gambler group may not be composed 
of individuals who are' real' gamblers. External 
responsiveness may be present only in people deeply involved 
in gambling. 
2. As Rodin (1981a) pointed out, there may be just as many 
'external' normal weight individuals as there are overweight 
, externals' . The same caveat may apply to gamblers and 
non-gamblers, that is, there could be just as many external 
gamblers as there are external non-gamblers. 
3. It may have been premature to search for an external 
responsiveness befo~e a sensitivity to gambling cues is 
established experimentally for gamblers. Gamblers may only 
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be influenced by cues which are associated with gambling. 
4. Perhaps the concept of externality does not apply to 
gambling, at least, to social gambling. 
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Recent pUblications by Rodin and her associates have 
tended to discourage the use of a simplistic 
internal-external responsiveness to explain overweight! 
normal weight differences (Rodin, 1978b; 1981a; 1981b). 
Nisbett (1972) argued that the association between obese 
overweight and cue responsiveness is an artifact. He 
suggested that many less obese overweight individuals are in 
a state of chronic deprivation because they have not attained 
their biologically determined set point. It is this 
deprivation which produces responsiveness to external food 
cues. However, data by Rodin, Slochower & Fleming (1977) did 
not support Nisbett's hypothesis. 
Another factor which appears important in the response 
to external stimuli is arousal. stricker & Zigmond (1976) 
showed that an external stimulus can be seen as having two 
effects: a specific one that elicits some appropriate 
motivational state and a non-specific one that arouses the 
organism thus permitting the responses to occur. Organisms 
could literally be turned on by an external stimulus, and at 
the same time, this arousal would make them more likely to 
eat, perhaps because arousal reciprocally increases 
responsiveness to external cues, Spitzer & Rodin (cited by 
Rodin, 1981> obtained data suggesting a relationship between 
individual differences in arousability in response to 
external non-food-related stimuli and subsequent overeating 
and weight gain when subjects lived in a food abundant 
envi ronment. This line of reasoning can explain 
arousal-related overeating without reference to psychodynamic 
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factors. 
From the above discussion and without getting too 
involved in the neural systems of organisms it would seem 
that the internal-external distinction may be discarded and 
the operant term 'discriminative stimuli' be adopted instead. 
Rodin (1978b) noted that the internal external distinction 
has provided very good heuristic value for research but is no 
longer adequate to explain present findings. Since the 
behaviour discussed is a response to a stimulus it is logical 
to revert to the operant learning paradigm. This is 
appropriate for two main reasons: firstly, no internal 
processes are assumed and secondly, there is already a wealth 
of research from which to formulate hypotheses. 
Discriminative stimuli are stimuli that precede and 
accompany operant responses. Such stimuli are called 
'discriminative' because they set the occasion for which the 
operant responses are reinforced (Fantino & Logan, 1979). In 
the context of gambling a gambler may be seen as more 
susceptible to gambling stimuli just as there is a heightened 
perception for food cues by a hungry person. This greater 
responsiveness of the gambler to gambling cues is used to 
explain their greater impact on gamblers as compared to 
non-gamblers. These gambling cues are likely to lead to a 
series of behaviours culminating in the participation of a 
gambling activity, For example the sight of a betting shop 
activates the response of walking towards it, entering the 
building, studying the programmes, and finally placing the 
bet at the counter. The sequence of events just described is 
similar to that effected by a discriminative stimulus. 
more precise, it is a description of a discriminative 
stimulus functioning in a chain schedule. Each stimulus 
To be 
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serves both as a reinforcer for the response that produces it 
and as a discriminative stimulus for the next response in the 
chain. Domjan 8. Burkhard (1982) pointed out that 
discriminative stimuli have a powerful effect on behaviour 
not because they are paired with the reinforcement but 
because they signal how or when the reinforcement is to be 
obtai ned. This suggests that the gambling response can be 
readily tri gerred given a wide range of available 
discriminative stimuli and the strength of the behaviour 
easily maintained without much effort due to the reinforceing 
qualities of the stimuli. 
It appears that there may be at least one aspect of 
gambling behaviour which can be understood in an operant 
framework. Cornish (1978) concluded that, 
Incoming information about gambling may define as well as 
identify the needs for which it provides satisfactions. 
Situational determinants operating in the potential 
gambler's environment, such as ecologic opportunities and 
structural characteristics, provide the source of this 
information. Consequently they have an important 
influence in determining likelihood of gambling, though 
their impact has in the past tended to be neglected. 
Futhermore, wi th the recent interest in cogni ti ve 
aspects of animal behaviour some evidence was gathered to 
show that the state of neural excitation in the brain created 
by classically conditioned stimuli leads to sensations in 
addition to eliciting particular types of emotions and overt 
responses. These sensations can come to serve as 
discriminative stimuli for the instrumental behaviour and 
thereby influence instrumental performance (Domjan 8. 
Burkhard, 1982). An inclusion of motivational factors would 
provide a more complete picture of the processes involved in 
gambling behaviour. 
To summarise, the notion of discriminative stimuli is 
useful in the understanding of gambling behaviour especially 
in terms of the potency of the reinforcing qualities of the 
stimuli rather than an outdated internal-external 
stimulus-binding distinction. It is also acknowledged that 
motivational factors be included if an explanation of 
gambling behaviour is attempted. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EFFECTS OF AROUSAL 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CUES ON GAMBLING. 
Introduction 
The nature of the purported relationship between 
behaviour and the level of arousal has been explicitly 
questioned by a number of theorists. The first work 
indicating that there might be an optimal level of 
stimulation came from Hundt (1893, cited in Zuckerman, 1979a) 
~ho found an inverted-U relationship of pleasurable sensation 
with several stimulus intensities. Freud (Breuer & Freud, 
1895/ 1935), in his earlier work, stated that: 
there is a tendency to preserve at a constant level the 
intracerebral excitement. An excess of it becomes 
burdensome and annoying, and there arises an urge to 
consume it. I believe that we can assume a level of 
the intracerebral tonic excitement, namely that it also 
has an opt i mum. On this level of tonic excitement, the 
brain is accessible to all external stimuli. 
Freud also stated that 'agitation' may be produced by 
excitement in excess of or below this optimal level. 
Other more behaviourally orientated researchers such as 
Yerkes and Dodson (1908) proposed a law which stated that 
learning involving easy discriminations or simple 
associations is facilitated by high levels of stimulation, 
whereas more difficult learning proceeds optimally at some 
intermediate level of stimulation. Hebb (1955) noted that 
when arousal or drive is at a low level, a response that 
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produces increased stimulation and greater arousal will tend 
to be repeated. But when arousal is at a high level further 
stimulation will be avoided thus signifying that there is an 
optimal level for effective behaviour. 
Lindsley (1951> conceived of the reticular formulation 
as a homeostat regulating the inflow of sensations to the 
cortex by allowing more stimulation to reach the cortex when 
it is under-aroused and a reduction when there is an 
overload. Schlosberg (1954) attempted to produce a 
3-dimemsional theory of emotions including pleasantness/ 
unpleasantness, attention/ rejection, and activation 
( arousal). He also stressed the importance of the diurnal 
cycle in the variation of, the optimal level of arousal. 
Another proponent of the optimal arousal concept, ~UffY 
(1957), suggested that individuals may differ in arousal for 
either genetic or environmental reasons, and such differences 
may affect their temperaments') Individuals with a fast alpha 
rhythm in the EEG (high arousal) are characterised as quick, 
impulsive and variable in behaviour, whereas those with slow 
alpha are rated as cautious and steady suggesting that the 
optimal, or accustomed, level of arousal may be the basis for 
sensation-seeking-type behaviour. 
The investigators mentioned above were interested in the 
relationship between levels of tonic arousal and emotion, 
learning or performance. other researchers emphasised on 
whether learning and performance are affected by any 
deviation from an adaptational level at the time of 
stimulation on the organism. )Bain (1875, cited in Zuckerman 
1979) stated that stimulation of the senses within certain 
limits of intensity was said to be pleasurable but beyond 
these limits becomes painful. He outlined his Law of 
Relativity as follows: "Change is necessary to feelingj we 
are unconscious of unremitted impressions; the degree of 
feeling is proportional to the change; abruptness or 
suddenness of transition is one mode of enhancing the 
effect. " 
Bain also formulated the Law of Accommodation which 
describes the tendency for intensity of either negative or 
positive feelings to subside with repetition of the stimulus 
or situation eliciting them. In an attempt to integrate 
learning theories Leuba (1955) suggested that, at anyone 
moment, optimal stimulation could be represented by a band 
somewhere between the minimal and the excessive. The basic 
postulate of Schneirla' s (1959) theory is that for all 
organisms in early ontogenetic stage, low intensities of 
stimulation tend to evoke approach reactions and high 
intensities withdrawal reactions, with references to the 
source. Berlyne (1960) talked about an optimal arousal 
potential and discussed the human proclivity to seek 
emotional experience and excitement either in real life or 
vicariously through art or entertainment, the self-inflicted 
stress being generally mild or else short-lived. Another 
similar inverted U-shaped curved was proposed by Fiske & 
Haddi (1961> in terms of an organism's activation level to 
account for the most efficient behavioural function. 
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The effects of excitation and inhibition represented the 
final theoretical basis of the optimal level construct. The 
works of Pavlov (1927/ 1960) and Hull (1943) appear to 
suggest that the optimal level may be conceived of a balance 
between excitation and inhibition, that is, the nett 
excitation after the subtraction of inhibition. In 
personality research Cattell (1950) suggested that the 
high-surgent (dominant) individual is characterised by a low 
level of arousal of the sympathetic nervous system and is 
therefore more complacent and disinhibited. H. J. Eysenck 
(1967) updated his previous analysis of introversion/ 
extraversion by attributing the trait to differential 
thresholds in the various parts of the ascending reticular 
activating system rather than on the relative 
excitation-inhibition characteristics of the cortex. The 
introvert would have a supersensitive activating system 
capable of producing high cortical arousal with a minimum 
amount of stimulation, whereas the extravert would require 
higher amounts and intensities of stimulation to reach an 
optimal level of arousal. 
Zuckerman (1979a) did a thorough review of the studies 
on optimal arousal and more specifically on 
sensation-seekers. He suggested that sensation-seeking is a 
displaceable motive, that is, it can be satisfied by a 
variety of activities, which may provide the key to dealing 
with its less socially desirable manifestations such as drug 
abuse. Although accepting that it is plausible for 
expressions of a trait to be influenced by social forces 
Zuckerman was clearly biased by findings of research in 
psychopharmacology and psychophysiology. He hypothesised 
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that the sensation-seeking trait is in part a function of the 
levels of the catecholamines, norepinephrine and dopamine, in 
the reward areas of the limbic system, as well as the 
neuroregulators, such as monoamine oxidase (MAO), that 
control their availability at the synapses within these 
neural systems. High levels of dopamine in the 
norepinephrine pathways would result in high activity and the 
tendency to explore new situations. High levels of 
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norepinephrine would be related to the expectation of 
positive reinforcements from persons or situations, providing 
part of the motivation to take social or physical risks. 
More recent wri ters (Corcoran, 1981; M. W. Eysenck, 1982) 
supported the notion of an arousal system governed by the 
inverted U-shaped function but generally favoured a more 
complicated multi-dimensional arousal system. In Corcoran's 
model the multi-dimensional theory assumes an origin in 
multi-dimensional space in which the co-ordinates are the 
many and diverse effects of mild and extreme stressors. It 
permits one to speak of arousal level, degree of arousal and 
differences in arousal within and between subjects. Some of 
the postulates of H. J. Eysenck's current view of the relation 
between personality and arousal were considered and the 
assumption that arousal level is a function of degree of 
current stimulation was deemed essentially correct. It was 
suggested that the assumed tendency of subjects to engage in 
activities to optimise arousal was in a sense empty, though 
nicely related to contemporary notions of stress, and to the 
distinction between strategy and state. 
In a comprehensive review of attention and arousal 
research M. W. Eysenck (1982) concluded that a two arousal 
system appeared to best explain the experimental findings. 
He argued that the apparent great flexibility with which the 
human processing system copes with very low or very high 
levels of arousal is perplexing for advocates of a 
uni-dimensional arousal theory since the results simply 
attest to the involvement of an active compensatory system. 
In other words, arousal does not exert a direct effect on 
behaviour but has indirect effects which are mediated by a 
central control system. However, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between the passive arousal state and the 
compensatory effort response. 
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M. W. Eysenck proposed that with a two-arousal system 
model a reasonable level of performance can be achieved in at 
least two different ways: 1. near-optimal arousal with little 
need for compensatory effort or, 2. sub- or supra-optimal 
arousal combined with much compensatory effort (that is, at 
high' cost' to the system). It is wrong to conclude from the 
existence of a non-significant effect of arousal on task 
performance that arousal has no effect at all on internal 
processi ng. On the contrary, comparable efficiency on the 
part of control and highly aroused subjects is often achieved 
at greater 'subjective cost' to the more aroused subjects 
(that is, reduced processing effectiveness). There is 
evidence that the ability to resist at least some kinds of 
environmental distraction is markedly reduced in states of 
high arousal (Howarth, 1969; Morgenstern, Hodgson 8. Law, 
1974; Pallak, Pi ttman, Heller 8. Munson, 1975). 
Although two separate systems have been identified they 
are often inter-dependent in their functioning with each 
system having definite effects on the other arousal system. 
When arousal in the passive arousal system is non-optimal for 
the task in hand, there will typically be enhanced activity 
of the compensatory system. The compensatory system responds 
to task demands and attempts to maintain task performance at 
a satisfactory level. If the attempt to do so is 
unsuccessful, then this produces arousal in the passive 
arousal system. 
A. Arousal and gambling 
It is hypothesised that gamblers represent a sub-group 
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of sensation-seeking or individuals with a higher thresholds 
of stimulation to reach an optimal level of arousal combining 
both Zuckerman's (1979a) and H. J. Eysenck's (1967) theories 
respecti vely. The differential thresholds in the various 
parts of the ascending reticular activating system account 
for the differences between introverts and extraverts while 
the differential thresholds in the entire limbic systems 
account for the neuroticism trait. H. J. Eysenck (1963) also 
proposed that the optimal level of tonic arousal is lower for 
introverts than for extraverts. This was used to explain the 
behavioural differences between introverts and extraverts. 
It is asserted that gamblers are characterised by a 
preference for monetary risk-taking over other arousing 
activities such as physical or social risk-taking. Basically 
the proposed model of the motivational characteristic of 
gamblers is similar to H. J. Eysenck's neuroticism or 
extraversi on. In other words, gamblers represent a sub-group 
of sensation-seekers who are characterised by a higher 
optimal level of arousal than the average person and also 
have a correspondingly high stimulation threshold. Part of 
this sensation seeking propensity is hypothesised to be a 
result of the sub-optimal arousal in the gambler's arousal 
system. However, instead of considering the gambling 
propensity as a trait it is more prudent at this stage to 
describe it as a construct in the same way Rotter (1975) 
referred to his internal-external control of reinforcement. 
One good reason for doing that is that gambling propensity 
represent only a very narrow' trait', unlike H. J. Eysenck's 
three dimensions of personality, and data supporting its 
existence have been meagre. Nevertheless, personali ty 
studies have provided some support for the model. The 
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results of the previous study on personality characteristics 
showed that pathological gamblers scored higher on the 
neuroticism scale than non-gamblers and social gamblers. 
High neuroticism is the only consistent personality trait 
that has been identified in pathological gamblers besides 
having an external locus of control and Bergler (1943; 1958) 
described the gambler as a misunderstood neurotic. 
Non-personality studies are reviewed in the following 
section to ascertain the viability of the model. Knowles, 
Cutter Walsh & Casey (1973) showed some convergence in a 
number of risk-taking measures with gambling which indicates 
that gamblers may be able to and do indulge in other 
activities to achieve in optimal stimulation comparable to 
the 'displaceability' of activities in sensation-seeking 
(Z uckerman, 1979a, b). The four-dimensional interpretation of 
risk-taking outlined by Jackson, Hourany & Vidmar (1972) 
inc 1 u des: 1. mo net a r y r i s k - t a kin g en t a iIi n g fin an cia 1 
gambles; 2. physical risk-taking concerning taking chances 
involving bodily harm or physical risk to the person; 3. 
ethical risk-taking involving taking chances in situations 
which normative ethical values are involved and, 4. social 
risk-taking concerning situations in which the person's 
esteem in the eyes of others may be at stake. In thi s 
context monetary risk-taking is probably the 'cheapest' in 
terms of energy expendi ture, and least 'di sastrous' form of 
arousing activity, in the sense that a thrill, excitement or 
arousal may be obtained with relatively small negative 
consequences. However, a negative consequence or a loss of 
some kind is essential to be arousing. Cutter & Heilizer 
(1968) argued that the operational definition of risk-taking 
requires that something of value be at stake, 
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atated that besides unavoidable risk, in gambling, the 
possession of money is determined solely by chance. Although 
the outcome may not be completely chance-determined there is 
inevitably an element of uncertainty. It is proposed that 
the un k now n 0 u t come, 0 f val" yin g pro b a b iIi tie s ,of e i the r a 
monetary loss or gain, creates an attractive arousing 
situation for gamblers but does not provide the same pleasure 
for non-gamblers. 
It has been observed that a majority of gamblers tend to 
increase the size of their wagers after becoming involved in 
gambling for some time (see the review in Cornish, 1978) and 
from the over twenty years involvement with gambling by the 
author it was observed that most gamblers tend to place 
higher wagers during the course of an individual gambling 
session as well. In other words, gamblers usually start off 
with stakes that are low and build up to what they can afford 
( some times cannot afford) and/ or fee 1 inc 1 i ned tori s k. 
Depending on the gambler's experience, social environment, 
financial situation and motive for gambling the agreed 
'limit' for wagers may be reached slowly or quickly or he/she 
may not get to that amount at all. The size of the stakes 
that predominates during the gambling session will depend on 
the above factors which could be seen as an example of 
Helson' a adaptation level (Helson, 1947; 1948; Helson, 
Dworki n &. Mi chels, 1956). And in line with the addiction 
literature, the amount of arousal required to attain the 
optimal or preferred arousal level increases as gamblers 
acquire 'tolerance' to monetary risk-taking. In behavioural 
terms, higher stakes and/or longer gambling sessions are 
required to bring about the same level of arousal activation. 
Other relevant points are the responses of gamblers 
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under higher arousal or under different kinds of arousal, 
that is, arousal which is in addition to that experienced as 
a result of gambling (Anderson & Brown, 1984) and the effects 
of these different arousing influences respectively. Cohen 
(1964) proposed that a situation involving danger disrupts 
the regulating mechanism and enhances risk-taking. Another 
interpretation to account for such an increase in risk-taking 
by individuals was that high arousal may be related to denial 
of threat (Rule, Nutter & Fischer, 1971) and a tendency to 
ignore cues of punishment (Hare, 1968). 
In the present model, it is proposed that gamblers have 
a distorted regulating mechanism under conditions of 
over-arousal due to gambling activities. Although disrupted, 
the regulating mechanism continues to function but at a 
dampened capacity. stimulus specificity in the 
stimulus-bound behaviour may be relevant, that is, the 
excitement, denial of threat and other emotional components 
experienced by the over-aroused gambler may not be 
generalisable to other activities which evoked these 
emotional responses. For pathological gamblers, a different 
set of motivational forces is suggested to dominate. These 
are manifested in the form of psychological dependence where 
the pleasurable effects of thrill, financial gain and other 
positive concomitants of gambling become secondary to a 
reduction of negative withdrawal effects such as 
irritability, restlessness, depressed mood, poor 
concentration, obsessional thoughts and somatic disturbances 
(Wray & Dickerson, 1981). Furthermore, the arousal 
regulating mechanism becomes severely impeded by the effects 
of psychological addiction. This could explain the common 
observation that pathological gamblers frequently gamble till 
their last cent is gone (Livingston, 1974). 
Research on the relationship between gambling and 
arousal is sparse. Most of the data obtained may be 
interpreted in terms of the traditional inverted U-shaped 
arousal curve. One related early study suggested that 
intolerance of ambiguity increases after exposure to stress 
(which consists of threats to the subjects' self-image), 
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reflecting an over-arousal effect (Smock, 1954). Brim 8. Hoff 
(1957) showed that subjects that were frustrated exhibited 
the greatest desire for certainty and that subjects that were 
satisfied exhibited the least desire for certainty, with the 
control subjects desiring an average amount of uncertainty. 
This provides further support for the inverted U-shaped 
arousal function. 
The Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS) was developed to 
measure a general sensation-seeking tendency which involved 
some enjoyment of tension-raising situations (Zuckerman, 
Kolin, Price 8. Zoob, 1964), In a gambling situation, the 
results of Walters 8. Kirk (1968) provided validation of the 
general SSS form in terms of risk-taking behaviour, that is, 
the sensation-seeking tendency is negatively correlated with 
a lower probability of winning higher payoffs. Zuckerman 
(1974) found that male subjects who preferred the gambling 
project over sensitivity or alpha training scored higher than 
the norms on the Disinhibition scale of the SSS IV. The 
small group of females differed significantly from the norm 
group on three scales: General, Experience Seeking and 
Boredom Susceptibility. 
The nature of risk-taking makes it easy to associate it 
wi th arousal. Slovic (1964) specifically contended that 
arousal is an important component in risk-taking. Support 
for the inverted U-shaped function in terms of gambling 
behaviour came from Steiner, Jarvis & Parrish (19713) whose 
rating showed that high arousal is associated with lower 
levels of risk-taking. A similar trend was found by 
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Kozlowski (1977) who demonstrated that subjects characterised 
by a strong demand for stimulation were found to prefer low 
probabilities (high risk) and subjects with a weak demand for 
stimulation favoured high probabilities (low risk). 
Moreover, larger significant differences were obtained in the 
higher payoff condition. 
However, not all data supported the inverted U-shaped 
model of arousal. Lieblich (1968) found that there is a 
general trend to take greater monetary risks when subjects 
are experiencing stress as compared to the no-stress 
condition. Investigating the effect of arousal on 
risk-taking, Rule et a!. (1971> obtained results which 
indicated that risk taking increases over trials in the low 
and high arousal conditions but decreases over trials in the 
moderate condition. In an attempt to consolidate the 
empirical evidence a two-factor approach was suggested by 
Rule et al. in which at lower levels of arousal risk is taken 
to increase or decrease arousal to some optimal level whereas 
at high levels of arousal greater risk is taken as a denial 
of threat. This proposed two separate arousal mechanisms, 
one which accounts for risk-taking at low arousal and the 
other operating at high arousal levels, is appealing in the 
current status of arousal theory which favours a 
mul ti - di mensi onal mode 1 (Broadbent, 1971 i Corcoran, 1981; 
Eysenck, 1982). However, empirical evidence for such a model 
of arousal in gambling is still inadequate. 
B. Effects of reinforcement history upon gambling 
beha vi our. 
104 
Studies which have dealt with sequential effects in 
choice situations (Jarvik, 1951; Nicks, 1959; Anderson, 1960; 
Anderson & Whalen, 1960) generally showed that predictive 
behaviour on any given trial is a function of the results of 
the preceding trials. It is further agreed that the 
probability of predicting an event E increases and decreases 
as the length and run of the E events increases, but the 
point where the run curves reach their peak and alternating 
occurs remains equivocal (Anderson, 1960; Anderson & Whalen, 
1960). 
Myers & Fort (1963) found that choice behaviour is 
largely a function of expectancies generated by the preceding 
pattern of events and hypothesised that sequential effects 
are themselves functions of the ordering of events. The peak 
of the run curve usually occurs after 3 consecutive similar 
events. Furthermore, the data indicated that choice 
behaviour is a function of the preceding pattern of responses 
as well as stimuli. No consistent decision to gamble or not 
to gamble was found under varying amounts of gain and loss 
although in the long term the probability of gambling 
following a losing gamble steadily declined. 
In a summary of his previous research on probability and 
variance preferences, Edwards (1962) concluded that an 
individual's choice among gambles is essentially independent 
of the amount of money won or lost on previous trials unless 
the sum is 'substantial'. Slovic, Lichtenstein & Edwards 
(1965) investigating the differences between make-believe 
sessions and gambling for real money also found that betting 
behaviour is apparently unaffected by past payoff history. 
On the other hand, ~CGlothlin (1956), in an analysis of 
pari-mutuel betting (horse-race punting) found some 
indication that losing bettors increase the size of their 
wagers more than winning bettors\ 
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Greenberg & Weiner (1966) failed to show any significant 
relationship between the amount of money won or lost and the 
3 indicators of risk preference used; probability, variance 
and potential winnings. However, subjects who had an equal 
number of wins and losses tended to be more conservative and 
subjects who had high or low reinforcement ratios preferred 
the high risk gambles. Greenberg & Weiner concluded that the 
reinforcement histories differentially affected the 
s~bjective probabilities. They argued that the low-ratio 
group exhibited a negative recency effect or 'gambler's 
fallacy' (Jarvik, 1946) in assessing their chances of 
winning, while the high ratio group exhibited a positive 
recency effect (Senders, 1953). 
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(cohen (1970) showed that, in a binary event, winning and 
losing have a differential effect on the next choice of 
outcome. After losing there is a much stronger expectation 
that the alternative outcome will appear but there is some 
indication that the belief in the alternative outcome 
occurring is stronger after a win since the mean stake placed 
on the alternative outcome after a win is higher than the 
mean stake placed after a loss. In general, a variable 
strategy of betting is prominant, that is, there is a 
tendency to increase the stake after winning and to decrease 
\ 
it after losing.\ Cohen also noted that his adult and 
I 
youngest (18+ years) subjects appeared to be maXimising the 
utility of play, that is, to prolong the experiment, as a 
game, for as long as pos si bl e. By contrast, the mi ddle group 
106 
(14+ years) seemed bent on minimising their losses rather 
than maximising their gains. 
Cohen (1972) pointed out that the common implication 
that winning and losing have similar effects on subsequent 
play could have arisen from a failure to distinguish between 
the gambler's fallacy and negative recency. In the case of 
negative recency the individual's choice is only affected by 
his knowledge of previous outcomes and previous choices, by 
their accuracy or otherwise. The distinction between 
negative recency and the gambler's fallacy is that something 
more is at stake beyond the choice. Whether a stake is 
raised or lowered does not depend merely on whether a choice 
has been correct or not, an additional component, a positive 
recency effect, could be present which expresses itself as a 
generation of uncertainty to challenge oneself and to impress 
the onlooker. 
(In a recent study, Leopard (1978) showed that the l 
majority of her subjects took more risks when they have lost 
than when they are ahead. Secondly, many subjects were 
influenced by run patterns of wins and losses in the amount 
of risk they took, but the nature of the influence depended 
on the individual. A number of suggestions were put forward 
to explain her results. Subjects' perceptions of the risk 
involved in the choice to play in a given game may vary. It 
follows that subjects' subjective evaluations of the 
likelihood of winning change with the outcome history as they 
play. Thus, subjects who believed in the gambler's fallacy 
would be encouraged to increase their stakes after a run of 
losses, 'expecting' a win. On the other hand, those who 
believed in runs of luck would expect more wins when winning 
and more losses when losing and bet acCOrdingl~ This 
i nterpreta ti on is ra ther si mi 1 ar to Greenberg & Wei ner' s 
(1966) hypothesis of the group receiving low reinforcements 
exhibiting a negative recency response and the group 
receiving high reinforcement exhibiting a positive recency 
response. 
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Morgan (1983) found that his subjects who predominantly 
lost in the early trials of the experiment made riskier 
decisions during the losing period than during a period in 
which winning is more regular. He also found that the 
initial winners and break-even group followed different 
patterns of risk preference over time than did initial losers 
by not changing strategies. These results led Morgan to 
argue that it is losing, not winning, which produces changes 
in individual preference of risk. 
The only study to use criterion groups to assess the 
effects of different reinforcement histories was carried out 
by Hatano & Inagaki (1977). Their results showed that 
extraverts tended to make' riskier' choices more in and after 
prolonged favourability of reinforcement but made' less 
risky' ones significantly more in unfavourable reinforcement 
sequences than introverts, 
On the whole, the available evidence favours the notion 
that reinforcement history in sequential gambling is an 
important determinant of future wagers. How wins and losses, 
and runs of wins and losses affect subsequent bets remains 
unclear and the reasons for these effects are even more 
ambi guo us. 
C. The importance of gambling cues in gambling 
behavi our. 
From the apparent failure of Experiment 3 to show any 
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stimulus-bound characteristics in gamblers, it was suggested 
that only gambling-related cues have any influence on the 
behavioural responses of gamblers, in this case, gambling 
behaviour. It was also proposed that the presence of 
gambling cues would stimulate both gamblers and non-gamblers 
but have a significantly greater effect on gamblers. The 
gambling cues serve as discriminative stimuli which set the 
occasion for gambling activities and act as reinforcements as 
well if the gambling behaviours occurring within a gamble is 
seen as chain of events. The individual gamble may also be 
interpreted as components which make up the series of events 
denoted as the gambling session. These cues are considered 
to have a minimal effect on non-gamblers since the stimuli 
have little discriminative value in the non-gambIer's 
behavioural repertoire. 
Most gambling research has ignored the possible effects 
of such a parameter which might have influenced the results 
especially when the characteristics of betting between 
gamblers and non-gamblers were compared. 
D. Chance, skill and risk preferences in gambling. 
Starting some 25 years ago, Cohen and his associates 
carried out extensive research into the relationship between 
skill and chance preferences in gambling and have uncovered 
valuable empirical evidence which has been repeatedly cited 
in the gambling literature. 
In an early study, Cohen, Dearnaley 8. Hansel (1958) 
showed that in a complex situation involving two sources of 
uncertainty, the subjective probablility of success in 
performance is equivalent to the product of psychological 
values relating to each separate source. However, the 
psychological measurements of probabilities, chance, skill 
and randomness are frequently distorted, though often in a 
predictable pattern (Kahneman 8. Tversky, 1982; Teigen, 
1983a, b, c, d) . 
Cohen (19713) found that choice preferences in a chance 
situation are non-random. The smaller the initial 
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mathematical value of small chances the more they are 
over-valued, and the larger the initial mathematical value of 
small chances the more they are under-valued. It was 
suggested that the' over-valuers' may be 'thrill-seekers' 
stemming from the greater uncertainty whereas 'under-valuers' 
are more externally controlled in the sense that they 
believed luck to be the major determinant of success. 
Other investigators (Tune, 1964; Kahneman 8. Tversky, 
1982; Teigen, 1983a) have looked at how patterned sequences 
affect behaviour or judgements of randomness. In general, 
people do not have a clear understanding of what randomness 
is. Events are considered not to be chance-determined and 
seen as non-random when a sequence contains prominant 
features. For example, in six tosses of a coin 3 heads 
followed by 3 tails or vice versa are subjectively less 
random than the sequence H T T H T H. Judgements under 
uncertainty are further influenced by three heuristics: 1. 
Representativeness - usually employed when people are asked 
to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to 
class or process B; 2. Availability of instances or 
scenarios, employed when people are asked to assess the 
frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular 
development and, 3. Adjustment from an anchor, usually 
employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is 
available (Tversky, 8. Kahneman, 1974). 
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Decisions are often made which deviate widely from those 
based solely on mathematical probabilities (Cohen & Hansel, 
1958). The main differences between the subjective and 
objective probabilities are that the value of the probability 
of a multiple additive choice is under-estimated and the 
value of a multiplicative probability is over-estimated. In 
general, values of psychological probabilities seems highly 
dependent on particular situations, personal preferences and 
beliefs. Slovic (1969) also showed that there is a very 
strong tendency for people to over-estimate the probability 
of a multiplicative compound event. The situation becomes 
even more complicated when the influence of the contribution 
of skill and/or chance factors are considered. Langer (1976) 
noted that there is a frequent lack of discrimination between 
controllable and uncontrollable events. One explanation for 
this is that skill and chance factors are closely associated 
in peoples' experience. Every skill situation contains 
possible chance elements, and every chance situation contain 
possible skill elements. Moreover, a positive or negative 
experience in a series of events influence the perception of 
skill or chance control of the events. Langer & Roth (1975) 
found that subjects participating in a purely chance task 
(predicting the results of a series of coin-tosses), the 
outcome sequences of which were manipulated by the 
experimenters to produce a winning run either early or late 
in the sequence, subjects are more likely to attribute skill 
to the prediction task if they have had the experience of a 
winning run early in the sequence. A series of successes at 
the beginning of a sequence would also influence the players 
to over-estimate their chances of success,:\ In an attempt at· 
replication, Ladouceur & Mayrant (1984) obtained ambiguous 
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results. The authors suggested that the illusion of control 
is found mainly in certain games with a population already 
sensitised or involved in gambling. The distinction between 
skill and chance situations becomes even less clear since 
positive outcomes are most often attributed to the actions 
that precede them regardless of the actual contingency 
(Bruner 8. Revusky, 1961; Goldi ng 8. Rorer, 1972). 
(cohen 8. Hansel (1958) found that when gi ven a choi ce on 
the types of gambles, subjects prefer to rely more on skill 
than on chance activities. ') Langer (cited in Langer, 1976) 
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obtained similar results. Once again the relationship is not 
a simple one since ~ohen (1970) showed that each individual 
may attach different weights to the role of chance and skill 
in determining the outcome of an event) What seems to the 
observer to be essentially a matter of chance may be regarded 
by the participants as governed by his skill. Thus, horse 
and dog bettors do not look upon themselves as playing with 
chance to any considerable extent. They only place their 
bets after careful deliberation, in the belief that they have 
selected the winning horse or dog on the basis of its 
superior capacity and other relevant conditions. Those 
attracted to horse- and dog-racing are disposed to draw a 
distinction between themselves and football pool punters who 
(in their eyes) are true gamblers. ~vertheless, a sizeable 
number of pool punters and roulette players see themselves a 
engaging in a task requiring skill in seeking a predictable 
pattern of outcomes, though in fact, each outcome is 
unpredictable~ 
A number of investigators have shown the importance of 
other parameters of gambling. The variance and probability 
preferences of a gamble playa key role in determining 
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choices among risky alternatives (Edwards, 1953; 1954a, b; 
McGlothlin, 1956; Coombs 8. Pruitt, 1960). other research 
supported related concepts such as subjective probability and 
utility (Edwards, 1955), expected value (Lichtenstein, 1965; 
Rachli n 8. Frankel, 1968), uti li ty of gambli ng (Royden, Suppes 
8. Walsh, 1959) and beliefs about the relative importance of 
probabilities and payoffs (Slovic 8. Lichtenstein, 1968). 
Further research demonstrated that these concepts are 
inadequate in explaining risky decisions. Lichtenstein et 
a1., (1969) found that expected value is not a good guide to 
gambling decisions even when the concept is carefully 
explained and displayed to the subjects. Montgomery 8. 
Adelbratt (1982) obtained similar results except in cases 
where repeated gambles are allowed. They suggested that 
instead of using an abstract measure, expected value, to 
guide their decisions, subjects may try to use concrete 
patterns of features such as high gains and high 
probabilities or some combinations of the two dimensions. 
Some investigators argued that there is more than one 
dimension in a gamble (Slovic 8. Lichtenstein, 1968; Lindman, 
1971; Payne 8. Braunstein, 1971>. These people demonstrated 
that a gamble is a multi-dimensional stimulus whose various 
attributes have differential effects on individual 
decision-making behaviour. Evidence was presented showing 
that choices and attractiveness ratings are primarily 
determined by the probability of winning or losing a gamble 
while bids are more influenced by the amount to be won or 
lost. The amount to win determines the attractiveness of the 
bet whereas the dislike of a bet is primarily determined by 
the amount to lose. Using the same bidding procedure, the 
amount to win dominate bids but not choice of gambles 
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(Lichtenstein 8. Slovic, 1971>. There is no starting point in 
choosing, whereas in bidding, subjects start with the amount 
to win and adjust it downwards to account for other 
attributes of the bet. In an extension of laboratory 
studies, casino patrons were also found to employ different 
strategies when choosing among pairs of bets than when 
attaching monetary values to single bets with payoff cues 
being an important determinant (Lichtenstein 8. Slovic, 1973). 
The author commented that these results seem to violate 
previous risky-decision models but could be understood in 
terms of information-processing considerations. 
There have been attempts to explain gambling behaviour 
which were rather similar to arousal or sensation-seeking 
which was discussed earlier. Portfolio theory was an attempt 
to explain gambling behaviour by assuming that people may 
like to seek some risk (Coombs, 1975; Coombs 8. Huang, 19713). 
The theory assumes that preferences for risky options are 
determined by two dimensions, expected value and perceived 
ri sk. For each expected value an individual is supposed to 
have an ideal level of risk at which his preference will be 
maximal. Deviation from this ideal risk either towards 
higher or towards lower risk will reduce preference. strict 
risk aversion is considered to be a special case where no 
risk is the ideal risk level. As in the structure of a 
gamble, perceived risk is also identified as having more than 
one dimension. Using a multi-dimensional scaling technique, 
Nygren (1977) showed that it is a powerful tool in 
identifying the characteristics of perceived risk. From his 
analyses, perceived risk is revealed as both a meaningful and 
measurable characteristic of gambles and that any descriptive 
theory of gambling behaviour must include the concept. 
Another feature of research in gambling is that the 
possibility of a loss seems to be an influential factor in 
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gambling behaviour. Edwards (1954) found that subjects tend 
to change their betting habits when they lose money, but not 
when they win. In an experimental study of risk preference 
in lotteries, Coombs, Donnell & Kirk (1978) demonstrated that 
there is a trend for the probability of losing dominating the 
effect of the amount to win. The importance of an element of 
a loss in defining perceived risk was upheld by Slovic' s 
(1967) results which showed that the perceived risk is 
determined by the probability of losing a gamble. Kietlinski 
(cited in Kozielecki, 1975) found that subjects consider two 
variables in estimating risk; the subjective probability of a 
loss and the amount to be lost. The product of the two 
variables amounts to the expected loss or risk. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1982) suggested that in risky 
choices preferences between gains are risk aversive and that 
preferences between losses are risk-seeking. Furthermore, a 
risky prospect is weighted by its probability, that is, low 
probabilities are commonly over-weighted but intermediate and 
high probabilities are under-weighted relative to certainty. 
The final important influence on gambling behaviour is, 
of course, the gamblers themsel ves. Significantly less 
research has been directed to learning about the effects of 
personality parameters on gambling behaviour compared to the 
more quantifiable constructs, at least, mathematically. 
Atkinson (1957), in an analysis of risk-taking behaviour, 
proposed that preferences for different probabilities of 
achieving success or avoiding failure are related to 
individual differences in motivation. Using Atkinson's 
model, Littig (1963) found that when motivation to achieve 
11 5 
success is stronger than motivation to avoid failure 
intermediate probabilities of success will be preferred, and 
when motivation to avoid failure is greater than motivation 
for success intermediate probabilities of success will be 
avoided. From an entirely different perspective, that of 
marketing methods of the legitimate gambling industry, the 
motives toward which appeals are made include: 1. 
rational-economic motives, 2. recreational motives and, 3. 
prestige-seeking motives (Hess & Diller, 1969). 
In spite of the differences which might have arisen from 
the variety in the mode of presentation of gambles 
(Aschenbrenner, 1978), it is still obvious that a large 
number of factors affect gambling behaviour. The most 
consistent finding points to the importance of losses which 
can be conveniently incorporated into the concept of 
perceived risk. This perceived risk is influenced by a 
number of variables such as the nature of the gamble, its 
representativeness and availability. It is also generally 
accepted that, gi ven the choi ce, people prefer a task wi th a 
certain amount of skill involvement rather than chance. 
However, results from personality research associated with 
gambling behaviour is too sparse to form any firm 
conclusions. 
Rationale and hypotheses 
Little research has been directed at comparing the 
risk-taking or probability preference of gamblers versus 
non gamblers. Nevertheless, popular literature, moralists, 
economists and politicians have repeatedly expounded the 
gambler's love for risk and uncertainty. Often these 
expositions are based more on personal experiences and biases 
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rather controlled investigations. The main purpose of this 
experiment is to provide data to identify some 
characteristics of social gamblers and to clarify some of the 
differences between social gamblers and non-gamblers. 
In view of the ,literature reviewed, several hypotheses 
were formulated for this experiment: 
1. It has been pointed out that an average individual would 
prefer a game which involves an element of skill rather than 
total chance control. Moreover, previous research has 
suggested that gamblers have an external locus of control 
(Moran, 1970a; Kusyszyn 8. Rubenstei n, 1971; Conrad, 1979) and 
it is also commonly commented that gamblers have a great 
affinity for uncertainty. Thus, it is hypothesised that 
gamblers would opt for uncertain alternatives and prefer more 
chance than skill involvement in a game as compared with 
non-gamblers. 
2. Social gamblers would be expected to be more interested in 
gambling than non-gamblers. This would be shown by the 
extended length of time spent gambling and the greater 
enjoyment experienced during the gambling session as compared 
to non-gamblers. 
3. Social gamblers process information about the gambling 
environment in a different manner than do non-gamblers. They 
tend to over-estimate the probability of eventually winning 
in their gambling pursuits. It is assumed that social 
gamblers pay more attention to success events than failure 
events, and so, in judging (calculating - from a gambler's 
perspective) on-going chances they are working from a data 
base which has an over-representation of success events. 
Assuming also that social gamblers are rational, it follows 
that they would be more optimistic and risk greater amounts 
of money than non-gamblers. 
4. Related to Hypothesis 3, social gamblers would be less 
affected by immediate wins and losses than non-gamblers. 
Social gamblers, with their history of gambling, would be 
sensitised to such fluctuations in fortune resulting in a 
continuation of the existing behaviour. Thus, sequences of 
wins and losses would create little change in betting, 
expectations of winning and making correct predictions for 
gamblers but hypothesised to be influential in the gambling 
decisions of non-gamblers. 
5. Gambling cues, being assoc,iated with a familiar activity 
for gamblers would be more meaningful to them. These cues 
would create a more realistic gambling atmosphere thus 
inducing more intense gambling and taking more risk in the 
decisions on the part of the gamblers but having relatively 
little impact on non-gamblers. 
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6. From the perspective of an inverted U-shaped function of 
arousal and performance and the proposed model of the 
under-aroused, sensation-seeking social gambler, highest 
risks would be taken by social gamblers under the non-arousal 
condition with lower risk taken in the exercise-arousal 
condition (physiological - assumed to be of shorter duration) 
and the least risk taken in the video-arousal condition 
(psychological - assumed to be longer lasting), These 
arousals would exceed the optimal level of arousal and become 
disagreeable to the normally-aroused, non-sensation-seeking 
non-gambler thereby reducing the risk taken. Social gamblers 
would be hypothesised to take greater risks in order to 
achieve more an optimal level of arousal. 
Method 
Subjects 
A gambling assessment questionnaire (Appendix 24) was 
administered to 263 introductory psychology students during 
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laboratory classes. Ninety-six volunteers were selected from 
the total sample and assigned into two groups of 48 
non-gamblers and 48 social gamblers on the basis of their 
responses to the questionnaire. Non-gamblers were defined as 
people who never gambled or take risks with money or have 
only gambled less than once a year. Subjects who gambled or 
took monetary risks at least once a month and risking more 
than $3 were classified as social gamblers*. More than half 
of the gamblers in the sample were gambling more frequently 
and with higher stakes. 
None of the non-gamblers enjoyed gambling whereas nearly 
all the gamblers included in the sample enjoyed gambling. 
The mean age of the non-gambler group was 19.6 years ranging 
from 17 to 38 years and the mean age of the gambler group was 
20.7 raanging from 17 to 41 years. 
*For the sake of brevity the word social will be omitted in 
the text in the results section. 
Materials 
Two packs of playing cards, a one-, two-, and ten-dollar 
not e (N e w Z e a 1 and cur 1" en c y), a rna h jon g set, a set 0 f six 
dice, 300 used race-track betting tickets, 80 race-track 
programmes (containing forms, owners and breeds of horses in 
the race-meeting), a book entitled' Positive Addiction', an 
ergometer, a video recorder and tape, a heart-rate monitor, a 
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photo-electric-plethysmograph, an Apple II microcomputer with 
the accompanying disk drive and monitor. 
Tests 
1. A repertory grid consisting of 11 elements pertaining to 
gambling situations and 12 constructs which are emotions 
associated with these situations (Appendix 25). 
2. A pre-experimental questionnaire (Appendix 26). 
3. A post-experimental questionnaire (Appendix 27) 
Procedure 
Subjects took part in the experiment individually in a 
room 3 m by 4 m. On arrival subjects were greeted and 
briefly informed that they were participating in a study on 
the relationship of arousal to their heart-rate. 
Subjects were first required to complete the repertory 
grid followed by the pre-experimental questionnaire. Each 
subject was randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions. Both 
groups of gamblers and non-gamblers were assigned to the same 
conditions resulting in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 design, that is, 
gambler/ non-gambler by win/ lose first by gambling cues/ no 
cues by film/ exercise / reading totalling 24 cells in all 
with 4 subjects in each cell (see Table 12). 
Table 12. The 24 experimental cells of the 
independent variable and experimental manipulations. 
reading 
win-first 
gambling cues exercise 
anxiety film 
reading 
no gambling cues exercise 
GAMBLERS anxiety film 
NON-GAMBLERS 
Arousal 
gambling cues 
reading 
exercise 
anxiety film 
lose-first -------------------------------
reading 
no gambling cues exercise 
anxiety film 
128 
Subjects in the film condition were shown a 3-minute 
video clip (developed by the Psychology Department, 
University of Melbourne) of a series of pictures depicting a 
hand being subjected to various forms of mutilation. The 
clip consisted of 18 5-second exposures followed by a 
14-second pause between the following scenes: 
1. A slap on the hand by another hand. 
2. A pinch on the skin of the hand by another. 
3. A pin-prick on' the index finger. 
4. A hi t on the hand by a ruler. 
5. A knock on the thumb by a hammer. 
6. Fingers being jammed in a door-way. 
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7. Burning of the index finger by a lighted match. 
8. Pouring of boiling water on the hand. 
9. Gashi ng of the palm wi th a carvi ng kni fe. 
18. Choppi ng off the fi ngers wi th a meat-cleaver. 
Subjects in the exercise condition were required to 
pedal on a 'Tunturi' bicycle ergometer for 3 minutes at a 
constant rate of about 35 revolutions per minute with a crank 
torque of about 15 newtonmetre which will require about 58 
watts per minute or 158 watts for the whole exercise. This 
was shown to be enough to raise the heart-rate of an average 
individual appreciably. 
Control subjects were asked to read the introductory 
pages of a neutral book (Positive Addiction) for 3 minutes. 
Gambling cues 
In the gambling cues condition a number of gambling 
implements and materials associated with gambling were 
present on the bench surrounding the computer screen. This 
included: 2 packs of playing cards, a mahjong set, 6 dice, 13 
New Zealand dollars, 388 used race-track betting tickets and 
88 race-track programmes. The bench was clear in the no-cues 
situation. In addition, during the actual gambling session 
the cues condition resembles a real-life gambling situation 
in terms of audio and visual stimulation. In the no-cues 
condition, the outcome of the rolls of 3 dice were simply 
presented as a set of 3 numbers. In the cues condition, 
however, pictures of 3 brightly coloured (blue, red and 
green) dice were drawn on the screen one after the other. 
The resultant picture on the screen was equivalent to a view 
of 3 coloured dice placed on a horizontal surface seen at an 
angle of 68 degrees. Following the dice display 3 'beeps' 
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sounded whenever a correct number was chosen signifying a 
winning bet. Six 'beeps' sounded when the subjects was to be 
paid twice the amount they staked, that is, whenever the 
number that was wagered on turned up on two dice. 
Reinforcement history 
The number of wins and losses and their occurrence in 
the 30-trial sequence were predetermined. Half the subjects 
were put in the win-first condition in which 8 single, 
double wins and 7 losses were experienced in the first 15 
trials (Set A). The other half of the subjects experienced 6 
wins and 9 losses in the first 15 trials (Set B) which is 
defined as the lose-first condition. The series of 30 
gambles were split into two sets of 15 trials with the wins 
and losses in the sequence arranged so that there would be 
minimal interference in the reinforcement order at the 
initial and final stages of each set (Appendix 28). All 
subjects were given the same number of wins and losses. 
On completion of the repertory grid and the 
pre-experimental questionnaire subjects' heart-rates were 
me as ure d. Subjects then carried out whatever activity that 
was required in their arousal condition after which the 
second heart-rate reading was taken. The third heart-rate 
reading took place after the 3rd gambling trial, followed by 
the fourth and fifth reading which were taken after the 13th 
and 28th trial respectively. The heart-rate measuring 
procedure simply involved clipping a 
photo-electric-plethysmograph onto the index finger (or any 
other preferred digit) and noting down the most stable 
instantaneous display on the heart-rate monitor. The whole 
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process usually took between 10 and 25 seconds. Even though 
the heart-rate measurements were only part of the cover story 
for the experiment, every effort was made to make it appear 
convincing but at the same time not to disrupt the flow of 
the gambling session. 
Following the second heart-rate measurement, subjects 
were then exposed to the rules of the game and instructions 
for betting via the monitor (Appendix 29>. Two trial 
sessions were given with the option of additional practice 
gambles. When the subjects were sure of the whole procedure 
the experiment proper began. 
Each trial consisted of 5 responses in the following 
order: 
What do you think is the chance of you winning in this trial? 
RESPONSE 
A six-segment box containing a number each from 1 to 6 
appears. 
Choose a number from the box above. 
RESPONSE 
How much do you want to stake? 
(Your limits are from 0 to 50 cents>. 
RESPONSE 
What is the chance of you making the right prediction in this 
trial? 
RESPONSE 
The result of the gamble is presented followed by the 
statement "you have won/lost X cents" together with the 
current balance. 
Are you ready for the next trial? 
RESPONSE 
After 15 trials an additional question follows the one above. 
If it were possible would you like to stop now? 
RESPONSE 
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(All subjects were given 30 trials regardless of the response 
to this question.) 
After the 38th trial the previous question was replaced by; 
You have played the required number of trials. However, if 
you are still interested you may continue for a few more 
trials. Do you want to continue? 
RESPONSE 
The maximum number of trials given was 35. Subjects were 
never told at any stage the number of gambles they were going 
to get to ensure that the length and position of the trials 
do not bias the size of the wagers and the estimate of the 
likelihood of success. 
Subjects proceeded to complete the post-experimental 
questionnaire after taking the last gamble. Finally, 
subjects were offered a choice of payment for participating 
in the experiment. Subjects could either accept half of 
their final balance after the series of gambles or draw a 
marble out of a bag containing 11 marbles. These marbles 
were marked e, 1, 2, to 18 denoting one tenth of the 
percentage of the final balance which would constitute the 
alternative payment for participation. 
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Results 
The results were analysed using a 2 (GAM -
gambler/non-gambler) x 2 (WILD - win-first/lose-first) x 2 
(GCUE - cues/no cues) x 3 (AROUSAL - exercise/video/read) 
multivariate analysis of variance design for repeated 
meas ures. 
1. Betting 
The first analysis involved the mean bets for all the 30 
trials taken together (output in Appendix 30). Predictably> 
gamblers (mean bet = 2B.1 cents) bet significantly higher 
stakes than non-gamblers (mean bet = 22.5 cents) overall, F 
(1,74) = 4.8, P = 0.03. However, there was a significant 
2-way interaction between GAM by GCUE. The relationship 
between gamblers and non-gamblers in their reaction to 
gambling cues can be seen in Figure B. 
lig. 8. The effect of gambling cues on the staking_ 
behaviour of gamblers and non-gamblers. 
........ 
..... 
o 
40 
30 
No cues 
Cues 
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Criteri on groups 
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The graphs indicate that when no cues were present both 
gamblers and non-gamblers have nearly identical betting 
styles in terms of the mean amount of money staked. The 
situation changed drastically when gambling cues were 
present, gamblers increased their stakes while non-gamblers 
decreased theirs, by a similar amount. The types of arousal 
experienced and receiving more payoffs either early or late 
in the session did not seem to affect the amount of money 
wagered. 
To gain a general impression of the trend in betting the 
mean stakes of all the 39 gambles were obtained for both 
gamblers and non-gamblers (Figure 9). 
A distinctive feature of the gamblers' betting pattern 
is the strong influence of payoffs of the previous gamble and 
often the outcomes of a run of gambles. A general betting 
strategy for gamblers is to increase their stakes after 
losing gambles and decrease their stakes after winning 
gambles. This trend is fairly consistent over the 39 trials 
and is most pronounced when there is a run of more than one 
winning or losing gamble. Non gambl ers, in the mai n, appear 
to adopt the opposite strategy, that is, increasing the size 
of a bet after winning and decreasing the size of the bet 
following losses. Non-gamblers are also slightly more 
variable in their betting behaviour compared to gamblers. 
With the exception of Trials 5 and 17, most of the variations 
in stakes placed by non-gamblers are smaller than the ones 
demonstrated by gamblers. 
Fig. 
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Next, the trials were separated into two groups; one in 
which the gambles were preceded by a win in the previous 
gamble and the other in which gambles were preceded by a loss 
in the previous gamble. Trials 1 and 16 were eliminated for 
this analysis since for half the Bubjects these two trials 
were not preceded by any previous outcome being the first 
trial in the gambling sequence. This would enable a 
comparison of the effects of a winning or losing outcome on 
the next bet in sequential gambling. The mean bets of the 
gambles following the 14 winning and 14 losing trials were 
analysed using a MANOVA design for repeated measures (Hull & 
Nie, 1981>, the output of which can be seen in Appendices 31 
and 32. The r e was a s i 9 n i f i can t GAM ma i n e f f e c t , F (1, 72) = 
4.6, P = 0.035. Gamblers (mean bet = 28.2 cents) bet a 
higher amount of money compared to non-gamblers (mean bet = 
22.7 cents) for gambles preceded by a win or loss. There was 
also a significant interaction of GAM x GCUE which looks 
almost identical to the GAM x GCUE interaction for the 30 
trials combined (see Figure 8). This is hardly surprising 
since the only difference between the two analyses is the 
exclusion of Trials 1 and 16 in the present analysis. 
There was also a WILD x GCUE x AROUSAL x OUTCOME 
interaction, F (2, 72) = 3.5, P :: 0.036. 
shown in Figure 10. 
This interaction is 
The major difference in the amount of money staked 
following a win or loss is mainly in both the arousal 
conditions having experienced a poor reinforcement schedule 
first, in the absence of cues. In other words, arousal 
decreases the amount of money staked only when the gambling 
situation is plain, without any audio or visual 
accompaniments, and when subjects have previously experienced 
an unfavourable payoff ratio (33 %). 
Fig. 10. The effects of the outcome of the Qrevious bet, 
arousal, having_good or bad reinforcement schedule 
first end the influence of cues on the amount of 
money staked. 
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On an l!. priori basis, an analysis of every trial 
in the 30-gamble sequence would not only be impractical but 
al so redundant, thus, onl y a number of t rial s t ha t were 
assumed to be important were selected for more detailed 
analyses. 
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These included 8 trials where, on the preceding 
trial(s), subjects encountered the following outcome to their 
gamble: 
Trial 
5 
7 
9 
12 
15 
21 
23 
26 
Outcome 
2 wins 
1 win 
1 double win 
2 wins followed 
3 wins 
1 win followed 
1 loss 
2 losses 
by 3 losses 
by 3 losses 
A detailed sequence of the positions of the winning and 
losing gambles in the 3B-trial betting session can be seen in 
Appendi x 28. 
Winning and losing appeared to have differential 
consequences in sequential gambling (Cohen, 1979). The most 
discriminating trials, in the sequence of gambles, would 
presumably occur following these gambles. One of the major 
aims of this experiment is to investigate the influence of 
winning and losing outcomes on the amount of money staked in 
the next gamble. An extension of this inquiry is the effect 
of a double payoff on the preceding trial (a very favourable 
outcome) compared with the trial which was preceded by a 
double payoff followed by 3 losing trials in succession (that 
is, a pleas ant res ul t followed by 3 unpl easant out comes) . A 
related analysis looked at the influence of runs of 1, 2, or 
3 winning or losing outcomes on the betting behaviour of 
gamblers and non-gamblers and the changes in betting effected 
by these runs of wins and losses. 
The bets in the after-double-win and 
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after-double-win-3-1osses trials were analysed using a MANOVA 
design for repeated measures (output in Appendix 32). Again 
a significant GAM main effect was found, F (1,72) = 4.8, P = 
8.832. Gamblers (mean bet::: 28.6 cents) bet more money than 
non-gamblers (mean bet = 22.1 cents). There were no 
significant interactions except for a near significant 5-way 
interaction of GAM x WILO x GCUE x AROUSAL x OUTCOME, F 
(2,72) ::: 3.1, p::: 0.051, the output of which is shown in 
Appendix 33. The only sensible thing that can be said about 
the interaction is that the amount of money staked in the 
after-double-win-3-1osses trial is much more variable than 
the after-double-win trial for both gamblers and 
non-gambl ers. All the factors seem to have a little 
influence on the stake size or risk taken without any 
systematic variation. 
The bets of the trials following the 1 win/loss, 2 
wins/losses and 3 wins/losses were analysed using a MANOVA 
design for repeated measures (output in Appendices 34 and 
35). There was a GAM mai n effect, F (1,72) ::: 4.1, P ::: 8.046. 
As expected, gamblers (mean bet = 28.4 cents) staked higher 
amounts of money than non-gamblers (mean bet::: 23.1) 
following trial<s) with outcome(s) of 1, 2, and 3 wins and 
losses. A significant GAM x GCUE interaction was present, F 
(1,72) ::: 5.5, p::: 8.822, shown in Figure 11. 
Fig. 11. The effect of gambling cues on the betting behaviour 
of gamblers in terms of the stake size following_l ,.2 
and 3 wi nsf' osses tri al s comb'j ned resQecti vel y~ 
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When there were no gambling cue present the amount of 
132 
money staked by gamblers and non-gamblers was fairly similar 
but with cues present gamblers bet a higher amount of money 
than when without cues and non-gamblers bet a corresponding 
lower amount of money following 1, 2, and 3 wins/losses. 
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Another significant interaction is that of GAM x WILO x 
GeUE x OUTCOME, F (1,72) = 5.3, P :::: 0.024 (Fi gure 12). 
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Following wins there is no difference in betting between 
gamblers and non-gamblers in the absence of gambling cues. 
With cues present gamblers increased the size of their bets 
regardless of whether they had a good or poor payoff history 
first. For non-gamblers, although they decreased their bets 
after experiencing both good or poor payoff history first, 
losing in early gambles lowered the risk taken in terms of 
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the amount of money bet. A feature of the interaction 
following losses is in the lose-first situation with cues 
present. Gamblers took distinctively higher risk than 
non-gamblers, who were comparatively very cautious. Agai n, 
there is not much difference between the gambler and 
non-gambler groups without cues present as in the win-first, 
cues situation. Comparing the risks taken after runs of wins 
or losses the most notable feature is the effect of 
reinforcement history in the presence of cues. Gamblers 
increase their stakes while non-gamblers correspondingly 
lower the stakes under the same conditions. 
The analyses which looked at the effects of having runs 
of either wins or losses showed a significant 2-way 
interaction involving WILO x RUNS, approximate multiple F = 
3.7, p = 0.03 (Hull 8. Nie, 1981, using Rao's (1973) 
calculation for the F ratio), shown in Figure 13. 
Fig. 13. The effect of h6ving 6 run of " 2 6nd 3 wins or 
losses on the 6mount of money staked when 
subjects h6ve 6 good or p-oor re'inforcement 
schedule first. 
........ 28 (J) 
..., 
t: 
Q) 
(.) 
-..-
"'0 26 Q) 
.::£ 
10 
..., 
(I) 
=n 
Q) 
t: 24 0 
E 
...... Lose-first 0 
..., 
E:: 
::3 
0 
E 
10 
t: 
10 
Q) 
I: 
1 win/loss 2 wi ns/1 osses 3 wins/losses 
Result of previous outcome(s) 
135 
For subjects encountering 1 win/loss in the previous 
outcome the amount of money staked after experiencing an 
unfavourable reinforcement history was lower than that staked 
after experiencing a favourable reinforcement history, 
Reinforcement history did not have any effect on the trials 
which occurred after a run of either 2 wins or losses, 
However, in gambles preceded by a run of 3 wins/losses the 
effect was the same as that for the after-1-win/loss except 
that the amount of money staked was higher following a run of 
3 wins/losses and lower when preceded by the after-1-win/loss 
trial. 
2. Estimates of the chances of winning and making 
correct predictions, 
An ANOVA was performed on the expectation of winning and 
making correct prediction data on the 30 trials taken 
together (output in Appendix 36), The overall mean 
expectation of winning was significant, F (1,74) = 4.7, p = 
0.033, Gamblers (mean expectation = 40,6%) were more 
optimistic than non-gamblers (mean expectation = 22.5 %), 
After the betting procedure gamblers were again more 
confident (mean expectation = 38.0 %) than non-gamblers (mean 
expectation = 30,8 %), this time of making the right choice, 
F (1,74) = 4.0, p = 0.048, The other almost significant main 
effect was the AROUSAL mani pulation, F (2,74) = 3,1, P = 
0. 051, Expectation of the chances of winning was highest in 
the video-arousal condition (mean expectation = 42.2%), 
followed by the no-arousal condition (mean expectation = 36,3 
%) and lowest of all in the exercise-arousal condition (mean 
expectation = 31.5 %). 
In the next analysis, the means of both the rating 
measures over each of the 30 trials were obtained with the 
ratings of both the gamblers and non-gamblers combined (see 
Figure 14), 
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Subjects' estimation of their chances of winning and 
making correct predictions over the 30 trials follow a 
similar pattern with the major exceptions on Trials 17, 21 
and 26, where there were runs of 2, 3 and 2 losses preceding 
those trials respectively, In Trial 17, while the chances of 
winning was estimated to be lower than the previous gamble, 
the estimation of making the correct prediction was 
increased. Ratings of correct predictions decreased less 
markedly from the previous trials than ratings of chances of 
winning on Trials 21 and 26. 
Fig. 14. 
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Overall, it appears that changes in the winning-chance 
ratings are sharper and more influenced by the outcomes of 
recent gambles, with losses encouraging a more optimistic 
estimate of winning and wins stimulating a more pessimistic 
estimate in the first lot of 15 trials. The trend was 
reversed in the last 15 trials. The dominant influence on 
estimates of correct predictions appears to be the overall 
sequence of wins and losses. Under a series of favourable 
payoff gambles the ratings of correctly predicting the next 
gamble increased steadily but generally decreased slowly 
following a run of unsuccessful wagers. 
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Since a significant GAM main effect was obtained in both 
the rat i n g me a sur e s (F (1, 7 4 ) = 4. 73, p :::: e. e 33 for 
win n i n g - c han c e est i ma t ion and F (1, 7 4 ) = 4. e 4 , p :::: e. e 4 8 for 
correct-prediction estimation) the gamblers ratings and 
non-gamblers ratings were compared. Figure 15 shows the 
ratings of the two groups on the two rating measures. 
The general pattern shows that gamblers were more 
consistent in their ratings of both chances of winning and 
making predictions than non-gamblers. The overall mean 
ratings steadily drop on both measures with a slightly 
greater decrease in the mean rating of chances of winning. 
For non-gamblers, the overall pattern shows two sharp 
rises in estimates for both measures starting from Trials 12 
and 27, and a sharp fall begi nni ng from Tri al 19. 
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In the poor payoff condition, estimates of the two 
measures were very similar compared to the favourable payoff 
condition in which the ratings of the chances of winning were 
nearly always higher than the ratings of correct predictions. 
The latter trend also characterised gamblers' ratings. The 
mean ratings of both the gambler and non-gambler groups 
converges from Trials 16 to Trials 22 which represented a 
period of the worst payoff in the series of 30 gambles. 
While both gamblers and non-gamblers lowered their ratings 
subsequent to the runs of losing gambles, non-gamblers were 
particularly sensitive registering a sharp decrease in 
ratings. 
Comparing the mean stakes of gamblers and non-gamblers 
with their estimates for winning and prediction, gamblers 
appear reasonably consistent, that is, the peaks and troughs 
of the mean stakes correspond fairly well to mean estimates. 
There is, however, a great discrepancy between mean stakes 
chosen by non-gamblers and their mean estimates for winning 
and prediction. The most striking examples include Trials 4, 
8, 17 and 26. In Trial 26, the decrease in mean estimates 
were disproportionally greater than the decrease in mean 
stakes whereas in Trials 4, 8 and 17, the mean stakes varied 
in the opposite direction to that of the change in both the 
me a n est i ma t e s . 
3. Choice of payment and skill versus chance. 
At the conclusion of the experiment, subjects were given 
a choice of keeping half their balance from the gambling 
session or drawing a marble to determine the payment for 
their participation. Twelve subjects indicated that they did 
not want any payment. These subjects were put into a third 
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group apart from those who chose half the balance or those 
who took a chance with the draw. A chi square analysis 
showed that there was a significant difference between 
gamblers and non-gamblers in the choice of payment or 
non-payment, chi square = 19.0, df = 2, P = 0.0001 (output in 
Appendix 37). The choices are more clesrly represented in 
Figure 16. 
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Non-gamblers did not show any preference whereas about 4 
times the number of gamblers preferred the more uncertain 
(risky) mode of payment over the fixed 50 percent of the 
balance. It is also interesting to note that there were many 
more non-gamblers compared to gamblers who were not 
interested in any form of payment for their participation. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire, subjects were 
asked whether the gambling game mainly involved skill or 
chance determination. Gamblers (mean rating = 2.7) perceived 
that significantly more skill was involved than did 
non-gamblers (mean rating 2.1) where 1 denotes pure chance 
and 7 denotes pure skill, F (1,74) == 6.5, P == 0.013. There 
was also an AROUSAL effect in the perception of skill or 
chance involvement in the game, F (2,74) == 3.4, P == 0.038 
(output in Appendix 38). In the non-arousal condition, 
subjects perceived more skill involvement (mean rating = 2.9) 
than the two arousal conditions in which subjects similarly 
rated that more chance was involved (mean rating in both the 
exercise- and video-arousal = 2.2). 
However, when asked to select a gambling game with 
varying combinations of skill and chance determination, no 
difference between gamblers and non-gamblers was evident. 
Similarly, there was no difference between gamblers (mean = 
2.0) and non-gamblers (mean = 1.7) in rating the amount of 
skill involved in correctly predicting the outcome of a 
coin-toss (output in Appendix 39). Both group ascribed that 
the correct prediction as more of a chance event. 
Gamblers were significantly different from non-gamblers 
in their probability preference even when all the choices 
have an expected value of .3, F (1,94) = 5.3, P = 0.024 
(output in Appendix 40). Gamblers preferred the chance of 
winning about 71 cents with a probability of .43 whereas 
non-gamblers opted for a more certain choice of a .58 
probability of winning about 51 cents. 
4. Luck 
Only a small number of either gamblers or non-gamblers 
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keep a lucky item in their posession. Neither was there any 
difference in the degree of superstition rating between the 
two groups (gambler = 2.8, non-gambler::: 2.4). However, when 
it comes to a belief in luck, gamblers (mean rating = 4.0) 
made significantly higher ratings than non-gamblers (mean 
rating = 2.9), on a 7-point scale, F (1,94) ::: 11.6, p::: 0.001 
(output in Appendix 41). 
Subjects also rated whether they were lucky or unlucky 
during the gambling session. The rating of luck showed a 
significant WILD effect, F (1,74) ::: 8.8, P ::: 0.004 (output in 
Appendix 42). Subjects who experienced the better payoff 
schedule in the second half of the experiment rated 
themselves more lucky (mean rating::: 4.5) than those who 
experienced the better payoff sequence first (mean rating ::: 
3.9). There was also a significant WILD by AROUSAL 
interaction in the rating of luck during the gambling session 
F (2,74) ::: 3.8, P = 0.028. 
in Figure 17. 
This interaction is illustrated 
In the win-first condition, the arousal manipulations 
did not seem to have any effect on the ratings, clustering 
around 4 which constituted the neutral position of a 7-point 
scale. However, not havi ng any arousal or exerci se-arousal 
in the lose-first condition increased the rating of having 
luck during the game while video-arousal remained unchanged 
by the manipulation of payoff history. 
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Gamblers (mean rating = 4.0) gave significantly more 
optimistic judgements than non-gamblers (mean rating = 3.1) 
when asked to evaluate their chances of winning a game they 
were going to play, F (1,94) = 11.9, P = e. eS1 (output in 
Appendix 43). 
Further analyses examined other possible contributions 
for the observed differences between the criterion groups. 
The was no difference in the perception of a major 
contributing factor to their overall success or failure in 
the gambling session between gamblers and non-gamblers (see 
Table 13). 
1 .(I <1 
Table 13. Responses to the question: What do you 
think is the most important factor contributing 
to your overall win or loss? 
Chance Luck Skill Knowledge Others 
Gamblers 
Non-gamblers 
28 
32 
7 
7 
3 
1 
5 
6 
5 
2 
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Judgements of fairness of the game was also very similar 
between gamblers and non-gamblers (see Table 14). 
Table 14. Responses to the question: Do you think 
the game was fair ( not rigged)? 
Yes Could No Probably Don't 
be not know 
Gamblers 1 8 18 3 7 2 
Non-gamblers 19 17 5 3 4 
However, significantly more gamblers than non-gamblers 
indicated that there were cues which influenced their betting 
behaviour, chi square = 7.8, df = 1, P = 0.005. Table 15 
below gives a breakdown of the variables that affect the 
subjects' betting. 
Table 15. Breakdown of the responses to the 
guestion: Were there any cues which may have 
influenced the way you bet? 
1 • Enjoyment 
2. Beeps 
3. Feeling good 
4. Chance of winning 
5. Boredom 
6. Mone y (s take si ze and mone y 
in hand 
7. Occurrences of dice numbers 
8. Knowledge of odds or other 
forms of gambling 
Gamblers Non-gamblers 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 1 
o 1 
23 
31 
2 
1 1 
16 
3 
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From Table 15 it is clear that money and dice numbers 
were the most salient factors influencing betting behaviour. 
Moreover, these were specified twice as often by gamblers 
than non-gamblers. 
Both gamblers (mean rating = 5.3) and non-gamblers (mean 
rating = 4.4) rated the game as enjoyable on a 7-point scale 
(output in Appendix 44). This difference in ratings was 
significant with gamblers enjoying the game more, F (1,74) = 
9. 2, P :: 0. 003. A significant 3-way interaction of GAM by 
WILO by AROUSAL was present, F (2,74) = 3.6, P ::: 0.032. 
interaction is shown in Figure 18 below. 
This 
Eig. 18. The effect of arousal and reinforcement history 
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The major effect appear to be the video-arousal under 
the different payoff schedules. Gamblers were fairly 
consistent in their ratings throughout the different 
conditions but video-arousal in the lose-first condition 
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lowered the rating of enjoyment for non-gamblers towards the 
lower end of the enjoyment scale. Another feature of the 
interaction is that gamblers appeared to enjoy the game more 
in the lose-first condition compared to non-gamblers 
indicating that they were susceptible to the more frequent 
gains encountered in the second half of the experiment when 
rating the game. 
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The number of gambles wanted was measured by the number 
of positive responses to the question, "If it were possible, 
would you like to stop now?" In the analysis the criterion 
for a definite desire to quit gambling was 3 consequtive 
affirmative replies. The total number of gambles wanted 
ranged from 15 to 35 since the first 15 were mandatory, at 
least, from the subjects' view-point. As expected, gamblers 
wanted significantly more gambles than non-gamblers, F (1,74) 
= 29.8, P '" 0.001 (output see Appendix 45). A significant 
GCUE effect was evident, F (1,74) = 5.2, P = 0.025. 
Surprisingly, fewer gambles were desired in the presence of 
cues (mean number = 23.7) than where cues were absent (mean 
number = 27.6). There was also a significant 3-way 
interaction of GAM by GCUE by AROUSAL, F (2,74) = 3.6, P = 
0.033. This interaction is illustrated by Figure 19 below. 
The most conspicuous feature in the interaction is the 
decrease in the number of gambles wanted by the non-gamblers 
in the presence of cues while at the same time the desire to 
gamble was decreased in the absence of cues. Overall though, 
cues lower the desire to gamble under both the arousal 
conditions. Gamblers wanted more gambles than non-gamblers 
in either the cues or no cues condition and were only 
affected slightly by the cues. 
Fig. 19. The effect of arousal and gambling cues on the 
35 
number of trials wanted by_gamblers and non-gamblers. 
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Finally, the amount of money that was in the subjects' 
possession at the end of the 30 trials was analysed to give 
an indication as to whether the available balance had any 
influence on the subjects' decisions in betting, desire to 
gamble and success at gambling. 
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There were two significant 2-way interactions (output 
see Appendix 46). In the GAM by AROUSAL interaction, 
non-gamblers appeared to be quite affected by the arousal 
mani pulations, F (2,74) = 5.4, p 0.007, being quite 
successful in the exercise-arousal condition but did very 
poorly in the video-arousal condition as shown by Figure 20. 
Fig. 20. The effect of arousel on gemblers and non-gamblers 
in terms of their success during the gembllng session. 
Exerci se Video Reed 
ArousaJ conditions 
Gamblers, on the other hand, were relatively unaffected 
by the arousal manipulations and performed at a level 
equivalent to non-gamblers in the non-arousal condition. 
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The second significant interaction was one of WILO by 
AROUSAL. F (2.74) := 4.5. P == 8.815. illustrated in Figure 21 
below. 
Fig. 21. The effect of arousal and reinforcement on the subjects 
in terms of the success in the gambling session. 
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There was again a striking video-arousal effect. The 
video-arousal effect combined with having few payoffs earlier 
in the session produced a very poor performance. Other 
manipulations did not appear to have any pronounced effect on 
the success in gambling. 
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Discussion 
The results obtained in the analyses show that there 
were quite a number of significant differences between social 
gamblers and non-gamblers and that the experimental 
manipulations were effective in altering the behaviour of the 
subjects in the gambling session, although not all in the 
direction expected. 
1. Betting 
The results clearly indicate that the differences in the 
amount of money staked in the 30 trials were very much 
affected by the presence of gambling cues. When gambling 
cues were present social gamblers placed higher stakes while 
at the same time these cues prompted non-gamblers to lower 
their stakes. The effects of gambling cues might be to 
produce a more enjoyable, entertaining and exciting 
atmosphere which was conducive to gambling thus inducing 
keener participation in the form of greater risk-taking. The 
lowering of the stakes of non-gamblers in the presence of 
cues could be explained in terms of the unfamiliarity of the 
stimuli which probably served to highlight losses and the 
aversiveness of the atmosphere associated with the losses. 
Along this line of thinking, social gamblers may be more 
tolerant towards other aversive non-gambling stimuli compared 
to non-gamblers. This may help explain results such as 
McGlothlin's (1954) who found his gambling subjects to be 
better adjusted than the norms of the Bell Adjustment 
Inventory. This could be easily tested by simply confronting 
both groups with aversive stimuli without any gambling 
content, under those circumstances, social gamblers would be 
expected to tolerate the averaiveneaa better than 
non-gamblers. 
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The overall pattern of gambling indicated that social 
gamblers increased their mean stakes after a loss and 
decrease their mean stakes after a win whereas non-gamblers 
increased their mean stakes following wins and decrease their 
stakes following losses. In ot he r words. soc i al gamblers 
were more influenced by the negative recency effect and 
non-gamblers the positive recency effect although 
non-gamblers exhibit more variability in their decisions. 
This negative recency effect was most pronounced when more 
than one win or loss was encountered consecutively showing 
more fallacious reasoning by social gamblers. 
Typical usage of the term' gambler's fallacy' is 
exemplified by the behaviour of gamblers in a gambling 
situation such as the one in the present experiment. 
Depending on the context it is being used, it has also been 
referred to as the 'Monte Carlo fallacy' or the 'fallacy of 
the maturity of chances'. Tversky & Kahneman (1974) argued 
that in a genuine game of chance no system of prediction is 
possible Which, in part, is what is meant by 'chance'. In 
gambler's fallacy clear cut information about the probability 
of an event is not taken into account because people believe 
that chance is a self-correcting process, such that deviation 
in one direction will necessarily be followed by a deviation 
in the opposite direction to restore equilibrium. In fact. 
deviations are not 'corrected' as such but as a chance 
process unfol ds, it is mere 1 y di 1 ut ed. 
The influence of both positive and negative recency 
effects, shown by the gambling decisions of non-gamblers and 
social gamblers respectively, are really examples of gambling 
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fallacies. In a chance situation it is equally probable to 
expect another loss to follow a previous win or loss and 
another win to follow a previous win or loss. From this 
reasoning and the nature of chance events it would mean that 
the most logical system of betting is a random one without 
taking into consideration the outcome of the previous bet. 
Although the two observed trends represent spurious reasoning 
they, nevertheless, provide guidelines for decision-making in 
a chance situation. 
In the di scus si on above, non-gambl e rs were desc r i be d as 
a little more logical, showing greater variability in their 
betting decisions. The most interesting observation, 
however, is that not only social gamblers but also 
non-gamblers as well exhibited gambling fallacies in their 
decisions and that these fallacies are fairly consistent 
within the gambler and non-gambler group, Future research 
should take into account the differential recency effects in 
sequential gambling especially when the subjects used include 
both gamblers and non-gamblers. 
Cohen (1970) demonstrated that winning and losing have a 
differential effect on the next bet that is placed. There 
was a tendency for his subjects to increase the stake after 
winning and to decrease it after losing although about half 
the stakes placed were unchanged after either winning or 
losi ng. The present data show that the variations in the 
mean stake placed is more a function of the characteristic of 
the group, that is, gambler or non-gambler, in a manner 
descri bed above. In addition, a number of other factors 
appear to be influential as well in determining the amount 
bet. Other investigators have shown that an individual's 
choices among gambles are independent of the amount of money 
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previously won or lost (Slovic, 1962; Slovic et a1., 1965; 
Lichtenstein, 1965; Greenberg 8. Heiner, 1966), but an 
alternative component of reinforcement history, the ratio of 
the number of wins to the number of losses, has significant 
effects on risk-taking behaviour (Greenberg 8. Weiner, 1966; 
Morgan, 1983). Subjects who have experienced either very 
high or low ratios of reinforcement on previous trials 
preferred high-risk gambles while those whose number of wins 
equalled their number of losses tend to select more 
conservative bets as measured by the probability and the 
amount to wi n. 
The effect of having a win compared to having a loss in 
the previous outcome was to decrease the amount of money 
staked when subjects have been aroused, encountered lower 
than 50 percent payoffs, and when the gambling atmosphere was 
dull. On closer inspection, a run of 3 losses following a 
double win appear to have an inexplicable effect on both 
social gamblers and non gamblers introducing many variations 
in the betting under the various influences. All the 
analyses showed that cues increased risking in social 
gamblers and decrease risking in non-gamblers but in the bets 
preceded by runs of 1, 2, and 3 wins and losses the major 
difference between social gamblers and non-gamblers was 
highlighted after subjects have experienced a greater than 50 
percent payoff ratio with cues present. Winning and runs of 
2 or 3 wins encouraged higher risk-taking in social gamblers 
following a history of better than average number of payoffs 
while non-gamblers decreased the size of their bets under 
similar conditions. Furthermore, social gamblers took even 
mo r e r i IS k s follow i n g two i n d i cat 0 r 13 0 f go 0 d f or tun e , an 
immediate one and another which was spread over a longer 
period of 15 trials and, similarly, for non-gamblers 
following immediate wins a good reinforcement history 
inspired greater risk-taking. Immediate losses only 
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exacerbated the effect of a poor reinforcement history by 
increasing risking in social gamblers and decreasing risking 
in non-gamblers again, showing consistent negative and 
positive recency effecs in social gamblers and non-gamblers 
respecti vely. This is further support for the contention 
that there is an interaction between the immediate and the 
longer term ratios of wins and losses in determining the size 
of the next bet. The other two important determinants of 
stake size were the presence or absence of gambling cues and 
the gambling status of the subjects - gamblers or 
non-gamblera. Overall, having a favourable reinforcement 
history stimulated higher risk-taking and an unfavourable 
reinforcement history reduced the risk taken for all subjects 
combi ned. Another interesting observation is that the effect 
of having a run of 2 wins or losses cancelled out the effect 
of individual wins or losses. When runs of 3 wins or losses 
were encountered the effect is similar to that following an 
outcome of 1 win or loss but with greater potency. It would 
be i nt eres ti ng to see how runs of 4, 5, 6 or more wi ns or 
losses effect the risk subjects will take. Extrapolating 
from the present results after a run of 4 wins/losses the 
risk taken will be like that after a run of two wins/losses 
and for a run of 5 wins/losses the result will be similar to 
that of 3 wins/losses but with an even greater influence 
ei ther way. But, the results of Myers & Fort (1963) suggest 
that the influence of a run of wins or losses will peak after 
3 consecutive similar outcomes have occurred although 
according to Anderson & Whalen (1960) th length of the run 
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before alternation occurs has yet to be determined. In any 
case, it is fairly clear that it was the number of wins and 
losses encountered and the vicinity of these outcomes, rather 
than the abaol ute amount of mone y won or los t, t ha twas 
critical in inducing the changes in the size of the 
subsequent stakes. This observation supports Horgan's (1983) 
results which showed that the number of initial wins is a 
seemingly more important variable than the actual monetary 
holdings in determining the risk preference. 
2. The subjective estimates of the chances of 
winning and making correct predictions. 
Prior to the gambling session social gamblers were a bit 
unsure of their chances of winning and non-gamblers were 
relatively more pessimistic. However, during the gambling 
session social gamblers expressed heightened optimism in 
their gambling decisions compared to non-gamblers in terms of 
the amount staked, ratings of the chances of winning and 
making correct predictions. A s me n t ion e d ear 1 i e r , the 
optimism in social gamblers may be a function of an 
over-representation of success events than failure events 
encoded in their memory. One can argue that bets higher than 
the overall mean bet chosen by social gamblers reflect their 
risk-taking tendency while the ratings of the chances of 
winning and making correct predictions really reflect 
optimism or pessimism and cannot be explained by a 
risk-taking propensity. A plausible explanation was offered 
by Greenberg & Weiner (1966) who observed a general trend 
among subjects whose subjective probabilities were biased. 
Further support for the contention that gamblers evaluate 
subjective probabilities of winning in a biased manner came 
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from Gilovich (1983). He speculated that subjects who are 
psychologically invested in being effective bettors, people 
who actually gamble in the real world, will be more biased in 
their evaluation of outcomes as compared to non-gamblers. 
This is derived from the observation that 'fluke' events are 
apparently siezed upon by losing subjects to explain away 
their 10SSi winning subjects, on the other hand, are 
unaffected by these events and this predicted bias is found 
only for those subjects for whom it is important to be an 
effective bettor. 
In the present experiment this persistent optimism of 
social gamblers relative to non-gamblers gradually decreased 
over the gambling session. Non-gamblers appear to be more 
suseptible to the outcomes of their previous two or three 
gambles in terms of the rating measures which again manifest 
the significance of the positive recency effect. 
Non-gamblers and social gamblers lowered their ratings 
subsequent to a run of poor returns but non-gamblers were 
particularly sensitive, exhibiting a sharp decrease. This 
provides further evidence that the same gambling outcome can 
have different effects on gamblers and non-gamblers. It is 
also interesting to note that social gamblers were nearly 
always subjectively more confident in winning than in making 
a correct choice. The same was true of non-gamblers in the 
good reinforcement half of the session but they were 
surprisingly similar in their ratings of both measures in the 
poor reinforcement half. The two sets of ratings were also 
comparatively more equivalent for social gamblers in the 
poorer payoff half of the experiment than the better payoff 
half. A possible explanation is that in times of adversity 
closer attention to the various parameters of gambling is 
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required resulting in closer matching of both subjective 
measures. Objectively, these measures should be identical. 
For example, a 60 percent chance of choosing the right number 
will yield a 60 percent chance of winning the bet. One 
possible reason for the discrepancy between the two measures 
is that the time lapsed between the first and second 
subjective measures was long enough to allow the subjects to 
reconsider their decisions. Since the task was basically one 
of chance orientation further deliberation would increase the 
uncertainty of the situation resulting in the lowering of the 
second subjective judgement in each trial. The similarity of 
the two measurements in the poor reinforcement section is 
interesting but difficult to interpret. It is suggested that 
perhaps non-gamblers exhibit greater rationality under 
adverse conditions, not allowing extra deliberation to 
distract them from adhering to their original subjective 
expectation of winning while at the same time consistently 
under the influence of the positive recency effect. 
Another interesting observation is that the mean 
subjective estimates and the mean stakes placed did not 
appear to correspond to each other as one would expect. It 
is a reasonable strategy to place a high stake when one is 
confident of winning and a low stake when one feels likely to 
lose. In this respect social gamblers were relatively 
rational whereas bets made by non-gamblers were highly 
discrepant with their subjective estimates of winning and 
making correct predictions. The independence of one set of 
decisions to the other indicates that perhaps the failure of 
non-gamblers to realise the relationship between the gambling 
decisions may be due to their inexperience in gambling. 
3. Probability. skill/ chance preference. enjoyment 
of the game and the belief in luck. 
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In terms of a certain or uncertain payment social 
gamblers clearly preferred to take a chance for a larger or 
smaller payment whereas non-gamblers were indifferent to the 
choices. There are several possible reasons for this 
observed difference; 
1. Gamblers took more risky alternatives as a habit; 
2. Gamblers selected drawing the marble simply for the 
excitement of an uncertain event; 
3. Gamblers saw the chance event as a challenge, also as an 
opportunity to beat the system and, 
4. Gamblers hoped to receive more than just half of the 
balance at the end of the session, that is, valued money more 
than non-gamblers. 
Only one gambler was not interested in any form of 
payment at all compared to 11 non-gamblers. This observation 
provided some indirect support for the proposed explanations. 
These results are also in line with research suggesting that 
gamblers may have biased evaluation of probabilities 
(Gilovich, 1983). Social gamblers rated that more skill was 
involved in the game than non-gamblers. This could be due to 
the perception of a skill component in a chance event. The 
ensuing bias would then allow social gamblers to manipulate 
their gambling behaviour in an attempt to improve their 
chances of success. Moreover, gamblers may have 
over-estimated their chances of success because they have 
anticipated them and enhanced their sense of control over the 
out come (L an g e r , 1 976) . As suggested earlier, gamblers may 
have more success events encoded in memory thus giving them 
an illusion of a greater likelihood of winning. Phillips 
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(1972) investigating the probability preferences of gamblers 
and non-gamblers obtained results which showed that gamblers 
opted for the highest utility choices available with the 
accompanying low probability of obtaining them. Gamblers, on 
the other hand, took both the utilities and probabilities 
into consideration whereas non-gamblers appeared to be 
motivated by the payoff alone, thus showing a learning and 
experience effect. Some of the gamblers in Phillips' sample 
remarked that their choice was a compromise between two 
, dislikes' 1. the infrequency of the reward that went with 
long shots and, 2. the i nsuffi ciency of reward that went wi th 
favouri tes. Phillips' data also indicated that in a 
situation which, on average, subjects can expect to sustain a 
loss they will come to regard not losing as a sort of a win. 
The present data point to a likelihood that the preference 
for the greater risk measured either by a choice of lower 
probability of winning or higher stakes placed could be 
related to the gamblers' higher estimates of success and 
optimism compared to non-gamblers. Overall, social gamblers 
took greater risks, chose the more uncertain alternative and 
have a more biased perception of the skill component in a 
chance game but there was no evidence to show that social 
gamblers prefer more chance than skill involvement in a game 
as compared to non-gamblers. 
All these characteristics together with a stronger 
belief in luck indicate an external orientation in social 
gamblers, at least in comparison to non-gamblers, although 
there was no difference in the perception of an important 
influencing factor contributing to the subjects' wins or 
losses, Neither was there any difference between the two 
groups in judging the impartiality of the game. The most 
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important elements in the game were money that was available 
to the subjects and the frequency of occurrence of dice 
numbers. These factors were twice as influential for social 
gamblers compared to non-gamblers. It was rather surprising 
that the probability of winning was mentioned only once and 
the probability of losing not mentioned at all, since these 
are some of the parameters that were commonly manipulated in 
the early studies of risk-taking, especially those of Slovic 
and Lichtenstein and their associates. However, phrasing the 
question differently might have elicited quite different 
responses. 
Social gamblers, in general, enjoy the game more than 
non-gamblers under most conditions. The significantly higher 
number of gambles desired by social gamblers supported the 
assertion that social gamblers experienced greater enjoyment. 
Maehr & Videbeck (1968) also found that subjects who were 
high risk-takers showed an overall higher mean persistence in 
performing a binary response task. Both greater enjoyment 
experienced and longer participation in the gambling session 
by social gamblers were evident even though both social 
gamblers and non-gamblers were equally successful in the game 
as indicated by the equivalent balance at the end of the 
session. This suggests that social gamblers may have reasons 
other than economic ones for participating in gambling 
activities. A pure joy of gambling is proposed to be an 
important motivational factor in the maintenance of gambling 
behaviour. This proposition has, on the the whole, been 
neglected in empirical gambling research, probably due 
largely to the difficulty in quantifying the concept. 
However, complex mathematical expressions have been 
formulated to qualify the concept in terms of more familiar 
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quantities such as expected values and utilities (Lee, 1969; 
Meginniss, 1976; Fishburn, 1980; Ebanks, 1982). With added 
research the pure joy of gambling concept could prove to be a 
useful indicator in discriminating between gamblers and 
non-gamblers as a selection criterion for research purposes. 
Generalisation of this concept to pathological gamblers 
s h 0 u 1 d bema d e wi t h c aut ion, i fat all, sin c ere sea r c h 
suggests that there are several important differences between 
social and pathological gamblers. Pathological gamblers bet 
more heavi ly (Lorenz & Shuttlesworth, 1983) than 
non-pathological gamblers, quite often down to their last 
penny before quitting (Livingston, 1974; Gamblers Anonymous, 
1974) and in many respects gamble as if they are addicted to 
gambli ng. That is to say, pathological gamblers do not 
gamble for the pleasure, excitement and money but more so to 
satisfy a craving, avoid withdrawal symptoms (Dickerson, 
1977a; Wray & Dickerson, 1981> and if psychoanalysts are to 
be believed, to dissipate unresolved conflicts. There are a 
number of references to the unimportance of money to 
pathological gamblers in their gambling pursuits particularly 
from psychoanalysts (for example, Bergler, 1958/1970) and the 
brilliant author Dostoevsky (1949). Money is merely a means 
to an end, to be used in gambling, to lose in an effort to 
alleviate guilt feelings (Greenson, 1947; Bergler, 
1958/1970), to challenge Fate (Lindner, 1950) and in 
Dostoevsky's (1949) illustration of a compulsive gambler 
money is a vehicle to fulfill gambling urges and test Fate. 
In other words, the pure joy of gambling appears to be unique 
to the social gambler. If this joy of gambling can be more 
concretely demonstrated it may lead to a better understanding 
of the fascinating allurement of the gaming tables and 
race-tracks and possibly a revision of some of the 
risk-taking theories. 
4. The influences of gambling cues, reinforcement 
history and arousal. 
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Next, the effects of the manipulated variables including 
gambling cues, reinforcement history and arousal are 
revi ewed. Although there was only one significant gambling 
cues main effect in any of the analyses of the data, several 
interactions were significant. Most of those interactions 
were with the gambler/non-gambler variable which highlight 
the relevance of gambling cues in the differentiation of 
social gamblers and non-gamblers. The only significant 
interaction of the gambling cues not with the 
gambler/non-gambler variable was with reinforcement history, 
arousal and outcome. It appears that gambling cues have an 
influence on the potency of the effects of the outcomes of 
previous gambles whether they were experienced in a series of 
trials prior to the gamble in question or when those outcomes 
immediately preceded the gamble in question. The consistent 
observation of cues promoting greater risk-taking in social 
gamblers may be explained by the familiarity of an enjoyable 
situation for them. Non-gamblers seem to take most risk 
under conditions where there were no 'frills and thrills', 
suggesting that gambling cues may present more of a 
distraction rather than an attraction for risk-taking as was 
the case for social gamblers. Specifically, social gamblers 
characteristically derive pleasure from a situation where 
monetary stakes are at risk and this joy of gambling is 
further enhanced by gambling cues. Non-gamblers not only 
derive no joy from gambling but the presence of gambling cues 
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also appears to suppress whatever monetary risk-taking urges 
they have. 
It is important to note that gambling cues were only 
influential in altering betting behaviour and not the other 
associated behaviours such as expectations of winning, making 
the right predictions and perception of luck. This could 
indicate that gambling cues only have impact on the 
risk-taking tendency of social gamblers. 
There were also a number of significant effects from the 
manipulation of the reinforcement history and related to that 
the influence of the previous outcome and runs of those 
outcomes. In general, following wins, stakes were increased 
and stakes were lowered following losses. The influence of 
the previous outcome over the size of the subsequent bet was 
at the same time biased by the reinforcement history 
experienced. After experiencing a good reinforcement 
history, bets were high following wins and low following 
losses but the experience of a bad reinforcement history had 
the opposite effect, that is, lowering stakes following wins 
and increasing stakes following losses. This would suggest 
that the number of payoffs received over a series of previous 
gambles also has a critical influence on the size of the 
subsequent bet than the outcome of the preceding bet. One 
explanation would be that subjects felt that the ratio of 
previous wins and losses was a good indicator of the outcomes 
of future gambles but being highly irrational in terms of the 
understanding of chance events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974) and 
biased by various fallacies (Cohen, 1972) the outcome( s) of 
the immediate preceding gamble( s) also exert their influence. 
Subjects who experienced the good payoff schedule in the 
second half of the experiment rated themselves more lucky 
166 
than those who experienced the good payoff schedule first. 
This can be explained by a recency effect since the rating 
was made soon after the end of the last gamble, that is, the 
immediate successes created an illusion of good luck. This 
contradicts Ryckman & Rodda's (1971) finding that subjects 
who had initial success on the task were more confident that 
they would do well on the remaining problems than subjects 
who experienced failure initially. However, this difference 
may not be too critical given the diverse nature of the tasks 
in the two experiments and more importantly different 
subjective evaluation that were employed. 
FUrther analyses of the luck ratings showed that the 
ratings of luck were relatively similar under varying arousal 
manipulations in the win-first condition but in the 
lose-first condition the most luck was perceived when there 
was no arousal followed by a deflated luck rating under 
exercise arousal and the lowest luck rating occurring under 
video-arousal. This result indicates that arousal was 
experienced as an unpleasant stimulus which was associated 
with a lowering of subjective luck. Another negative 
consequence of video-arousal was the strikingly poor 
performance of subjects under this condition after 
experiencing the poor payoff schedule first. This unusually 
large loss could possibly explain the low ratings of luck 
under video-arousal. 
In general, the hypothesis that non-gamblers were 
affected by the outcome of gambles than social gamblers was 
supported especially in terms of the expectations of winning 
and making correct predictions but not so evident in betting 
behaviour. This highlights the importance of the criterion 
on which a construct - in this instance, the effect of the 
outcome of gambles - is being evaluated especially when 
comparing different studies. It is also relevant to note 
that both the result of the preceding outcome or a run of 
similar outcomes and the ratio of the number of wins and 
losses previously encountered were influential in altering 
gambling behaviour. 
Finally the results of the arousal manipulations are 
considered. The ratings of enjoyment was affected in the 
same way as the ratings of luck. Both rating measures were 
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relatively unaffected by arousal manipulations in the 
win-first condition with the exception that social gamblers 
enjoyed the game more and non-gamblers enjoyed the game less, 
than all the other manipulations, under video-arousal in the 
lose-first condition. These data provide good support for 
the U-shaped arousal function. The video-arousal raised the 
arousal level inducing a more pleasant state for social 
gamblers but the heightened arousal might have exceeded the 
optimal level for non-gamblers making the situation aversive. 
The video-arousal produced both the highest stakes 
placed and highest expectation of winning followed by 
exercise-arousal and non-arousal conditions respectively in 
the main effects. Both arousal conditions also tended to 
increase the ratings of chance rather than skill involvement 
in the game, that is , more accurate perception of the chance 
orientation of the game was made. It seems that arousal, 
especially video-arousal, promoted accurate judgement of the 
chance nature of the game. In spite of that higher risk were 
taken in terms of higher stakes placed and g~eater optimism 
were expressed, in terms of the subjective chance of winning 
as if the individuals were caught up with the spirit of the 
occasion. This observation is more easily explained by 
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separating the Bubjects into the two criterion groups. 
Soqial gamblers would be trying to achieve optimal arousal by 
taking greater risks and the accompanying optimistic 
expectations of winning may be interpreted to be a means of 
reassuring themselves, perhaps to maintain a peace of mind. 
Non-gamblers, on the other hand, being unfamiliar to such 
increased arousal in a gambling situation became agitated by 
the additional video-arousal thus biasing their judgements 
and enhancing their risk-taking due to a disruption of the 
regulating mechanism as proposed by Cohen (1964). 
detailed explanation was provided by Rule, et al. 
A more 
(1971> who 
hypothesised that increased emotional arousal may decrease 
the perception of risk and increase the risk taken in a 
situation. Descriptions of a person upset by some prior 
experience suggest that the upsetting experience mutes their 
sense of danger. This could be due in some cases to the 
person's attention being focussed on irrelevant cues. It 
could, however, be due to his/her elevated arousal level and 
a concomitantly low subjective estimate of the probability of 
unfavourable consequences. 
Video-arousal seemed to have over-aroused the optimally 
aroused non-gamble rs whi 1 e, on the whol e, the addi t i onal 
arousal appeared to have made the game more enjoyable for 
social gamblers who were hypothesised to be Bub-optimally 
aroused and to have a higher arousal threshold than the 
average person. For social gamblers the desire was for a 
continuation of heightened arousal by requesting for more 
gambles compared to non-gamblers. Gambling cues also seemed 
to have the effect of overloading the arousal in non-gamblers 
causing them to markedly reduce the number of gambles wanted. 
Social gamblers appeared to be unaffected by arousal in 
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terms of their successes or failures throughout the gambling 
session as indicated by the amount of money they had at the 
end of the session. This could reflect the experience, 
habituation and increased tolerance in gamblers to the 
variations in arousal under certain circumstances, especially 
gambli ng. On the other hand, non-gamblers performed 
distinctively poorly under the video-arousal condition. 
Having a poor payoff schedule coupled with video-arousal also 
produced an inferior performance but this unfavourable 
video-arousal effect seemed to be neutralised by the positive 
win-first condition. This would suggest that having a poor 
reinforcement history is aversive which interacts with 
emotional arousal to create an even more unpleasant situation 
resulting in the poor performance. 
The data collected so far seemed to lend some support to 
the notion of the U-shaped arousal function. Although the 
experiment was not specifically designed to test the 
hypothesis of gamblers as under-aroused individuals with a 
high threshold for arousal some of the data gathered could be 
used to refine this hypothetical model. 
One major problem with the model of the under-aroused 
gambler is the specification of the optimal level of arousal 
for the optimally aroused individual. According to the 
literature this optimal arousal is one which the individual 
is most efficient in performing the particular task in hand, 
with different individuals having different optimal levels 
and different tasks requiring different levels for optimal 
effi ci ency. A related problem is the determination of 
whether the value obtained constitutes a point on the left or 
right of the optimal level. That is to say it is difficult 
to determine the level of efficiency the person is 
functioning at a point in time, whether an increase in 
arousal would improve or deterioriate performance. 
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The last major obstacle in this model is quantifying the 
arousal produced by each type of stimulus which is 
encountered in a gambling situation. This would enable an 
indirect mapping of the position of gamblers and non-gamblers 
on the arousal curve. 
It is wrong to assume that gamblers are chronically 
under-aroused 24 hours of the day and every day of the year. 
It is more realistic to suggest that the under-arousal is 
determined by the levels of hormones in the biological 
system. The effects of a number of naturally occurring 
stimulants such as endorphins are only beginning to be 
understood. It is possible that the monetary risk-taking 
activities of gamblers are expressions of a search for 
stimulation, in this instance, one which is internal in 
nature not unlike the' jogger's high'. Furthermore, as in 
the case of drug and alcohol use and abuse social and other 
psychological factors may be involved. Zuckerman (1979a,b) 
has ably reviewed the optimal level of stimulation and 
arousal theories and also research on sensation-seeking. He 
proposed a biological model incorporating hormones and 
neurotransmitters to account for the sensation-seeking trait. 
The present model is not very different from that developed 
by Zuckerman except in the terminology employed. It is 
argued that although sensation-seeking may be a better term 
in that it is more specific, it nevertheless implies a 
, dri ve' to seek some form of arousal. Currently the concern 
is more in clarifying the nature of the biological influences 
of the urge to gamble and the obvious starting point is the 
well established concept of optimal arousal. 
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One practical significance of this model is that, if it 
can be established that gamblers are indeed under-aroused 
individuals and that gambling is their preferred means of 
sensation-seeking to attain their optimal level of arousal 
then, for problematic gamblers, an alternative form of 
arousal inducing activity may be introduced into their 
behaviour repertoire, instead of treatment methods such as 
lengthy psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Boyd & Bolen, 1970) or 
the discomforting aversion therapy (Barker & Miller, 1968; 
Goorney, 1968; Seager, 1970). 
To sum up, the results of this experiment lend some 
support to the notion of a U-shaped arousal curve and also 
the notion of the gambler as an under-aroused individual. 
However, a lot more work is required to determine the effects 
of arousal and other gambling related variables such as 
gambling cues, reinforcement history and gambling experience 
of the individual and the effects of the interactions of 
these factors on gambling behaviour. It was shown that the 
relatively ignored arousal mechanism and gambling cues are 
influential factors in gambling decisions and should be taken 
into consideration in future studies. 
The final words of this chapter most appropriately come 
from Cohen (1972) who speculated that, 
The ease with which men everywhere (and increasingly 
women too, and even children) become punters or gamblers, 
whatever the nature of the stake or payoff, points, not 
to an instinct of gambling, but to a 'divine discontent' 
which is distinctly human. Animals do not play poker, 
nor are they interested in football pools. Yet they are 
capable of 'probability learning', and the fact that 
intermittent reinforcement renders their habit more 
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resistant to extinction than continuous reinforcement 
suggests that arousal mechanisms may possibly be at work 
in a manner common to man and animal alike; an analogy 
between the self stimulation of a rat with electrodes 
implanted in its hypothalamus and a man sitting in front 
of a one-arm bandit may not be entirely far-fetched. 
CHAPTER SIX 
AN APPLICATION OF THE REPERTORY 
GRID TECHNIQUE TO GAMBLING RESEARCH. 
Introduction 
Since the publication of "The psychology of personal 
constructs" (Kelly, 1955), an increasing number of studies 
have used the repertory grid as a research tool. The 
applications of the grid technique have gathered further 
impetus with the advent of computers. Slater's INGRID 67 
program was one of the first to become accepted and widely 
available for grid analysis. This was later updated and 
replaced by the INGRID 72 which is still commonly used. 
The repertory grid is used primarily as an exploratory 
tool in this thesis. Thus, there will be minimal discussion 
on Kelly's Personal Construct theory although it is 
acknowledged that Kelly provided the most significant 
contribution to the development of the repertory grid 
technique. Bannister and Mair (1968) have noted that grid 
methods can be employed independently of construct theory. 
The theory can be formulated without reference to the 
technique and conversely grids are obtainable without 
depending on the theory. 
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Kelly's fundamental postulate is that man's behaviour is 
directed by the way in which he anticipates events. For 
Kelly, understanding another man is achieved to the extent 
that we know how he goes about the task of making sense of 
his world. The personal construct system of each individual 
is the set of representations or models of the world he has 
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developed which has been acquired through social experiences, 
some pre-verbal, and others verbally transmitted, but not all 
of it accessible to the individual in terms of 
self-consciously held concepts. In all cases, this system is 
to some degree shared with otherB and to Borne degree unique 
to the individual. The personal construct system iB not 
i mm uta b 1 y fix e d but as wit h B c i e n tis t B ' h y pot he s e B , fur the r 
experiences may modify it. 
The personal construct system iB built up of 
interrelated constructs, each individual construct being 
concerned with diBcriminating between elements. An element 
is defined as anything which can be so compared and 
contrasted, such as people, situations or concepts. It is 
important to recogniBe that words are used to label the poles 
of the constructs but are themselves not the constructs. 
Following from Kelly's theory, there are several explicit or 
implicit features which characterised these constructs. A 
construct can only be applied to elements which fall within 
the same class or range of convenience. A distorted picture 
of an individual's construing will be obtained when elements 
used are incomparable, such as an inclusion of concepts, 
situations and people all on the same liBt. By the same 
token, only constructs relevant to all the elements should be 
employed. For example, it makes Ii ttle sense to construe 
whether a piece of rock is kind-unkind or clever-stupid. 
Construing, which Kelly regarded as a typical form of 
thought, is the recognition of a contrast between two sets of 
things. For example, a man construes his acquaintances when 
he forms the opinion that some are stupid and others are 
clever. The construct stupid-clever would be senseless to 
him if it does not provide any distinction between people he 
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has to mi x wi tho Even though only one of its opposite poles 
is defined a construct is implicitly bipolar. The term used 
to define it explicitly is described in that case as the 
emergent pole and the contrast left undefined as its latent 
pole. 
Another important feature of constructs is that they are 
arranged in a hierarchical order. One construct may subsume 
another as one of its elements, in which case its ordinal 
relationship is known as superordinal and the relationship of 
the other becomes subordinal. Thus, an individual structures 
his constructs by concretely arranging them into hierarchies 
and by abstracting them further. Since man is constantly 
construing events and processes around him, and re-evaluating 
his constructs, superordinacy is then a relative term. A 
construct is seen as more or less superordinate at different 
points in time. 
A grid may be defined as any form of sorting task which 
allows for the assessment of relationships between constructs 
and which yields these primary data in matrix form (Bannister 
and Mail', 1968). The grid itself records interactions 
between two sets of functions- a set of operators and a set 
of operands- named by Kelly (1955) as constructs and elements 
respecti vely. Some examples of different elements that hve 
bee nus e d a I' e : fee 1 i n g s (F I' a n sell a and A dams, 1 966) , 
situations (Watson, 1970), diseases (Orley and Leff, 1972), 
occupations (Shubsachs, 1975), consequences of si tuati ons 
(Watson, Gunn 8. Gristwood, 1976), rooms (Honikman, 1976), 
relationships (Ryle, 1981>. This list is by no means 
exhaustive but illustrates the great versatility which 
characterises the grid technique. A number of psychologists 
have regarded the grid and the Semantic Differential as 
176 
similar measuring tools in psychological research. There 
are, however, a number of important differences between the 
two measurements which make the grid a superior and more 
appropriate instrument to use in the context of this thesis. 
Osgood (1962) argued that "meaning is a multi-dimensional 
space and that a particular word will be represented by a 
point in this multi-dimensional space." In summary, the 
Semantic Differential is an instrument which utilises 
seven-point, bipolar rating scales. This rating scale is 
itself a special scale since it is derived from an extensive 
series of factor analytic studies. The instrument allows a 
cross comparison of the meanings of two different words for 
one subject, or the meanings of one word for a number of 
subjects, by enabling the experimenter to sum ratings in 
terms of three allegedly major dimensions of meaning. 
The major difference between grids and the Semantic 
Differential is that personal construct theory lays great 
stress on the idea that constructs and construct sub-systems 
have limited ranges of convenience and that personal 
construct theory embodies a fairly radical set of assumptions 
compared to the traditional theories of human psychology. 
The central characteristic of Semantic Differential is its 
utilisation, on the basis of factor analytic research, of 
three major, allegedly orthogonal dimensions. Since they are 
thought to be independent of each other, they are designed to 
give maximum dispersion of concepts in the structured 
semantic space, thereby providing an optimal description of 
the meaning of concepts thus plotted. The Semantic 
Differential assumes the generality of meaning in the words 
used to label the scales and concepts - a strange assumption 
for a measure of meaning - while the grid asks a question and 
attempts an answer (Bannister and Hair, 1968). In grid 
terms, the Semantic Differential is concerned with the 
placement of certain specific elements in relation to a 
number of constructs. The advantage of the grid method is 
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that not only does it allow an examination of the elements in 
the construct space but also allows an examination of the 
relationships between constructs in the element space. 
A description of the repertory grid technique. 
The raw data of a grid consist of an m by n matrix where 
m is the number of elements and n the number of constructs. 
The grid denotes the elements in the individual's range of 
convenience which is usually assumed when the elements are 
provided. This grid can either be obtained by ranking or 
grading the elements in terms of the constructs. For 
example, in the AROUSAL GRID (Appendix 25) the situation that 
causes most anxiety will get a ranking of 11, the one that 
elicits the second highest amount of anxiety will get a 
ranking of 10 and so on with the least anxiety provoking 
situation being assigned a ranking of 1. The remaining rows 
are obtained in a similar fashion using different constructs 
each time. Ranking is not the only method of scaling that 
can be used, any other method that the informant can manage 
is permissible. A seven-point scale used in a similar 
fashion as the Osgood's Semantic Differential (1957) also 
forms a two-way table of numerical entries which can be 
treated like a grid. Even a 1 or 0 grading denoting the 
applicability of the construct to each element in turn will 
serve the purpose of providing a grid although the nominal 
properties of its entries restrict the range of analyses 
available. The advantages and disadvantages of each method 
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are discussed in Hair and Boyd (1967), Bannister and Hair 
(1968), Fransella and Bannister (1977), Shaw (1980), Shaw and 
Gaines (1981) and others. 
When factor analysis or principal component analysis is 
proposed the computations begin with the calculation of a 
covariance matrix. It may be formed by summing squares and 
products over the constructs and elements. In experiments 
with grids interest is not likely to concentrate on one 
aspect of the data and overlook the other. Besides studying 
the relationships between particular constructs, the 
experimenter may want to examine the relationships between 
parti cuI ar elements and, mos t of all, the re 1 at ions hi ps 
between functions of one set and the functions of the other. 
Factor analysis is unsuitable for a few reasons. The 
fundamental objection to it is the untenable assumption of 
specific factors. It cannot give all the results required 
but is limited, at best, to a dubious and incomplete analysis 
of the correlations between operators or constructs (Slater, 
1964). 
The grid may be read either by row or column. Each way 
of reading the array gives the specifications for a 
multivariate dispersion. The entries in any column form a 
vector of co-ordinates giving the location of the element in 
a space with an axis for every construct- C-space for 
conveni ence. Likewise the entries in any row form a vector 
locating the construct in a space where there is an axis for 
every element, the E-space. Thus, there are two multivariate 
dispersions corresponding exactly to the array of entries but 
generally appearing very different from one another 
geome tr i cally. Since they both represent the same data one 
may expect to find some relationship between them. Principal 
component analysis defines the connection between the two 
(Slater, 1960i 1977). 
It is most common to see grid results represented on a 
two dimensional diagram in C-space (Ryle, 1975; Slater, 
1976) . The elements are distributed at different distances 
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in different directions away from their point of equilibrium-
the multivariate mean- which has been placed at the origin of 
the C-space by the operation of centering. The distance of 
an element from this origin measures the importance of the 
element in the construct system, sometimes referred to as its 
sali ence. The relation between the two dispersions is shown 
on the plane of the first two components (usually with the 
h o.r i z 0 n t a I a xis for the fir s tan d the ve r tic a I a xis for the 
second component). The plane is treated as a section of the 
component space within the C-space, the elements being 
indicated by points and the constructs by directions. 
The points for the elements are found by taking their 
loadings as co-ordinates. Similarities and differences are 
indicated by the differences between them. In order to show 
the relations between constructs a circle with a convenient 
radius is drawn round this distribution with its centre at 
the origin, but rectangular boundaries are just as effective 
and commonly presented in the literature. The loadings of 
the constructs define the axes crossing it and their opposite 
poles are shown projecting from the circumference. The axis 
of a construct will pass through the centre and the point 
determined by construct loadings as co-ordinates. It is 
extended to the circumference in both directions to show its 
positive and negative poles. 
In summary, the diagram shows the relationships among 
and between constructs and elements. The degree of accuracy 
of the plane used depends on how much of the variation is 
absorbed by the roots of the first two components. Three 
component diagrams can also be mapped by using the polar 
co-ordinates of the constructs and the projections for the 
elements to locate their respective positions on the 
geographical globe. The advantage of a 3-component diagram 
is that results for all three components can be combined. 
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The circumference of a circle is replaced by the surface of a 
sphere. The Ingrid 72 program lists their polar co-ordinates 
to simplify mapping of such results (Slater. 1977). 
The relevance of the grid technique in gambling 
research. 
A commonly debated point concerning the grid technique 
centres on the use of either provided or elicited constructs, 
adequately discussed in Bannister and Hair (1968) and more 
recently reviewed by Adams-Webber (1970). There is evidence 
to suggest that grids using provided constructs can produce 
meaningful results (Nysteld. Ekehammar & Kuusinen. 1976) and 
are significantly related to individuals' behaviour 
(Fransella & Bannister, 1967>. In any case, it is 
theoretically impossible to «supply" constructs since 
constructs are not verbal labels but are really the 
discriminations which the subjects make between elements. 
Thus, all that can be supplied are the verbal labels to which 
people will attach their own constructs. If the guesses of 
the experimenter are good and there is close agreement 
between the verbal labels used' supplied' and' elicited' 
constructs will not make much difference. On the other hand, 
unfamiliar supplied verbal labels will produce a marked 
difference (Fransella & Bannister, 1977>, But as constructs 
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in this study have been selected from a common pool they are 
not, in any simple sense, either' provided' or 'elicited'. 
When both the constructs and elements of the grid are in 
practical terms 'supplied' to the subjects the grid can be 
seen as a special kind of personality questionnaire (Slater, 
19713). Duck (1973) suggested that the advantages of the 
repertory grid over personality tests seem to depend on its 
emphasis on the more personally relevant items of cognitive 
structure. In Duck's study, for the grid, the content 
similarity between generated constructs was recorded (the 
words used), and in the Californian Psychological Inventory 
similarity of marks on the test (the numbers scored). Thus, 
in the latter case, it may have been possible for subjects 
with different answers to sets of particular questions to 
achieve a similar score without any great agreement existing 
between them on the particular items. Duck (1973) also 
pointed out that any dimensional test of personality relies 
on the same measuring technique for summarising personality. 
The other advantages of the grid technique are that it gives 
the subjects a chance to disclose a lot about themselves in a 
short time and because of the nature of its construction it 
is adaptable for use in nearly any situation. 
In this study the grid is adapted to investigate the 
relationships between elements and constructs pertinent to 
gambli ng. With the STIMULUS GRID (Appendix 22) additional 
analyses were carried out especially on the data concerning 
elements THE PERSON I AM and THE PERSON I WOULD LIKE TO BE, 
to examine the perceptions of the self and ideal self in 
terms of the provided constructs. In the AROUSAL GRID an 
attempt was made to specifically include elements that were 
gambling related activities along with the associated 
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emotions as constructs. The choice of elements and 
constructs were deliberately biased to allow for a more in 
depth examination of the personal constructions of gamblers. 
Non-gamblers were included as controls even though it is rare 
for controls to be used in grid studies due to the potential 
difficulties in sharing constructs between groups (Bannister 
& Ma i r, 1 968; S I ate r , 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 7 7) . However, Watson, Gunn & 
Gristwood (1976) showed that the grid can usefully be 
employed in a group situation and indicated the potential of 
the grid in group research. 
It is hypothesised that a number of differences between 
the constructions of gamblers and non-gamblers will emerge 
without expectations of any predicted pattern due to the 
nature of the grid analyses. It is the organisation of the 
construct-construct and construct-element interrelations 
which is the fundamental interest in this experiment and the 
applicability and usefulness of the grid technique are 
apprai sed. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects completing the STIMULUS GRID consisted of 
23 non-gamblers and 13 gamblers who took part in the 
Stimulus-bound Experiment which was described in Chapter 4. 
Subjects completing the AROUSAL GRID were made up of 48 
non-gamblers and 48 gamblers who participated in the Arousal 
Experiment described in Chapter 5. 
Construction of the grids. 
The elements and constructs of the STIMULUS GRID were 
fully ·provided'. Elements were persons who were assumed to 
be influential in the subjects' lives including four 
different perceptions of the self. Constructs consisted of 
character descriptions that were relevant to gamblers and 
were derived from previous studies including the Personality 
Study described earlier (see Appendix 22 : STIMULUS GRID). 
The elements and constructs were 'elicited' for the 
AROUSAL GRID. Three social, non-pathalogical gamblers 
(personal acquaintances of the author) were extensively 
interviewed individually without any rigid structure to 
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gather information pertaining to gambling activity, The most 
frequently mentioned situations and associated emotions were 
included in the grid. The resultant grid contained 
situations or behaviours which are related to gambling as 
elements and the associated feelings or emotions as 
constructs (see Appendix 25 AROUSAL GRID). 
In the STIMULUS GRID both poles of the constructs were 
explicitly identified while only a single term designating 
the construct is provided in the AROUSAL GRID. 
Procedure 
Subjects were asked to complete the grid by indicating 
how the constructs apply to the elements using a 7-point 
rating scale. It was explained clearly that 1 and 7 were 
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respectively the lowest and highest ratings allowed with the 
rating of 4 as the indifference point between the two 
extremes. Subjects were also required to give their 
impressions without deliberating too long on anyone item. 
They were verbally assured that it was their opinions that 
were being sought and that there were no right or wrong 
answers. In both cases nearly all grids were completed 
between 15 to 25 minutes. 
Note 1. 
Due to the frequent reference to the terms social gambler 
the word social is omitted from the text in this section 
although the characteristics of the gambler refers to the 
social gambler. 
Note 2. 
In the Results and other subsequent sections elements will 
be denoted by capital letters and constructs by an emphasised 
font to allow easier differentiation between the two 
components of the grids. 
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THE STIMULUS GRID 
The individual STIMULUS GRIDs of the 13 gamblers and 27 
non-gamblers were averaged into two 'consensus' grids 
representing a typical gambler and non-gambler grid respectively. 
This was achieved by calculating the mean rating of each cell in 
the 13 gambler grids taken together and the same procedure was 
used with the 27 non gambler grids. The two grids were then 
analysed using Slater's INGRID 72 program. A principal component 
analysis was carried out on both the grids of the typical gambler 
and non-gambler along with the options for obtaining the 
construct construct and construct-element interrelationships. 
The interrelations between the constructs are shown on Table 
16 in terms of their correlations and angular distances. For 
gamblers there was a significant positive correlation between the 
construct does not like/ likes to gamble and does not 
believe/ believes in luck supporting the previous finding that 
a belief in luck is closely associated with gambling. The pole 
believes in luck was also associated with the pole likes 
excitement. The pole takes risks was associated with 
likes excitement and is optimistic while the opposite 
pole does not take risks was associated with the poles 
tends to worry. has a liberal outlook and is not 
superstitious. 

Further examination of the interrelationships between the 
constructs showed a cluster of the following constructs; is 
usually calm! tends to worry, is not concerned about failure! 
fears failure, has high! low self esteem, has a liberal! 
conservative outlook, is not! is superstitious and is 
pessimistic! is optimistic. 
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Interestingly, the constructs does not need! needs 
achievement, is not easily! is easily aroused, does things better 
alone! better in a group and prefers known! uncertain 
outcomes did not correlate with any of the other constructs. 
The polar co-ordinates for constructs and projections for 
elements provided by the INGRID 72 can be used to plot their 
positions on a 3-dimensional plane (Appendix 47). These 
constructs when depicted on a composite diagram for the first 3 
major components (accounting for 86.5 % of the total variance) 
showed the dispersion of the construct and element positions on 
the 3-dimensional geographical globe (Figure 22). This gives a 
convenient representation of the interrelationships between the 
constructs and elements but it is difficult to indicate the third 
dimension, that is, the distance of the points away from the 
origin (A program for projecting a 3 dimensional sphere onto a 
2 dimensional surface using NCAR on the B6900 is given in 
Appendi x 56 - courtesy of R. G. Ri tchi e) . 
From the component loadings of both the elements and 
constructs (Appendix 48) it is possible to obtain the emergent 
poles of the important constructs and elements. 
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Composite diagram for components 1, 2 and 3 
for the gamblers' STIMULUS GRID. 
A indicates the position constructs 
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The first component, which accounts for 67.8 % of the 
variance, is explained by the following constructs and 
elements and their contrasts. 
positive pole negative pole 
elements 
6 the person I dislike most 2 the person I would like 
8 the person who usually 
upsets me 
4 
5 
to 
the 
10 
the 
be 
person I will be in 
years time 
person I admire most 
7 the person I Ii ke most 
11 the person whose company 
I enjoy 
constructs 
3 is usually calm/ tends to 2 does not take/ takes 
worry risks 
5 is not concerned about/ 4 does not like/ likes 
fears failure excitement 
6 has high/ low self-esteem 14 is pessimistic/ is 
optimistic 
10 has a liberal/ 11 does not believe/ 
conservative outlook believes in luck 
13 is not/ is superstitious 9 does things better alone/ 
better in a group 
The second compone nt, whi ch account s for 11 % of the 
variance, consists mainly of the element THE PERSON WHOM I 
FI ND COMFORTI NG. This is contrasted by the element THE 
PERSON I AM, which is associated with the construct does 
not likel likes to gamble. Finally, the third component, 
accounting for 8 % of the variance, comprises mainly the 
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elements THE PERSON WHOM I FIND THREATENING and THE PERSON 
WHOSE COMPANY I ENJOY with the associated constructs does 
things better alone! better in a group and prefers known! 
uncertain outcomes. 
The non-gambler STIMULUS GRID 
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The' average' non-gambler grid was similarly analysed by 
using the INGRID 72 program. Correlations and angular 
distances between constructs are shown in Table 17. For 
non-gamblers the construct pole likes gambling is 
associated with construct poles has a conservative 
outlook and is superstitious while at the same time the 
opposite pole does not like to gamble is associated with 
does not like excitement. The construct pole takes 
risks is correlated with the construct poles does things 
better in a group and prefers uncertain outcomes. The 
contrast pole, does not take risks is associated with 
is not concerned about failure and has high 
self-es teem. The pole believes in luck is positively 
correlated with the constructs poles; fears failure, has 
low self-esteem, needs achievement and has a conservative 
outlook but does not believe in luck is associated with 
is pessimistic. A very similar grouping of correlated 
constructs is again evident for non-gamblers. This cluster 
of constructs includes; is usually calm! tends to worry, is 
not concerned about! fears failure, does not need! needs 
achievement, is not easily! is easily aroused, has a liberal! 
conservative outlook, is not! is superstitious, and is 
pessimistic! is optimistic. 
Table 17. The inter-correlations and angular distances 
between constructs for the non-gambler STIMULUS GRID. 
CONSTRUCT 1 
213.4563.4 
6 -e. 22 1132.9 
113 13.713 45.8 
14 -13.57 125.13 
CONSTRUCT 2 
3 13.33 1138.9 
7 -13.15 98.4 
11 -8. 28 186.5 
CONSTRUCT 3 
3 8. 613 
7 8. 65 
11 8. 34 
53. 6 
49. 6 
713. 2 
4 -8.813 98.8 
8 -8.34 118.1 
12 8.84 33.1 
4 -13.72 135.6 
813.5755.3 
1213.2675.1 
5 -13.68 133.2 
9 13.69 46.8 
1313.13686.6 
5 8. 18 
9 8. 74 
13 8.86 
84. 3 
42. 3 
31 . 1 
6 -13.77 1413.3 
18 -13.24 183.6 
1413.2476.8 
4 -8.68 126.8 5 8.78 38. 8 
84. 7 
33. 7 
6 13.52 58.8 7 
1 1 
e. 91 
e. 64 
25.2 
58. 3 813.9616.3 913.89 113 13.9123.9 
12-13.47118.31313.83 14 -8.94159.7 
CONSTRUCT 4 
5 13.22 182.4 
9 -8.68 127.8 
13 -8.82 145.5 
CONSTRUCT 5 
6 e. 84 
9 -8.42 
12 -13.87 
33. 2 
114. 7 
158. 4 
CONSTRUCT 6 
7 8. 48 
18 8.39 
13 8.17 
CONSTRUCT 7 
61. 7 
66. 8 
88. 8 
8 -8.86 
11 8.72 
14 -8.92 
38. 4 
44. 2 
157. 8 
CONSTRUCT 8 
98.15 81.4 
12 -8.44 116.2 
CONSTRUCT 9 
188.36 68.7 
13 8.54 57.3 
CONSTRUCT 18 
118.66 48.6 
14 -8.84 147.6 
CONSTRUCT 11 
12 -8.61 127.8 
CONSTRUCT 12 
13 -8.22 1132.6 
CONSTRUCT 13 
14 -8.88 151.4 
613.13686.3 
18-13.78141.3 
148.5755.5 
7 8.46117.5 8 -13.58 125.3 
1213.1283.2 11 -8.31 1138.1 
7 8; 78 
113 8. 59 
13 13.58 
8 
11 
1 4 
8. 57 
e. 66 
e. 54 
. 38. 4 
53. 8 
613. 1 
55. 1 
48. 6 
122. 9 
9 13.113 84.2 
12 -8.43 115.7 
113 13.94 
13 13.79 
11 13.137 
14 -13.16 
213. 6 
37. 6 
86. 2 
99. 1 
12 -13.34 1139.7 
13 8.64 513. 6 
14 8. 52 58.9 
8 8. 74 
11 8.74 
14 -13.88 
9 -8.48 
12 -8.78 
113 13.77 
13 13.83 
42. 3 
42. 5 
142. 7 
118. 9 
1 41 . 6 
413. 13 
34. 13 
118.69 46.1 
14 -8. 88 152.1 
12 8.59 54. 2 
13 13.88 27. 9 
14 -13.75 138.5 
1 91 
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The first two components of the non-gambler grid account 
for 90,3 % of the variance thus a two-component composite 
diagram (Figure 23) is considered adequate in demonstrating 
the relationships between the constructs and elements. The 
component loadings for all the elements and constructs 
indicate their contribution to the total variance and provide 
the coordinates for plotting the respective points and axes 
(Appendix 49), 
Fig. 23. 
Two component graph of the non-gamblers' STIMULUS GRID 
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The first component explains 67.6 % of the variance 
contributed mainly from these constructs and elements along 
with their contrasts. 
posi ti ve pole negative pole 
elements 
6 the person I dislike most 2 the person I would like 
to be 
8 the person who usually 5 the person I admire most 
upsets me 11 the person whose company 
I enjoy 
constructs 
3 is usually calm/ tends to 14 is pessimistic/ is 
worry 
8 is not easily/ easily 
aroused 
13 is not/ is superstitious 
7 does not need/ needs 
ac hi eve ment 
1 does not like/ likes to 
gamble 
optimistic 
4 does not like/ likes 
excitement 
10 has a liberal/ conservative 
outlook 
5 is not concerned about/ 
fears failure 
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The second component accounted for 22.7% of the variance 
derived mainly from the following elements and constructs. 
positive pole 
elements 
3 the person I was 5 years 
ago 
1 the person I am 
negative pole 
10 the person whom I find 
threatening 
constructs 
6 has high/ low self-esteem 1 does not like/ likes to 
gamble 
9 does things better 
alone/ better in a group 
2 does not take/ takes 
risks 
Significance of the results of the STIMULUS GRID 
It would appear that for gamblers taking risks is 
associated with positive, socially admired characteristics 
such as having high self-esteem, not being concerned about 
failure, doing things better in a group and preferring 
uncertain outcomes. This tends to create a picture of 
risk-taking as an activity engaged in to improve ones 
interpersonal status, similar to an adolescent's desire for 
recognition or to appear 'cool'. In other words, it may be 
alleged that gamblers present themselves as rather immature 
individuals, inferred from the constructs associations. 
Support for this allegation comes from Livingston's (1974) 
observation that a glaring characteristic of compulsive 
gamblers is "a craving for unsolicited attention or 
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admiration, a desire to attract and enchant all eyes". In 
the same study Livingston also noted that members of Gamblers 
Anonymous frequently refer to their past 'immaturity' as an 
explanation for their gambling. 
A completely different set of constructs is associated 
with risk-taking for non-gamblers. This includes excitement, 
optimism, calmness, liberal outlook and not superstitious 
giving the impression of a more mature, rational relationship 
between risk-taking and these constructs, This is a very 
interesting difference between the two criterion groups and 
its significance will be further discussed along with the 
results of the AROUSAL GRID. 
Gambling, not surprisingly, is associated only with luck 
for gamblers which is in turn positively correlated with 
excitement whereas for non-gamblers luck is unrelated to 
gambling or gambling related activities. Instead, luck is 
more associated with more social and personal constructions 
such as concerns about failure, levels of self-esteem, 
achievement needs, outlook in life and a pessimisticl 
optimistic attitude, Thus, it seems that the seriousness and 
concerned nature of non-gamblers is also evident in their 
perceptions of luck compared to the rather frivolous attitude 
of gamblers. This assertion is further confirmed by the 
correlation of not liking excitement, having a conservative 
outlook and being superstitious, with the gambling construct. 
One could almost feel a sense of aloofness among the 
non-gamblers possibly approaching contempt towards gamblers 
for their' weakness' . 
In the analyses of the interrelationships between 
constructs and elements the first components for the gambler 
and non-gambler grid both contributed about 68 % towards the 
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variance. Furthermore, the constructs which are prominent in 
this component are relatively similar and in the case of the 
elements nearly identical. This means that most of 
constructions of the person elements are consistent for both 
the typical gambler and non-gambler. The association of 
different poles of the same constructs with the same elements 
provides additional evidence that similar persons were 
construed in the same manner but differentiated by 
contrasting poles. This also increases the validity of the 
grid technique in the comparison between the two groups. 
The first component seems to involve positive versus 
negative features of interpersonal relationships. In both 
groups THE IDEAL SELF is clustered with THE PERSON I ADMIRED 
MOST and THE PERSON WHOSE COMPANY I ENJOY which were 
contrasted with THE PERSON I DISLIKE MOST and THE PERSON WHO 
USUALLY UPSETS HE. These are associated with their 
respectively related constructs, the significance of which 
has already been discussed earlier. 
The second component which accounted for 23 % and 11 % 
of the variance of the non-gambler and gambler grid 
respectively, appears to contain a strong bias of the self 
element and gambling construct. One element pole is the same 
consisting of THE PERSON I AM but with a different contrast 
for each group- the SELF element is contrasted with THE 
PERSON I FIND COMFORTING for gamblers and a relatively 
opposite construct, THE PERSON I FIND THREATENING, for 
non-gamblers. Self-esteem is associated with the self in the 
case of non-gamblers and gambling, taking risks and style of 
doing things associated with the threatening person. 
Gamblers, on the other hand, simply relate the gambling 
construct to the self element. This points to an additional 
implication of apprehension to the already unfavourable 
impression of gamblers and gambling activities by the 
non-gambl e r. 
The third component is only important for gamblers, 
accounting for 8 % of the variance. The most salient 
elements are THE PERSON WHOM I FIND THREATENING and THE 
PERSON WHOSE COMPANY I ENJOY. From an inspection of the 
3-component composite diagram the positive element, the 
person providing enjoyable company is associated with the 
certainty of outcome preference whereas the threatening 
individual is associated with the efficiency of being a 
loner! gregarious construct. 
A comparison of the self versus ideal self. 
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To further elaborate on the differences between the two 
criterion groups, the first two columns comprising of the 
elements THE PERSON I AM and THE PERSON I WOULD LIKE TO BE, 
were analysed using a series of t-tests. The two columns 
were treated as 7-point ratings of the self and ideal self in 
terms of the 14 constructs provided using the raw data from 
each individual member of both the gambler and non-gambler 
group as if they were administered rating questionnaires. A 
summary of the t-test analyses of the self data is given in 
Table 18. 
Gamblers, as expected, like gambling significantly more 
than non-gamblers and also, predictably, took more risks as 
well. Although both gamblers and non-gamblers like 
excitement gamblers again prefer significantly more 
exci tement. Gamblers showed a need for achievement which was 
significantly greater than the relatively high rating of the 
same construct by the non-gamblers. Although the high 
Table 18. A summary of the t-tests for the self data 
(1 = gambler, 2 = non-gambler) 
CONSTRUCTS MEAN S. D. T-VAL. 2-TAIL PROB. 
15.54 1.45 
1 does not/ likes to gamble 6. 66 0.000 *-*-
22.44 1.34 
14.92 1.19 
2 does not/ takes risks 2. 84 0.007 *-*-
23.60 1.47 
14.00 1.68 
3 calm/ tends to worry 0. 66 0. 512 
23.63 1.64 
1 6.23 0.60 
4 does not/ likes excitement 2. 62 0.013 *-
2 5. 11 1. 48 
14.77 2.05 
5 unconcerned/ fears failure -0. 01 0. 989 
24.78 1.70 
12.23 1.01 
6 has high/ low self-esteem . -3. 57 0.001 *-*-
23.74 1.35 
6.00 1.41 
7 does not/ needs achievement 2. 1 5 0.038 *-
24.89 1.58 
5.23 1.48 
8 not easily/ easily aroused 1. 97 0. 057 
24.19 1.62 
4.08 2.10 
9 does better alone/ in group 2. 94 0.006 *-*-
22.56 1.19 
3.081.80 
10 liberal/ conservative outlook -0.32 0. 751 
23.26 1.84 
5.620.96 
11 does not/ believes in luck 3. 64 0.001 *-*-
2 3.63 1. 84 
4.382.22 
12 known/ uncertain outcomes 2. 21 0.033 *-
23.07 1.49 
4.00 1.63 
13 is not/ is superstitious 2. 51 0.016 *-
2 2.59 1.67 
5.231.69 
14 is pessimistic/ optimistic 1 . 66 0. 106 
2 4.30 1.66 
(no. of gamblers = 13, no. of non-gamblers 27, df = 38) 
*- denotes p < 0.05, *-*- denotes p < 0.01 
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achievement need could possibly be attributed to the student 
subject sample it is commonly observed that a trade mark of a 
compulsive gambler is his 'big ego' (Livingston, 1974>' 
Other significant differences between the two groups show 
that gamblers, compared to non-gamblers, do things better in 
a group, believe in luck more, prefer uncertain outcomes and 
are more superstitious, all confirming characteristics which 
have been previously attributed to gamblers. 
One rather unexpected result was that gamblers perceived 
themselves to have higher self-esteem than non-gamblers. 
Although there has been no research which showed that 
gamblers have either higher or lower self-esteem compulsive 
gamblers have been described as being egotistical, striving 
for power and constantly competing in an attempt to beat 
someone else, but more often the 'system' (Zola, 1963). 
This would give the impression of the gambler as an 
individual of low rather than high self-esteem. However, it 
is quite possible that high self-esteem is a characteristic 
of social gamblers and low self-esteem one of compulsive 
gamblers. Assuming that compulsive gamblers were once social 
gamblers the high self-esteem that they previously had could 
have been eroded and replaced by a poorer perception of 
themselves due to the difficulties encountered and 
deteriorating circumstances which are part and parcel of 
compulsive gambling. 
The two groups gave similar ratings to the following 
constructs; calmness/ worry, not concerned about/ fears 
failure, is not easily/ is easily aroused, has a liberal/ 
conservative outlook and being pessimistic/ optimistic. 
It would appear that these characteristics are not as 
important as the others in discriminating between the two 
groups. It is surprising that gamblers were not 
significantly more optimistic than non-gamblers since this 
trend has been quite consistent in the gambling literature 
and. especially. throughout this thesis. Since actual 
gambling was involved when ratings were taken in this study 
it may be that the optimism of gamblers apply to gambling 
activities but not in other areas of life. 
Similar analyses were performed on the ideal self data 
which consisted of the ratings on the element the person I 
would like to be. A summary of the t-test results of the 
ideal self data is given in Table 19. 
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Table 19. A summary of the t-tests for the ideal-self data 
( 1 ""gambler, 2=non-gambler). 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 does not/ likes to gamble 
2 does not/ takes risks 
3 calm/ tends to worry 
4 does not/ likes excitement 
5 unconcerned! fears failure 
6 has high! low self-esteem 
7 does not! needs achievement 
8 not easily! easily aroused 
9 does better alone/ in group 
MEAN 
1 5. 23 
S. D. 
1. 64 
2 2. 413 1. 39 
5.231.42 
2 3.93 1.77 
12.013 1.08 
22.26 1.16 
1 6.23 13.93 
2 5.137 1.43 
3.542.07 
23.313 1.82 
11.85 1.21 
22.48 1.139 
1 5.23 2.24 
2 3.89 1.55 
4.38 1.85 
2 3.22 1.67 
1 3. 85 2. 23 
2 3. 56 1. 613 
T-VAL. 2-TAIL PROB. 
5. 66 
2. 31 13.1326 * 
-0. 68 e. 5134 
2. 64 13.1312 1< 
0. 38 e. 7138 
-1. 67 e. 1134 
2. 21 e. 1333 * 
1. 99 e. 1354 
e. 47 e. 6413 
- ----
1 2. 1 5 
10 liberal! conservative outlook 
1 . 73 
2 2. 85 1 . 35 
1 4.62 2.14 
11 does not! believes in luck 
2 3.37 1.86 
1 3. 31 2. 36 
12 known/ uncertain outcomes 
23.62 1.57 
3.382.18 
13 is not! is superstitious 
2 2. 11 1. 45 
15.77 1.48 
14 is pessimistic! optimistic 
2 5. 313 1 . 913 
(no. of gamblers 13, no. of non-gamblers 
1< denotes p ( 13.135, 1<1< denotes p ( 13.131. 
-1. 413 e. 1713 
1. 89 e. 1367 
e. 51 e. 611 
2. 213 13.1334 * 
e. 79 e. 435 
= 27, df = 38) 
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Half of the significant differences between the two 
groups disappeared when the subjects rated how they would 
like to be as compared to what they were. The ideal person 
for gamblers still likes to gamble, takes risks, needs 
achievement, likes excitement and is superstitious 
significantly more than non gamblers. All the constructs 
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listed appeared to be gambling related except for achievement 
needs. This observation together with the above discussion 
on the egotistical nature of gamblers suggests that the need 
for achievement may represent a genuine characteristic of 
gamblers. The ratings of excitement and gambling levels on 
the self and ideal self are similar for both gamblers and 
non-gamblers suggesting that these aspects of the self are 
quite acceptable. A certain degree of stability in these 
constructions is also implicated. It is interesting to note 
that gamblers, ideally, do not wish to have such a high 
belief in luck and preference for uncertain outcomes although 
these constructs, like optimism, may be readily subjected to 
change under gambling situations. 
Overall, it appears that there are several constructions 
which seem to differentiate gamblers from non-gamblers and 
these are relatively stable and consistent. With reference 
to gamblers some constructs, perhaps, only become manifested 
under gambling conditions but are relatively unapparent on 
other occasions. 
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The AROUSAL GRID 
The AROUSAL GRIDs derived from the 48 gamblers and 48 
non-gamblers were averaged by using Slater's SERIES program. 
Unfortunately, there was very little documentation available 
on SERIES analysis which meant that the analyses were 
restricted to two ~consensus' grids, again representing the 
typical gambler and non-gambler. The values for each of the 
construct cells were obtained by summing the general mean to 
the differences of each of the element mean subtracted by the 
general mean, obtainable from the output of the SERIES 
analysis. The two resultant grids were then analysed 
individually using the INGRID 72 program. The 
non-normalising option was selected so that the principal 
component analysis, element-element and element-construct 
interrelationships were derived from the 'raw' entries 
obtained by the method described above. 
The gambler AROUSAL GRID 
For this analysis the major points of interest are not 
so much the interrelations between constructs themselves but 
the element-element and element-construct relationships. The 
inter-element relations are available in the output as 
cosines (which can be treated as similar to correlations) and 
degrees (Appendix 50), The relationships are represented in 
a more concise manner on a two-component composite diagram 
(Figure 24) which are derived from the vector loadings of the 
principal components analysis (see Appendix 51), 
Fig. 24. 
Two component graph of the gamblers' AROUSAL GRID 
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I t can be see nth a t the e 1 e me n t s , a t fir s t g 1 a n c e , are 
divided into two major clusters diametrically opposed to each 
other. The element superstitious behaviour appears isolated 
from the rest of the elements. However, closer examination 
of the correlations and vectors expressed in cosines and 
degrees show that superstitious behaviour is negatively 
correlated with elements challenge and risk-taking and that 
the elements decision-making and testing predictions are not 
related with the other elements. Thus, the two clusters 
consisted of the elements uncertainty, loss of control and 
losing money in a bet on one end and, opposing these, the 
elements; monetary gain, having a bet, beating the system and 
less inclusively risk-taking. 
The relations between constructs and elements (see 
Appendix 52) are summarised in Table 20 below. 
Table 213. The relationships between constructs and 
elements for gamblers (only correlations of 0,7 and 
above are included, 'I< and '1<* indicate correlations of 
0.8 and 13.9 or higher respectively>. 
element 
uncertainty 
constructs 
positive corr. 
anger ** 
frustration ** 
depression ** 
remorse '1<'1< 
negati ve corr. 
thrill ** 
interest ** 
joy ** 
excitement ** 
elation ** 
optimism )I< 
loss of control 
losing money 
in a bet 
decision-making 
superstitious 
behaviour 
monetary gain 
anger *'" 
frustration "'''' 
depression "'* 
remorse "'''' 
anger "'*-
frustration *-
depression '" 
remorse **-
determination 
thrill 
"'''' 
interest 
"'''' 
joy "'* 
excitement ** 
elation *'''' 
opt i mi sm*' 
anxiety 
thrill '" 
interest "'*' 
joy *'" 
excitement *-
elation *'" 
optimism '" 
thrill *'" 
interest *'" 
joy"'''' 
excitement "'''' 
determination * 
elation ** 
opU mi sm 
thrill 
excitement 
determination ** 
opU mi sm 
elation 
anxiety 
anger **-
frustration ** 
depression ** 
remorse **' 
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having a bet 
beaU ng the 
system 
challenge 
risk-taking 
thrill 'I< 
interest ". 
joy'" 
excitement '" 
elation '" 
opt i mi s m'" 
thrill 'I<'A 
interest '" 
joy"'''' 
excitement "'''' 
elation "'''' 
optimism '" 
thrill "''* 
interest "'''' 
joy"'''' 
excitement "'''' 
determination *'" 
elation *'" 
optimism "''* 
thrill '" 
interest 
joy 
excitement '" 
determination '" 
elation 
optimism '" 
anger "'''' 
frustration "'''' 
depression "'''' 
remorse 'A 
anger "'''' 
frustration ** 
depression '" 
remorse '* 
anger 
remorse '" 
2137 
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It is clear from Table 19 that the three elements 
MONETARY GAIN, HAVING A BET and BEATING THE SYSTEM are 
construed as direct opposites to LOSS OF CONTROL, UNCERTAINTY 
and LOSING MONEY IN A BET with almost identical constructs 
correlated. The only two differences are the extra negative 
correlation of anxiety with LOSS OF CONTROL and 
determination with LOSING MONEY IN A BET. CHALLENGE and 
RISK-TAKING are both associated similarly with the positive 
emotions by gamblers and a negative correlation between 
CHALLENGE and constructs anger and remorse which is 
interestingly absent in risk-taking. DECISION-MAKING is 
construed in terms of determination while SUPERSTITIOUS 
BEHAVIOUR is negatively correlated with the positive 
emotions. 
The first component, contributing 88 % of the variance, 
could really be regarded as a gambling component since the 
elements and constructs are biased towards gambling. 
more or less, summarises the relationships between the 
elements and constructs as follows: 
This, 
positive pole 
2 uncertainty 
5 loss of control 
First component 
elements 
negative pole 
3 challenge 
8 losing money in a bet 
4 monetary gain 
9 risk-taking 
19 having a bet 
11 beating the system 
3 anger 
4 frustration 
9 depression 
11 remorse 
anxiety 
constructs 
2 thrill 
5 interest 
6 joy 
7 excitement 
8 determination 
19 elation 
12 opU mi sm 
For gamblers the positive emotions are associated with 
gambling and its related situations and negative emotions 
related to unpleasant consequences of gambling. 
The second component contributes 7 % of the remaining 
variance and the most salient element is superstitious 
behaviour which is contrasted with decision-making. If a 
line passing through the origin, joining the two emergent 
opposing poles of the second component, were to be drawn it 
would most closely correspond to the axis of the construct 
determi na t ion. Decision-making is thus associated with 
determination and, implicitly, superstitious behaviour is 
associated with with no determination. 
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The non-gambler AROUSAL GRID 
The grid for the typical non-gambler was derived and 
analysed using exactly the same procedures as for the gambler 
grid. The inter-element relations are obtained (Appendix 
53). and discussed in association with the two-component 
composite diagram (Figure 25) derived from the vector 
loadings of the principal component analysis (Appendix 54). 
From the composite diagram the distribution of elements 
in the construct space is not immediately apparent. There 
is. however. an obvious cluster of 5 constructs the axes of 
which appear to pass through a significant number of element 
points. The inter-relations between the constructs and 
elements are further elaborated by an output (Appendix 55) 
which is summarised in Table 21 below. 
Table 21. The relationships between constructs and 
elements for non-gamblers (again only correlations of 
0.7 and above are presented and correlations of equal 
to or greater than 0.8 and e.9 are indicated 
respectivelY by '" and **. 
element 
decision-making 
uncertainty 
positive corr. 
interest 
determination '" 
opti mi sm 
anger * 
frustration "'* 
depression * 
remorse "" 
thrill *"" 
negative corr. 
challenge 
monetary gain 
loss of control 
testing 
predictions 
superstitious 
behaviour 
having a bet 
interest ** 
joy **' 
excitement ** 
determination ** 
elation ** 
optimism ** 
thrill *' 
interest 
joy *'* 
excitement * 
elation *'*' 
optimism 
anger **' 
frustration *' 
depression 'I<. 
remorse *'* 
interest 
joy 
optimism 
anger 
frustration 
remorse 
thrill 
joy 
excitement 
elation 
anger 'I<. 
depression 
remorse 'I< 
determination *' 
interest >'< 
excitement 
determination '1<.* 
optimism 
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losing money in 
a bet 
risk-taking 
beating the 
system 
thrill 
exci tement 
thrill ** 
joy ** 
excitement '" 
elation "'* 
optimism 
thrill 'A* 
interest ** 
joy 'A'A 
excitement ** 
determination ** 
elation ** 
opti mi sm * * 
remorse 
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From Table 21 there are two obvious contrasting pairs of 
elements; the element CHALLENGE is perfectly contrasted with 
LOSING HONEY IN A BET, and it is also worth noting that the 
correlation between the elements and the constructs are all 
0.9 and over, and the second close contrast is between the 
elements DECISION-HAKING and HAVING A BET. The remaining 
elements do not show clear relationships in terms of the 
provided constructs. The final analysis which should further 
clarify the inter-relations involves looking at the nature of 
the components derived from the principal components 
analysis. 
The first component contributed 70 % of the total 
variance and the associated elements and constructs are 
summarised below. 
posi~ive pole 
2 uncertainty 
5 loss of control 
8 losing money in a 
3 anger 
4 frustration 
9 depression 
1 1 remorse 
First component 
elements 
negati ve pole 
3 challenge 
4 monetary gain 
bet 6 testing predictions 
9 risk-taking 
1 1 beating the system 
constructs 
2 thrill 
5 interest 
6 joy 
7 excitement 
8 determination 
10 elation 
12 optimism 
214 
The first component appears to describe an adventurous, 
competitive, sensation-seekinging set of situations for 
non-gamblers. The ambiguity of situations is seen as a 
challenge to be tested and risked for a chance of monetary 
gain or beating the system. These successful situations are 
understandably construed positively. In contrast, the close 
association of LOSS OF CONTROL and LOSING MONEY IN A BET with 
UNCERTAINTY creates the impression that uncertainty in this 
context is probably better interpreted as being unable to 
control the situation or a state of helplessness. 
Appropriately, these situations are construed in terms of 
severe negative emotional feelings. 
The second component explains 22 % of the remaining 
variation with the following elements and constructs 
associated. 
Second component 
elements 
positive pole 
4 monetary gain 
7 superstitious behaviour 
19 having a bet 
constructs 
negative pole 
1 decision-making 
2 uncertainty 
5 loss of control 
1 anxiety 
3 anger 
4 frustration 
5 depression 
11 remorse 
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It is interesting to note that there are no constructs 
closely associated with the three gambling elements perceived 
by non-gamblers. The most important observation here is that 
HAVING A BET, SUPERSTITIOUS BEHAVIOUR and MONETARY GAIN are 
construed similarly, the implication being that for 
non-gamblers betting is a superstitious behaviour indulged 
mainly for monetary gain. Contrasted with these the elements 
decision-making, uncertainty, and loss of control clustered 
around the opposing end of this seemingly gambling component, 
and these are construed negatively. 
Significance of the results of the AROUSAL GRIDS 
The major difference between the first component of the 
gamblers' and non-gamblers' grids is that for gamblers HAVING 
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A BET is included amongst the elements MONETARY GAIN, BEATING 
THE SYSTEM, CHALLENGE and RISK-TAKING whereas, TESTING 
PREDICTIONS is substituted in place of HAVING A BET for 
non-gamblers. The rest of the correlations, of contrasting 
elements and associated constructs are virtually identical. 
This suggests that, on the one hand, the first component (88 
% of the variance) reflects a strong betting or gambling 
content for gamblers while on the other hand, the first 
component (70 % of the variance) of non-gamblers is more of 
an inquisitive, competitive and venturesome nature. It also 
appears that both gamblers and non-gamblers construed 
negative situations such as uncertainty, loss of control and 
losing money in a bet in similar negative terms. For 
gamblers losing money in a bet is perceived to be an 
unpleasant situation in the same mould as uncertainty and 
losing control. This is contrary to the popular view that 
gamblers do not mind losing money. The two positions can be 
incorporated by the proposition that it is not so much the 
money that worries the gamblers but the fact that the money 
was lost which signifies to the gamblers a feeling of being 
beaten. It has been mentioned earlier that for compulsive 
gamblers money is a tool for gambling and its loss is of no 
great consequence. However, the situation may be different 
for social gamblers in that money is of greater value since 
it provides a medium for gambling but, more importantly, 
winning it is a sign of success. This is especially obvious 
when monetary gain is associated with having a bet construed 
in terms of joy, elation, thrill, excitement, and other 
positive emotions. 
The important elements associated with the second 
component (7 % variance) for gamblers is superstitious 
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behaviour contrasted with decision-making construed in terms 
of determination. Non-gamblers appear to construe the second 
component (22 % variance) as one of gambling. The point to 
note is that although gamblers are seen as superstitious by 
other people, especially non-gamblers, they themselves are 
not prone to associate gambling with superstition. Instead, 
for gamblers superstition is more related to behavioural 
events such as making decisions as opposed to the 
non-gamblers perception of gambling as a superstitious 
behaviour indulged in for monetary gain. Again one gets the 
impression that gambling behaviour is really belittled by 
non-gamblers. For them, gambling and associated situations 
are not at all construed positively unlike gamblers, and the 
contrasting situations uncertainty, losing control and 
decision-making are in turn construed in negative terms. 
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Discussion 
A number of interesting observations emerged from the 
analyses of both the gamblers' and non-gamblers' STIMULUS and 
AROUSAL grids. The t-tests of the self and ideal self data 
also revealed useful information. 
In the gamblers' construction gambling is closely 
associated with a belief in luck but gambling is construed by 
non-gamblers to be related to superstition, conservatism and 
exci tement. The construct takes risks is related to 
excitement, optimism, calmness/worry, outlook in life and 
superstition for gamblers while non-gamblers tend to 
associate risk-taking with doing things better alone or in a 
group, outc orne pre ference, f ai 1 ure and sel f-e s teem. The 
final major difference between the two groups is the 
construction of the belief in luck. Gamblers associate it 
with excitement as well as gambling whereas non-gamblers 
associate belief in luck in terms of failure, self-esteem, 
needs achievement, outlook in life and pessimism. There is a 
similar cluster of the constructs calmness/worry, failure, 
self-esteem, outlook in life, superstition and 
optimism/pessimism for both gamblers and non-gamblers. The 
construct arousal is not associated with any other construct 
in the non-gambler group while for gamblers, in addition to 
arousal, doi ng t hi ngs be t te r alone or ina group and out come 
preferences are not related to other constructs. 
It has been mentioned that the relationships between the 
constructs for gamblers implied a desire for recognition and 
immaturity but a more rational and disdainful picture is 
presented by non-gamblers, all this mainly in relation to 
gambli ng. It is also clear that gamblers tend to construe 
gambling and risk-taking along with other constructs that 
have been previously shown to be associated with gambling 
such as luck, excitement, superstition and optimism. 
Non-gamblers, in addition to some gambling constructs, tend 
to relate gambling and risk-taking also to personality type 
constructs including self-esteem, outlook in life, and 
failure. In other words, gamblers seem to be more gambling 
orientated in their construing as opposed to a social and 
personal approach of non-gamblers especially where gambling 
and risk-taking are concerned. 
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A comparison of the self perception of the gambler and 
non-gambler groups confirms that gamblers are aware of their 
gambling and risk-taking tendencies. Furt hermore, the ide al 
self differences show that gamblers are not worried about 
their gambling interests and imply a willingness to retain 
the status quo. It is quite interesting that the ideal self 
for gamblers include significantly higher needs for 
achievement than non-gamblers suggesting an important 
perceived characteristic of gamblers. 
It appears that the situations uncertainty, loss of 
control and losing money in a bet are construed by gamblers 
as opposites of monetary gain, having a bet and beating the 
system. For non-gamblers a challenging situation is 
perfectly contrasted with losing money in a bet and a less 
precise contrast between decision making and having a bet. 
The first major component of the principal component analysis 
is derived from a similar set of elements and constructs and 
their contrasts for both gamblers and non-gamblers but the 
first component of the gambler grid contributes about 88 % of 
the variance compared to 70 % from the non-gamblers grid. 
The other difference is that the first component for gamblers 
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has a heavy emphasis on gambling whereas for non-gamblers it 
seem to embody a more competitive and adventurous nature. 
There is an unexpected similarity in the constructions 
of uncertainty, losing money in a bet and loss of control by 
both the gamblers and non-gamblers. It was suggested that 
the close associations of the three constructs implied a 
sense of helplessness rather than merely not knowing what to 
expect and/or how to proceed. These situations are construed 
in intense negative terms. Since gamblers so frequently take 
risks in their gambling pursuits it has been suggested that 
losing money is nothing new to them and they might even seek 
uncertainty to increase their arousal level. However, as 
mentioned before, uncertainty may have been interpreted in a 
different manner in this context. It is asserted that 
gamblers dislike uncertainty just like everbody else because 
they do not feel in control of the situation. The effect 
that is desired is more like a delayed unknown result, one 
which is usually revealed in the immediate future. This 
could explain the inconsistencies in the locus of control 
studies. Furthermore, the control experienced may simply be 
a perceived entity. 
The second component deals with superstitious behaviour 
for both gamblers and non-gamblers but has more importance 
for the latter since it absorbs three times the remaining 
variance. It appears to contain a gambling bias for 
non gamblers. It is curious to note that there are not many 
reports from gamblers suggesting their obsession in a 
superstitious habit. Host of the claim regarding the 
synonymy of superstition and gambling usually come from 
researchers and non-gamblers. It may be a consistent denial 
on the part of gamblers or an unconscious belief in fate and 
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the Bupernatural. In any case, the concept of superstition 
and luck in the gambling context is particularly interesting 
and will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. 
Throughout the analyses of both the STIMULUS and AROUSAL 
grids one gets the impression that gambling behaviour is 
condoned, wanted and enj oyed by gamblers. A different 
attitude seems to emerge from the non-gamblers' 
constructions. Gambli ng is seen, more or less, as a 
detrimental behaviour, indulged for avaricious intent using 
illogical, superstitious methods. It is difficult to 
determine how these cognitive differences arise but it would 
not seem too far fetched to suggest that they are a result of 
the circumstance. In other words, in the case of gamblers, 
gambling becomes a pleasurable activity through a social 
learning process with the help of a variety of reinforcers 
including increased self-esteem, satisfaction in winning, 
fulfilling achievement needs and thrill besides the more 
obvious monetary gain. The attitude of the non-gamblers is 
probably derived from a necessity to explain their 
non-participation and for some a disdain for gambling. The 
easiest way to achieve this is to degrade gambling as 
evidenced in the constructions of persons and situations from 
the grid analyses. 
From the above analysis it would appear that the 
superordinate construct which differentiates gamblers and 
non-gamblers is the attitude towards gambling. Gamblers tend 
to construe gambling in positive terms. Non-gamblers are 
less appreciative of the pleasure that can be derived from 
gambling and are normally uncomplimentary towards the 
activity and its participants. This unfavourable disposition 
on the part of non-gamblers may have arisen from the 
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observation of compulsive gamblers who do not generally 
create a good impression by their behaviour. The main point 
here is that besides having a different attitude towards 
gambling and its related activities gamblers also share quite 
a few things in common with non-gamblers. Whether this 
cognitive dissimilarity pervades the personality structure of 
these two groups is still uncertain. From the current state 
of research it appears that there are a number of personality 
characteristics which tended to be associated with both 
social and compulsive gamblers although there is a paucity of 
data on the former group. Considering the prevalence of the 
disease conception of compulsive gambling it will be 
enlightening to study the intermediate stage in the 
progression of the disease since a number of implications 
follow from the model. 
It can be seen that the repertory grid is a useful tool 
in the study of gambling behaviour. Although the data in the 
present experiment were grouped and the operators and 
operands in the grid not totally 'personal' the technique 
still provides a Quick and efficient method of obtaining a 
lot of information from an individual in a relatively short 
period of time. The resulting constructs are a sample of an 
i n d i vi d u a l' sse ma n tic spa c e and, inK e 11 y' s de fin i t ion I par t 
of his personality. The fact that the range is restricted 
and incomplete need not make the repertory grid any worse or 
less satisfactory than other personality test. Indeed, the 
looser structuring of the repertory grid has the advantage of 
allowing the individual to tell us in his own way how he 
views some of his circumstances (Duck, 1973). Inferences are 
made on the assumption that statistical relationships within 
the grid reflect psychological relationships within the 
person's construing system. These psychological 
relationships represent something relatively stable and 
permanent in a person's construct system provided that the 
rules of statistics are observed when interpreting the grid 
results even though the level of statistical significance 
required for accurate prediction is still unresolved 
(Fransella and Bannister, 1977). 
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In conclusion, the grid technique can be gainfully 
employed in gambling research especially in the early stages 
of an investigation. A number of interesting results were 
obtained from the two repertory grids that were presented to 
the gamblers and non-gamblers. These results provided 
implications that might have been less obvious with other 
measurement techniques. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ASSOCIATION OF LUCK AND SUPERSTITION WITH GAMBLING. 
In this chapter an attempt is made to find the link 
between the notions of luck and superstition and gambling 
beha vi our. It is very common for people to associate the 
concepts of luck and superstition with gamblers and gambling 
activity, Many authors have mentioned this relationship but 
224 
few have considered how these concepts relate to gambling and 
why there should be any relationship at all, A brief review 
of the notions of luck and superstition will be necessary 
before they can be discussed in the gambling context. 
A number of references to luck have already been made in 
the previous chapters and the influences and belief in luck 
are investigated in the present studies. It must be 
remembered that the present discussion of luck is limited to 
its effects under situations of uncertainty and gambling. 
Along with methodical studies on gambling in the 
mid-fifties to the late-sixties, Cohen and his associates 
included a fair amount of empirical work into luck research. 
Cohen (1960) reviewed many interesting instances of the 
importance of luck in ancient societies. In an early study, 
Cohen found that when asked the meaning of luck students gave 
two typical responses: one, that it means an unear,ned 
advantage or something fortunate happening to a person 
without any effort on his/her part; and the other is that 
what happens is unexpected or 'against the odds' or a 
fortuitous outside influence'. Cohen and Hansel (1956) found 
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that juveniles and adolescents tend to believe they have 
stores of luck that can be depleted and replenished, in the 
sense that if one of two players has been winning for some 
time, he / she has use d up his 1 u c k, w hi 1 e his / her 0 p p 0 n e nt' s 
store has remained intact and is therefore more likely to win 
in the future. 
In the same study, other features of luck were obtained 
from three groups of subjects; 8-year-olds, 14-year-olds and 
19-year-old students. Eight-year-old children have on the 
a verage one 1 uc ky number, day, and colour, and some times more 
than one. Among 19-year-old (students). about one in two has 
a lucky number and one in three has a lucky day or colour. 
Numbers are thought to be lucky by 8-year-olds (children) 
because they are associated with colours; because they have 
gained pri2es at fairs or raffles; because they are linked 
with gifts; because they relate to birthdays or ages of the 
family or the si2e of the family; because they refer to 
house-doors or registers at school; or because they are 
linked with lucky stones or charms. The most common reason 
for describing certain days as lucky by children is that they 
are the occasion for pleasant events, such as receiving 
gi ft s. Children feel that colours are lucky if they are fond 
of them or think they are nice, or because they make a good 
effect in drawing or they may be the colour of lucky teams or 
badges. Older subjects mostly say they enjoy wearing a 
particular colour and therefore feel well or confident in it. 
Several other questions regarding certain situations 
were also presented to these subjects to assess the extent to 
which luck was believed to be attached to a person and how 
this belief changed with increasing age. The situation 
involved a raffle with a hundred tickets of which one was the 
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winning ticket. One hundred persons drew a ticket from a box 
and put it back. The subjects were told that they have a 
chance to draw a ticket and win a prize and then asked the 
number of people they thought would be lucky enough to draw 
the winning ticket. Children thought that about 50 would be 
lucky, the corresponding figure for the 14-year-olds 
(adolescents) and students being 5 and 2 respectively. 
Increase in age and intelligence make the guess resemble more 
what would actually happen. 
A related question asked was that if they (the subjects) 
had more t han one at tempt, how many would the y need to be 
lucky. There was great variability in the responses: among 
chi Idren, from 2 to 99 (medi an ;:: 4); among adolescents, from 
8 to 100 (median;:: 23); and among students from 5 to 1013 or 
more (median = 30). Agai n, i ncreasi ng age brought about 
increasing realism although there was a clear tendency for 
even the older students to overrate the chances of drawing 
the winning ticket. This could be a result of a poor 
understanding of probabilities and randomness (Teigen, 
1983a,b,c,d; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), or a belief in some 
supernatural force which influences events. Before actually 
drawing their tickets subjects were asked whether they 
themselves would be lucky. About 25 percent of the children 
expected to be lucky and draw the winning ticket but only 12 
percent of the older subjects thought they would be lucky. 
Another study using Training College students and Grammar 
School boys aged about 15 when asked the same question 
yielded a figure of 18 percent. There was also a sex 
difference, 12 percent of females felt lucky compared to 7 
percent of the males in drawing the winning ticket. 
About 28 percent of the subjects in all the age groups 
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felt that they were generally lucky. For the younger 
subjects it was because they had won games or raffles, got 
sums right, had a lucky stone or coin or lots of nice things, 
or because their wishes were often unexpectedly gratified. 
Some thought they were lucky (or unlucky) before they played 
a certai n game and therefore won (or lost) it; others thought 
they were lucky (or unlucky) because they had won (or lost) 
t he game. The reasons given by 19-year-olds were different. 
Some said they were lucky because they had been successful 
wi thout effort, in other words, an unearned advantage. A 
larger proportion identified luck with fortuitous events. 
The next series of experiments in Cohen (1959) looked at 
the concept of luck in terms of performance. Two types of 
tasks were used, one where the outcome could not be estimated 
on an .2.. priori basis, but only in the light of 
previous experience of similar tasks, in this case, to 
estimate how many times they would succeed if they were to 
throw a ball into a basket at distances of 2, 4, or 12 feet. 
In the other task, the outcome of which could be predicted on 
.2.. priori basis, the subjects had to estimate how many 
blue beads would appear if 10 beads were drawn at random, 
with replacement, from an urn containing blue and yellow 
beads well mixed. Similarly, there were 3 levels of 
difficulty: (1) 90 blue and 10 yellow beads in the urn; (2) 
50 blue and 50 yellow; and (3) 10 blue and 90 yellow. 
Subjects were asked to estimate their success under five 
conditions: (1) if they were lucky; (2) if they were unlucky; 
(3) if they were as lucky as they could possibly be; (4) if 
they were as unlucky as they could possibly be; and (5) if 
they were as realistic as possible in making their 
judgements. The results showed that expectations of success 
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depend on how difficult the task appears to the individual. 
When the task seems very easy it is believed that one will be 
successful however unlucky one feels, on the other hand. when 
the task appears very difficult one thinks that one will 
always fail however lucky one feels. At the point of maximum 
uncertainty of either success or failure one is least 
accurate in estimating the amount of luck as compared to the 
realistic values. 
Another question concerned the effect on actual 
performance if the subjects were lucky. unlucky, very lucky 
and very unlucky. The results indicated that when subjects 
felt lucky they hoped for an improvement of 6 to 12 percent. 
An expectation of very lucky implies a hoped-for improvement 
of 12 to 26 percent. An expectation of unlucky carries the 
belief that performance will deteriorate by 15 to 40 percent, 
whilst an expectation of a very unlucky performance implies a 
deterioration of about 17 to 80 percent. In other words, 
lucky and unlucky are not thought of as affecting performance 
symmetrically about a realistic average. The decrement 
expected to occur as a.result of unlucky is about three times 
as great as the increment which luck is expected to bring; 
the discrepancy is nearly as great between the increment due 
to 'very lucky' and the decrement due to very unlucky'. 
Cohen suggested that it was a reasonable observation because 
in practice there are more factors which impair performance 
than improve it. 
The final question was addressed to finding out how 
often one thinks one is lucky or unlucky. since the frequency 
with which good or ill fortune befalls oneself may be an 
important aspect of the idea of luck. Subjects first stated 
the various performances they believe they could achieve with 
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different degrees of luck and unluck respectively. Then they 
were required to say how often in 100 trials they thought 
each of these performances would occur. The results showed 
that realistic situations will occur on about 52 percent of 
the occasions, lucky or unlucky outcomes on about 17 percent, 
and very lucky or very unlucky outcomes on about 7 percent of 
the occasions. 
All three aspects of luck involve a relationship between 
a person and a task. In the more primitive or childlike 
notions, luck is supposed to inhere in a person or thing or a 
period of time, like some indwelling spirit. The present 
observation reveals a more sophisticated concept which 
provides a way of stating that ones performances and 
achievements are not uniformly good or bad but are unequally, 
though systematically, distributed over a range that extends 
from the extreme of bad to the extreme of good. People seem 
to be aware of the fluctuation that characterises any series 
of attempts at a task and that these changes are not random 
but are influenced by a multitude of factors, including 
'unearned advantage' and' fortuitous intervention', which 
they ascribe to the operations of luck. 
Cohen (1960) suggested that the vigorous belief in luck, 
accompanied by a host of luck-bearing devices to trap good 
fortune and circumvent evil, is an antidote invented by man 
to help him in coping with the inescapable uncertainties of 
daily existence. Furthermore, in a competitive culture, the 
idea of luck may serve as a stabiliser, conveniently, that 
is, tot he I u c kyo n e s , and at the s a me time stu I t i f yin g 
initiative and independent thinking. If someone makes a 
fortune merely because the person is believed by others to be 
lucky, and not through having the right connections or 
special merit the individual will be safe from envy. 
Similarly, the unsuccessful need not lose face, they are 
merely unlucky (Merton 1949). 
The experiments of Cohen (1959) showed the various 
influences of luck on the behaviour of the individual. 
Another aspect of the potency of luck was demonstrated by 
Taylor (1967>. In an experiment presented as one on 
extra-sensory perception, subjects were asked to guess the 
sequence of colours in a shuffled pack of playing cards. 
After a preliminary run, those scoring high (lucky) were 
separated from those scoring low (unlucky), The subjects 
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were then required to engage in another round of guessing the 
colours. On a chance basis, one would expect both groups to 
perform equally well in the second guessing task but the 
results showed that the' lucky' group continued to do 
significantly better than the' unlucky' group. The author 
cautiously pointed out that his data provided some empirical 
support for the popular notion of luck. The procedure 
followed for the experiment was quite reasonable with an 
appropriate statistical test used. For this kind of study a 
large sample should be used to prevent any chance effects, 
There were only 12 subjects each in the lucky and unlucky 
groups thus it is possible that the result may have been a 
coincidental grouping of those who performed better and those 
who did not perform as well. Taylor also mentioned that 
assumptions in statistical procedures may be violated when 
response criteria are derived from measures involving 
responses to chance-determined events. On the other hand, 
one may be unjustifiably sceptical about the influences of 
luck. 
The above discussion showed that there are a number of 
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features that characterise notions of luck and its potency 
under various situations. The use of some aspect of luck in 
everyday life is a common occurrence in most individuals. 
Such frequent usage of luck implies its importance in human 
dea1i ngs. Merton (1949) stated that both the eminently 
'successful' and the eminently' unsuccessful' in our society 
quite frequently attribute the outcome to 'luck'. For the 
successful, it is in psychological terms, a disarming 
expression of modesty. In sociological terms, the doctrine 
of luck as expounded by the successful serves the dual 
function of explaining the frequent discrepancy between merit 
and reward while keeping immune from criticism a social 
structure which allows this discrepancy to become frequent. 
On a micro level, for the unsuccessful, particularly for 
those among the unsuccessful who find little reward for their 
merit and their effort, the doctrine of luck serves the 
psychological function of enabling them to preserve their 
self-esteem in the face of failure. This orientation toward 
chance and risk-taking accentuated by the strains of 
frustrated aspirations may help explain the marked interest 
in gambling (Merton, 1949). 
It also appears that the more chancy an operation, the 
more necessary it is to the peace of mind of the individual 
to summon the assistance of supernatural forces (Maple, 
1971>. Thus, it is perhaps not very surprising to find such 
a close relationship between gambling and the belief in luck 
since, by definition, an element of chance exists in any real 
gambl i ng ac ti vi t y. 
Supersti tion 
Superstition is a term which has always been closely 
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associated with discussions on luck. In one of the first 
major studies on superstitions, Haller and Lundeen (1933) 
described a superstitious belief as one that ascribes causal 
relationship to phenomena and objects which bear no such 
relationship to one another. Maple (1971>, in a similar 
vein, commented that superstition has been well described as 
a belief or system of beliefs, based on imaginary connections 
between events and incapable of being justified on rational 
grounds. Although this definition seems quite reasonable 
Jahoda (1970) maintained that there is no objective means of 
distinguishing superstition from other types of belief and 
action and that the term is relative to time and place. 
The results of Maller and Lundeen (1933) indicated that 
the effectiveness of each of the sources including friends, 
home, observation, and education, whether it is in the 
direction of fostering superstition or correcting 
superstitions, depends on the total background of the 
individual. The same source may be fostering superstition in 
one individual and correcting superstitions in another. This 
observation subtly hinted that personality factors may be 
involved in the acquisition of superstitions. I ndeed, more 
recent research provides some support for this assertion. 
Boshier's (1973) study partly supported the propositions of 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) that, 
"superstition is a central component of the highly 
conservative fascistic type person and indicates a tendency 
to shift responsibility from the individual on to outside 
forces beyond his control; it indicates that the ego might 
already have' given up', that is to say, renounced the idea 
that it might determine the individual's fate by overcoming 
external forces." Another study, (Liddell and Morgan, 1978), 
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provided some evidence that ritualistic compulsions in early 
teens could predict later levels of neuroticism and that 
there may also be an association between obsessionality and 
phobic superstitions in young adults, Windholz and Diamant 
(1974) were able to show that the superstitious individual is 
characterised as impulsive rather than controlled, reflective 
rather than practical, neurotic rather than well adjusted, 
and showing characteristics of a schizoid group. 
These psychological correlates of superstitions should 
not totally overshadow the importance of environmental 
influences for it is obviously the interaction between the 
person and the surroundings which gives rise to the 
superstitious beliefs and behaviour. This assertion is well 
demonstrated by Skinner (1948; also, Morse 8. Skinner, 1957) 
in which a type of superstition is developed in pigeons. 
Using operant conditioning, he was able to establish firmly 
the behaviour patterns that happen to precede the 
presentation of the reinforcement. The bird made swiping 
motions with its head behaving as if there were a causal 
relation between its behaviour and the presentation of food, 
although such a relation was lacking. The superstitious 
rituals are not due only to the fact that a reinforcing 
stimulus strengthens any behaviour that may happen to follow, 
even though a contingency has not been explicitly arranged, 
but also to the fact that the change in behaviour resulting 
from one accidental contingency makes similar accidents more 
probable, 
It appears that human beings are no more rational than 
pigeons when it comes to superstitions. Merton (1949) stated 
that the best seed-ground for superstition is a society in 
which the fortunes of men seem to bear practically no 
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relation to their merits and efforts. In a society suffering 
from anomie, the ordinary virtues of diligence, honesty, and 
kindliness seem to be of little avail. As a result, people 
tend to put stress on mysticism: the workings of fortune, 
chance and luck. Jahoda (1969) suggested that where people 
are deficient in the rational understanding of an uncertain 
environment they have a greater tendency to resort to 
superstitious ideas. Superstition creates a false sense of 
security in a situation which demands serious thought and 
posi ti ve action (Maple, 1971) and may thus serve the function 
of reducing anxiety, since it provides at least the 
subjective feeling of predictability and control. 
To summarise, the relevance of luck and superstition to 
gambling behaviour appears to stem from the nature of 
uncertainty in gambling. In Halliday 8. Fuller's (1974) 
definition one of the fundamental ingredients of gambling 
behaviour is that the determining process always involves an 
element of chance, and may be only chance. Work done to 
assess the effects of these influences on gamblers in their 
gambling decisions is virtually non-existent except for 
Cohen's s t udi es. Given the prevalence of gambling activity 
in so many aspects of living it seems strange that so little 
attention has been devoted to the effects of a belief in 
these two constructs. From the results of the present 
stUdies it appears that there are differences between the 
associations of gambling, and luck and superstitions. It may 
be possible that some of the inclination to gamble may have 
arisen from a distorted belief in luck and that superstitious 
practices follow the participation in gambling. Besides 
serving social functions such as allaying envy and providing 
justification for failure in the unsuccessful a belief in 
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luck and superstition may also provide confidence in ones 
decisions thus reducing anxiety and stress. No doubt more 
research in this field will reveal interesting information. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
OVERALL DISCUSSION 
Personality characteristics of gamblers. 
In the initial study an attempt was made to identify 
some personality characteristics of pathological gamblers (GA 
members) and social gamblers with a non-gambler control 
group. One of the aims was to assesss the applicability of 
non-clinical tests in mapping personality characteristics of 
a clinical population. Carey (1968) reported that the 16 PF 
could differentiate pathological gamblers from non-gamblers. 
Unfortunately, the actual differences are unknown since the 
original Carey study is unobtainable. 
The results of the present study showed that none of the 
16 factors significantly differentiated between the three 
groups. However, in a comparison of high risk-takers and low 
risk-takers, Zaleski (1980) found that both males and females 
can be differentiated on the 16 PF. High risk-takers score 
significantly higher on the E (Humble/Assertive), H 
(Shy/Venturesome), I (Tough-minded/Tender-minded) and M 
(Practical/Imaginative) than low risk-takers. To generalise, 
risk-takers compared to low risk-takers are more impulsive, 
assertive, impatient and excitable. They are more 
self-confident, less conventional and have a stronger need 
for power and status. They want to be noticed and 
appreciated by others but in situations of conflict they seem 
to have a higher level of tolerance. However, Zaleski's high 
risk-taking subjects were not economic gamblers ~ 
~ but individuals who chose the more risky alternative 
on the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (Kogan & Wallach, 1964). 
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Although the traits appear to describe the gambler reasonably 
well it is still too early to suggest that monetary 
risk-takers (gamblers) also take greater risks in other areas 
of their lives. There is some evidence that risk-taking in 
various activities is related (Williams, 1965) and a 
suggestion of risk-taking as a personality trait (Knowles et 
a1., 1973) but other studies tended to point out the 
considerable lack of agreement among what are supposed to be 
measures of the same general characteristic (Slovic, 1962; 
1964). It is probably more realistic to accept that there is 
more than one facet of risk-taking as demonstrated by Jackson 
et a1., (1972). The author would like to reiterate that the 
only individuals studied in this research are those involved 
in economic risk-taking. 
At this stage, there are only two consistent personality 
characteristics which have been shown to be associated with 
compulsive or pathological gamblers, that is, they have a 
higher locus of control and higher neuroticism score than 
non-gamblers. One reason for the small number of 
characteristics identified may be the limited range of 
personality questionnaires that have been presented to such 
gamblers. But we may learn from the experience in 
personality research in alcoholism where numerous studies are 
required to clearly pin-point the real nature of alcoholics 
(Cox, 1979) to enable a refinement of classification and 
screening procedures for optimal treatment modalities. Cox 
also pointed out that alcoholics represent a wide diversity 
of personality subtypes. A lot of resources can be saved and 
channelled towards more fruitful projects if the 
multi-dimensionality of risks and the existence of 
personality subgroups among gamblers is acknowledged (Moran, 
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1970b; Kusyszyn, 1972). 
The study of the personality characteristics of social, 
non-problematic gamblers is important because it may provide 
some indication as to the causes or consequences of some 
characteristics. For example, if a particular characteristic 
is present in both social gamblers and pathological gamblers 
then it will be safer to conclude that that trait predisposes 
the behaviour rather than resulting from it. In the other 
case where the characteristic is only present in pathological 
gamblers and not in social gamblers then ascribing 
predisposing qualities to the trait would be rash. However, 
it has been fairly well established that traits and the 
situations interact to form the measured personality at that 
moment (Magnusson, 1976; Endler, 1976; Endler & Magnusson, 
1976; Mischel, 1977). More empirical research with gamblers 
under gambling and non-gambling situations will be required 
to clarify the issue of relative importance of individual and 
situational factors. 
It is common knowledge that there are many social 
gamblers who never progress to the pathological stage. 
Proponents of the disease conception of pathological gambling 
(such as GA members) assert that it is only a matter of time 
before a social gambler turn into a pathological one and 
under certain conditions (for example, an adversity in life 
or a windfall) the transition is accelerated. The social 
gambling stage is a required link. If such is the case, 
studies concentrating on social gamblers are not only 
important but also practical since early detection and 
intervention in diseases produce better prognosis. Yet 
studies on social gamblers and gambling are not common, that 
is, excluding those using student populations. In most 
societies, the research priorities of dealing with the sick 
and abnormal may reflect a preoccupation with healing and 
239 
treating symptoms rather than preventive meaaures. The level 
of funding for research to ease the suffering of those 
already afflicted undoubtedly plays a large part in the state 
of affairs but in the long run preventive medicine yields 
better results. 
The relationship between gambling with the locus of 
control, recall, I uck and re i nforceme nt. 
After the initial inquiry into the personality 
differences of pathological gamblers, social gamblers and 
non-gamblers, it became increasingly apparent that social 
gamblers and especially pathological gamblers would be 
difficult subject populations to obtain for research. To 
overcome the diminishing pool of gambler-subjects student 
subjects were used. The majority of studies on risk-taking 
or gambling in the laboratory typically involved paid student 
volunteers or those participating for course credits and 
allowing them to keep a portion of their winnings to maintain 
their interest. Although not entirely novel, it was ensured 
that the students used for the following studies have 
characteristics other than being merely students, such as 
having a higherl lower locus of control, or being social 
gamblersl or non-gamblers so that more information may be 
gathered by separating them in terms of the attribute 
studied. Besides, the readily accessible student population 
can provide good heuristic data. 
In the next experiment, one of the major questions asked 
was whether internals or externals take more monetary risks 
in the laboratory situation. Another question was the recall 
performance of the two groups in terms of the gambling 
events. It seems reasonable to assume that gamblers, who 
enjoy taking chances and taking risks in chance determined 
activities, are naturally individuals with an external 
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control orientation. In the few studies of internal-external 
orientation of gamblers the traditional method is to present 
an I-E scale to a group of gamblers and, if the investigation 
is more thorough, to a control group of non-gamblers at the 
same time. 
The generalisation of the attribute of an external 
control orientation from the observation of a frequent 
risking of money in mainly chance-determined activities is 
questioned. The results from the study of risk-taking by 
high and low locus of control subjects showed that this 
relationship is not always true. The weakness of the 
assumption may lie in the implied transitivity of the 
relationship between external control and higher risk-taking. 
Risk-taking propensity in individuals is not consistently 
correlated with an external locus of control and neither is 
an external locus of control consistently correlated with 
risk-taking including gambling. Indeed it would be 
surprising and would be extremely unlikely if such a simple 
relationship exists given the varied procedures for the 
selection of risk-takers and gamblers and locus of control 
me as ureme nt s. 
The results of control orientation and risk-taking have 
been conflicting to date. It has been shown that externals 
take more ri sks (Li verant 8. Scodel, 19613; Horan, 197Ba; 
Conrad, 1978; Wong, 1980, cited in Dickerson, 1984) and also 
that internals take more risks as well (Strickland et al., 
1966; Baron, 1968). It may not be a coincidence that the 
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Horan, Wong and Conrad s t udi e s us i ng pa t hol ogi cal, GA me mbers 
and race-track gamblers showed an external orientation while 
the remaining three studies showing no external relationship 
with gambling were laboratory studies. 
Perhaps, only individuals habitually or seriously 
involved with gambling have an external control orientation 
or it could be that there may exist two kinds of externals in 
the Western society (Rotter, 1975). These are the defensive 
externals who rationalise or project the control of powerful 
others in their lives and the passive externals who logically 
accept the learned external attitudes. Rotter commented that 
Levenson's (1973) distinction of belief in powerful others 
versus a belief in chance overlaps that of defensive and 
passive externals. Some of the contradictions in the 
reported results may be resolved by regrouping the 
pathological gamblers as passive externals and occasional or 
social gamblers as defensive externals. The rationale for 
the assignment of these descriptors to these groups stems 
from personality research which suggests that although 
pathological gamblers exhibit more pathological or socially 
less desirable characteristics than social gamblers, 
defensiveness is evident in social gamblers (Conrad, 1978) 
but has never been reported to characterise pathological 
gambl ers. Social gamblers may be more disposed to 
rationalise their participation in chance activities whereas 
pathological gamblers do not have the same inclination since, 
for them, gambling is a serious activity not really engaged 
in for recreational purposes. It is a need, compulsion or 
addiction to internal urges which are often brought upon by 
external stimuli. 
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The following classification of the various types of 
gamblers and their locus of control propensity is suggested. 
Internals 
Non-gamblers 
Externals 
Belief in chance Defensive Passive 
and luck 
Occasional 
gamblers 
Social 
gamblers 
Pathological 
gamblers 
The only difference between non-gamblers and occasional 
gamblers in terms of the internal-external distinction is a 
greater belief in luck and a stronger influence of chance 
factors in their lives for occasional gamblers. In other 
areas such as the influence of powerful others and the 
perception of their own ability for achievement they are 
quite internal in nature which makes them appear rather 
similar to non-gamblers. As mentioned previously, the 
studies comparing risk-taking in internals and externals have 
generally used college or school samples without reference to 
their subjects' gambling participation. This, together with 
the proposition that there are likely differences in 
internality-externality among the various categories of 
gamblers, may have lead to the inconsistencies among past 
rese arc h. 
Future research into gamblers and their locus of control 
should investigate the relationship between passive and 
defensive externality or a belief in chance or powerful 
others among different types of gamblers. This may provide 
some implications for the scales now in use for the 
measurement of locus of control orientation. Items which 
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contain Bome elements of risk taking may have to be included 
considering that risk-taking is so common in ordinary life 
and that risk-taking and locus of control have been shown to 
be related. 
Subjects provided with information on luck were less 
accurate in the recall and estimation tasks than when they 
were not informed. In a game which was primarily determined 
by chance females were also shown to rate themselves more 
unlucky than males in the same situation. 
Another variable which is considered to be important in 
gambling activities is the retention in memory of the events 
occurring during gambling by the participants. Some of the 
retention may be assessed by recall and post-estimation 
tasks. Two of the more salient features of the gambling 
process were investigated, namely, the numbers of the dice 
that were rolled and the amount of money that was involved 
during the gambling session. Recall of stimuli (the numbers 
chosen by subjects to put their bets on) was better when the 
situation was negative, such as the experience of more losses 
than wins. Gilovich (1983) also found that losses in 
gambling are better remembered after a longer period (two 
weeks). Most people who make wagers would have more episodes 
of losing encoded in memory but these do not seem to deter 
them from further participation in betting. This suggests 
that individuals who occasionally or more frequently gamble 
may have an encoding of winning and losing events which is 
bia~ed towards winning or that they are super optimistic in 
nature. It may also be possible that the outcome of gambling 
is uni mportant, t ha tis. these people gambl e because the y 
enjoy gambling and are willing to pay for it, which results 
in them accepting gambles with the knowledge that the odds 
are against them or bets with a negative expected value. 
This may provide a valid explanation for the failure of the 
original maximisation of expected value model. 
The recall of numbers that least and most frequently 
occurred in the rolls of the dice mainly differentiated 
internals from externals. The results strongly support the 
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finding that the frequency of occurrence of infrequent events 
tends to be over-estimated while the occurrence of 
comparatively frequent events is under-estimated. An 
interaction showed that internals are no more accurate than 
externals. Under chance conditions, externals tend to 
over-estimate the occurrences of infrequent events more than 
internals while both internals and externals tend to 
under-estimate the occurrences of frequent events. Since the 
over- and under-estimation is such an established phenomenon 
in human judgement (Kahneman et a!., 1982) the finding of 
differential recall performance of internals and externals 
along these lines an addition of an over- and 
under-estimation item in the locus of control scales may 
further improve the distinction between the two groups. 
However, more research will be required and perhaps a 
re-analysis of some of the previous data. 
In terms of the estimation of the amount of money staked 
internals were more accurate than externals. This was 
attributed to the internals' characteristic of better 
attention to, and utilisation of, information. The 
estimation of the amount of money won or lost during the 
gambling session did not show a simple superior internal-
inferior external performance division. An interaction 
showed that external males were most accurate in their 
estimation and external females least accurate with the 
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internal males and females in between. This was explained in 
terms of the greater exposure of gambling experiences in the 
males and the lower personal control of females of college 
age in addition to the traditional internal-external 
di fferences. 
The consideration of gambling as stimulus-bound 
behaviour. 
The discussion of gamblers as being influenced by 
external factors and observations of responsiveness to 
stimuli, especially those related to gambling activity, led 
to the idea that gamblers may be stimulus-bound in a manner 
similar to that suggested to account for the eating behaviour 
of over-weight individuals in the late sixties. 
Theoretically it is probably more appropriate to ascribe 
stimulus-binding to gambling behaviour since there is less 
necessity to account for an internal sensitivity which 
remained an obstacle in the explanation of stimulus-binding 
in over-weight individuals. There are no internal conditions 
in a gambler which are equivalent to 'stomach rumblings' to 
characterise a state of hunger or a release of insulin in 
response to visual. auditory and olfactory food cues in the 
externally responsive over-weight individual. at least. with 
the knowledge of the internal functioning of gamblers that is 
presently available. Externali ty, in obesi ty research, was 
later acknowledged to be more a characteristic of the general 
population rather than just that of the over-weight. The 
shift in emphasis has only minor impact on the proposed 
stimulus-bound characteristics of gamblers. 
still be shown to be externals. 
Gamblers could 
However. the results obtained did not support the 
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contention that social gamblers are more external than a 
control group of non-gamblers. It was suggested that perhaps 
the external sensitivity was only applicable to gambling 
stimuli. When considered in this vein, the expression 
'external sensitivity' could be substituted by the basic 
operant concept of 'discriminative stimulus'. At first 
glance it may seem to be a strange substitution but when the 
behaviours elicited by these two concepts are compared they 
appear to be quite similar and the major difference lies in 
the terminology within the particular theoretical framework. 
It is felt that the operant framework offers a more concrete 
and precise set of definitions which are supported and have 
been refined by a large amount of research. Furthermore, 
discriminative stimuli also provide a plausible explanation 
of the chain of events which follows the initial positive 
response to the stimulus concerned, by supplying reinforcers 
for each behavioural response in the chain. 
Thus, starting from an observation of the similarity of 
gamblers and over-weight individuals in their reaction to 
certain stimuli it was then hypothesised that gamblers might 
also perform equally well in tasks that have been shown to 
reflect external responsiveness. Social gamblers were not 
found to be responsive in these tasks. It was suggested that 
the responsiveness may only be to gambling related stimuli 
and that the terminology could be changed to an operant one 
with greater clarity and explanatory power. 
The effects of reinforcement history, gambling cues 
and arousal on the gambling behaviour of social 
gamblers and non-gamblers. 
A number of indices have been employed in gambling 
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research to assess the risk-taking of subjects under certain 
conditions of uncertainty. probability of payoff and the 
amount to be won or lost. One of the major and easily 
identified index of risk-taking used in this experiment and 
also throughout this thesis is the amount of money subjects 
are willing to risk in a particular gamble. The choice of 
probabilities of the outcomes and the associated payoffs for 
the respective outcome are the other common measurements of 
risk. It has already been shown in previous research that 
other factors are also important in explaining risky 
decisions. These included; expected value and utility, the 
beliefs in the importance of probabilities and payoff. and 
risk-seeking interest of the person. Other less commonly or 
rarely discussed factors which may be influential in risky 
decisions are: 
1. the belief in luck and the importance of luck in gambling 
decisions; 
2. the differences between one-off gambles or sequential 
gambling and related to that, the effects of the outcomes of 
the previous trial, or series of similar outcomes. and the 
ratio of the history of wins and losses encountered; 
3. the effects of environmental cues surrounding the gambling 
situation; 
4. other psychological factors such as the interest in and 
pleasure of gambling; related to that are the confidence. 
skill and experience in gambling activities; 
5. personality factors including. locus of control, need for 
achievement. impulsivity, extraversion and neuroticism; 
6. the sensation-seeking motive and the arousal level of the 
person concerned. 
This research has been an attempted to qualify some of 
these factors. Most serious researchers in gambling 
behaviour would agree that it cannot be explained by one or 
two general concepts such as greed for money or being under 
the control of intermittent schedules of reinforcement. 
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Other factors including those listed above are likely to play 
a part in the initial decision to participate in gambling or 
in the maintenance of the gambling activity. Although there 
was no direct intention to show that the above factors are 
instrumental in initiating or maintaining gambling behaviour 
demonstrating the differences between social gamblers and 
non-gamblers on these variables may give an indication of 
their possible contribution to the participation in gambling. 
Bearing in mind that a secondary objective of this 
thesis is a comparison between social gamblers and 
non-gamblers some of the results obtained would be more 
appropriate for listing the similarities and differences in 
these two groups rather than testing general theories of 
gambling behaviour though some inferences may be made from 
observed characteristics of the two groups. The rna j 0 r i n d ex 
used for the comparison between social gamblers and 
non-gamblers is their betting behaviour under the influences 
of the various manipulated stimulus conditions. An 
individual's confidence in winning the next bet or making the 
correct choice offers an alternative to the size of stakes in 
determining the potency of the variables. 
A. Probability, skill and chance perception and 
pre fe re nces I and recall. 
The first task is to look at the findings from the 
rating data collectively and suggest some plausible 
explanations. When presented with a choice of payment, one 
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which consists of a fixed Bum and the other uncertain amount 
of money but with a possibility of receiving more than the 
former, social gamblers prefer the uncertain alternative. 
Social gamblers perceived that more skill was involved in the 
chance game than non-gamblers although Anderson & Brown 
(1984) did not find any difference in the perception of skill 
or chance involvement in blackjack in his gamblerl 
non-gambler samples. They concluded that the higher stakes 
placed by gamblers cannot be attributed by the perception of 
a greater skill component in the game (blackjack). 
The results of the present study showed that, in terms 
of the probability preference, social gamblers chose the 
lower while non-gamblers chose the higher probability of 
winning a higher and lower amount of money respectively. 
Social gamblers were also more optimistic about winning in 
the gambling session before they start than non-gamblers. 
These observations could be explained in learning terms. 
With greater participation in gambling, gamblers would have 
encountered more successes and losses than non-gamblers. At 
the same time if gamblers have a biased encoding system 
whereby more success than failure events are stored in 
memory, this process may create a false sense of control over 
the outcome of events over a period of time, The above 
observations then seem to be more coherent. The preference 
of more uncertain alternatives, lower probability of 
occurrence of an event and greater optimism expressed may be 
a result of this encoding bias of positive events over 
negative ones into memory. Some support for this line of 
reasoning comes from the results which showed that even 
though social gamblers perceived that there is a higher skill 
involvement in a chance game than non-gamblers, the amount of 
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chance and skill present in a chance game preferred by social 
gamblers and non-gamblers are about the same. This would 
indicate that social gamblers really dislike uncontrollable, 
chance events as much as non-gamblers but because of an 
illusion of control acquired over a period of time via a 
faulty encoding system, for gamblers, chance events are 
perceived to have a skill component and the uncertainty of 
the outcomes of those events occurring is reduced in 
comparison to non-gamblers. 
The earlier study comparing the gambling behaviour of 
internals and externals and the influences of luck and the 
ratio of payoffs showed that recall of losses by subjects was 
better than recall for wins. Similarly. the recall of the 
numbers chosen by subjects to put their bets on was best when 
subjects experienced the least number of payoffs indicating 
that events were better remembered following negative 
outcomes. In the present experiment the hypothesis which is 
generated states that social gamblers selectively encode more 
success events than failure events compared to non-gamblers. 
The next step would be to run a similar experiment to the 
former one and compare the recall performance of gamblers and 
non-gamblers. If losses or losing-related events are better 
remembered by non-gamblers and gamblers show better recall 
for wins and winning-related events then it can be concluded 
that in gambling, losses are more salient for non-gamblers 
while for gamblers wins are more important. The generality 
of such a relationship can easily be tested in a non gambling 
situation where the recall of, say. the results of a series 
of games in a tournament, is compared between gamblers and 
non-gamblers. 
Such a line of investigation may eventually lead to the 
question of the' need' of gamblers to be reinforced more 
often and the possibility that they are more responsive to 
251 
positive events than non-gamblers. Gamblers may display such 
behaviour because of a lower self-esteem, lower self-efficacy 
or even an insecurity about themselves and their abilities. 
It may be argued that previous personality research (see 
earlier review and Dickerson, 1984) did not find any such 
characteristics but it should be pointed out that those 
studies generally involved pathological gamblers, not social, 
non-problematic gamblers. Furthermore, investigators 
typically only look for limited characteristics such as 
introversion-extraversion, neuroticism and locus of control. 
A more direct and perhaps less clinically orientated approach 
may be necessary to ascertain the existence of the proposed 
attributes in gamblers, both social and pathological. 
Further research is needed before the influences of these 
features in gambling activities can be determined. 
B. Luck and superstition. 
The perceived role of luck by people presents an 
intriguing area of study. The attributes of luck seem to be 
amplified under conditions of uncertainty such as gambling. 
In a previous review of luck and superstition, the adult 
notion of luck is most frequently described as a fortuitous 
intervention followed less frequently by the description of 
an unearned advantage. Furthermore, people seem to have the 
idea that a person has so much luck in store, so that after a 
run of bad luck, good luck is to be expected, hence the 
sayings' every cloud has a silver lining', 'there is a calm 
before the storm' and so on. In a sense the possession of 
luck functions as a form of natural justice. The other 
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feature of luck is that good and bad luck do not have the 
B arne pote nc y. The increment in performance lucky and very 
lucky is expected to bring is only one third of the decrement 
due to unlucky or very unlucky respectively. 
Individuals also seem to over-estimate their 'luckiness' 
in terms of their chances of success in a random event such 
as drawing a winning ticket, compared to the objective 
probabi 1 i t y. Older people were shown to be more realistic, 
stating that more numbers of draws were required before a 
person is considered lucky. Another study compared the 
chance of the number of people (out of 100) who are lucky 
enough to draw a winner out of 100 tickets. Again older 
subjects were found to be more realistic and less dependent 
on luck. Taking these results and that of a higher rating of 
a belief in luck by social gamblers there may be some 
justification in the assertion that gamblers lack maturity. 
But social gamblers are no more likely to keep lucky items 
among them than non-gamblers. Neither are they any more 
supersti tious. Experimentally, the ratings of luck were 
shown to be influenced by the reinforcement history. An 
experience of a favourable ratio of wins over losses 
immediately prior to the time when the rating was made 
induced ratings of lucky, This observation indicates that 
perceptions of luck are also influenced by the situation 
rather than being wholly determined by the individual's store 
of luck. It is difficult to make conclusive statements 
regarding the acquisition of a greater belief in luck since 
most of the data obtained is of a correlational nature. 
However, if the selective encoding of positive events by 
gamblers is accepted then one can argue that the greater 
belief in and reliance on luck may be a function of 
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experience, that is, more success events are retained in the 
memory of a gambler thus creating a 'luckier' disposition in 
the gambler. 
Feeling lucky can introduce a feeling of confidence, as 
if one can' take on the world' because the gods are on ones 
6i de. The acceptance of the luck concept also serves a 
function in society by 'allaying discontentment' in people 
(Cohen, 1960). He explained that; 
If a man makes a fortune merely because he is believed by 
others to be lucky, not because he has the right 
con n e c t ion SOl' any 6 p e cia 1 me ri t , the n he iss a f e fro m 
green-eyed envy. Someone else might have been lucky. 
Similarly the unsuccessful need not lose face; they are 
merely unlucky.... The successful ones themselves 
usually prefer to attribute their good fortune to effort 
and merit rather than to luck, if only in the interest of 
their self-esteem, although modesty may require some 
lip-service to luck. 
The above description is fairly typical of gamblers in 
relating their successes and failures in gambling in that 
successes are commonly attributed to their personal skill and 
effort even in a mainly chance-determined activity, and bad 
luck is often presented as an excuse for misfortunes. In 
this way losses may be made to become more bearable than when 
failures are attributed to personal factors, the individual 
then has to live with both the loss from their failures and a 
lower appraisal of their abilities at the same time. For 
people who frequently experience failures or misfortunes, 
such as gamblers, laying the blame on bad luck constitutes 
the most palatable justification for themselves and the 
people for whom an explanation is required. 
The association of superstition with gambling is most 
likely due to the uncertain nature of the outcome of the 
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decisions made in a gambling situation. Ferster, Culbertson 
& Boren (1975), referring to the fishing practices of the 
Trobriand Islanders, suggested that superstitious behaviour 
is only necessary when there is danger and uncertainty 
involved and where knowledge and skill is reliable 
superstition does not exist. From the previous review on 
luck and superstition it seems that a belief in these 
constructs has the function of reducing cognitive dissonance. 
Furthermore, decision-making is simplified; for example, 
certain numbers (or combinations of numbers) are claimed to 
be luckier than others, thus a selection of these would 
improve ones chances of success. The decisions are probably 
arrived at quicker since some of the alternatives are more 
favourable than others. other instances of a belief in luck 
aiding decision-making are a random selection of a number on 
the roulette table by choosing that number indicated by the 
accidental dropping of the money which was to be staked 
(perhaps indicating that the gods have given their divine 
guidance), or simply varying the size of stakes according to 
how lucky or unlucky one feels. Similarly, a certain ritual 
of throwing dice may be followed to ensure the best chances 
of winning (Henslin, 1967>' 
In the author's experience, there is a tendency for many 
individuals in South East Asian Chinese communities to 
associate a disaster with success in gambling - the license 
plate number of a car involved in an accident is a favourite 
for '4-digit', a form of lottery. Dreaming of winning money 
is not a good omen to go gambling but a dream where there is 
some element of faeces involved is a sure sign of prosperity. 
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Likewise, the practice of counting money before the whole 
gambling session is over and lending money during gambling 
will lead to great losses whereas generous tipping or a visit 
to the temple before the gambling session are regarded as 
luck bringing behaviours. For the more desperate losers a 
change of clothing or washing of the hands may help change 
their fortunes at the tables. 
From an observer point of view these behaviour may 
appear laughable but often for the gambler they are performed 
in earnest although most of them carry out these rituals more 
as a form of insurance against bad luck than a serious 
coercion of the gods to turn the outcomes in their favour. 
One can speculate how these superstitious practices evolved 
and arrive at very interesting propositions. The many 
individualistic quirks in the gambling fraternity support the 
contention that most of these rituals exist mainly because 
they have been associated with past successes in gambling in 
much the same way as the pigeons in Skinner's superstition 
experiment (1948) acquired their superstitious behaviour. 
However, many superstitions are transmitted from generation 
to generation through the socialisation process (Maller & 
Lundeen, 1933) explaining the longevity of some of them. 
To sum up, the main factor that associates gambling with 
luck and superstition is the uncertainty of the gambling 
situation. The proposed functions of a belief in luck and 
superstition are an aid in the decision-making process, an 
injection of confidence, a reduction of cognitive dissonance 
and quite importantly, a scapegoat for their misfortune. 
C. Rei nforceme nt hi s t or y, 9ambl i n9 cues and arousal. 
The gamblers' fallacy is one concept which appears to be 
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used to mean a choice in variety of situations. 
it has been taken to mean: 
In gambling 
1. Choosing the alternative which has not appeared for a 
while as if expecting nature to restore an equilibrium in 
chance happenings; 
2. Choosing the alternative which has appeared a number of 
times, expecting a run of (lucky) events; 
3. Placing a smaller bet following a winning trial or placing 
a larger bet following a losing trial as if expecting that 
wins and losses should even out. 
4. Placing a smaller bet following a losing trial or placing 
a larger bet following a winning trial as if expecting a run 
of bad or good luck. 
Cohen (1970) attempted to distinguish between negative 
recency and the gambler's fallacy. The rationale for his 
distinction between the two terms is that the choice for a 
particular alternative may either be further influenced by 
seeing the gamble as a self-challenge or wanting to impress 
the spectator or both. This represents a positive recency 
effect which contributes to the gambler's fallacy. 
The results of this study helps to clarify the 
situation. It appears that gambler's fallacy and recency 
effects may be differentiatied in terms of the cognitive 
aspects of the decision, in this case, the conviction in 
making the right decisions or making correct predictions. 
Strictly speaking the original usage of the term 
gambler's fallacy refers to the first situation (Jarvik, 
1946; 1951>. In a binary event one either commits fallacies 
1 or 2, which is to say whatever decision is made one is 
committing a fallacy, Thus to follow some form of logic, in 
the second case it could be called the non-gambIer's fallacy. 
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Under normal circumstances, one might be reluctant to 
disgrace the non-gambler by naming the second fallacy as such 
and call it gambler's fallacy II, and the former gambler's 
fallacy 1. There was some evidence to support the proposed 
classification. In this experiment social gamblers tended to 
favour the first strategy while non-gamblers appeared 
consistently to select the second alternative in a chance 
determined situation. It would seem appropriate then to name 
the second fallacy the non-gambIer's fallacy, to 
differentiate it from the other three cases. 
For fallacies 3 and 4, it may be best to abandon the 
term gambler's fallacy altogether and refer to positive and 
negative recency effects. Positive recency effect is thus 
defined as an increase in confidence or risk-taking resulting 
from the occurrence of the previously staked number or from 
experiencing a previous winning outcome. The negative 
recency effect is the opposite, that is, confidence is 
decreased by the non-occurrence of the object staked or by 
the experience of a losing outcome. The outcome of the 
previous event influences the confidence in terms of the 
stake placed unlike gambler's or non-gambler's fallacies 
where it is the choice of horses, dogs or numbers that is 
influenced. In other words, the major difference between the 
fallacies and recency effects is in the choice of outcomes 
and the expression of the confidence in the choices. 
All the four decisions listed above can be considered to 
be 'gambling' fallacies since they are all based on 
fallacious reasoning. Paradoxically, (at least to the 
gambler, who enjoys the use of 'systems') in a mainly 
chance-determined gambling activity the most successful 
method or rule to follow while betting is random selection. 
These fallacies have been argued to arise from a poor 
unders t andi ng of c hanc e, probabi 1 it y (Tve rsky 8. Kahneman, 
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1974) and randomness (Teigen, 1983a>. It can also be argued 
that even though these decisions are not optimal these rules 
provide guidelines for decision-making especially in 
situations where quick responses are required. Although 
recent studies (Kahneman et a1., 1982) have shown that biases 
in judgements and preferences exist in most people, whether 
these rules are consciously or unconsciously applied is still 
uncertain. 
It was shown previously that outcomes of preceding 
gambles do influence the size of the next stake. Another 
consistent finding was that the ratio of wins and losses 
plays an important part in determining the betting strategy 
of subjects. I n fa c t , i nth e pre sen t ex per i me nt, the res u Its 
suggest that the ratio of previous wins and losses and the 
immediate preceding wins and losses or up to runs of three 
similar outcomes have a strong influence on the risk-taking 
behaviour of subjects. The history of payoffs probably 
indicates the chances of success which differentially changed 
the confidence after runs of wins or losses with social 
gamblers more influenced by the negative recency effect while 
non-gamblers were more susceptible to the positive recency 
effect. Immediate outcomes especially runs of either wins or 
losses increased the strength of their influence. 
Morgan (1983) showed that the number of initial wins 
appears to be the more important variable than the actual 
monetary holdings in determining the risk preference. 
However, wins and losses are proportional to each other, that 
is, an increase of one necessarily involves a decrease in the 
number of the other. Since in most gambling situations the 
outcome of bets is either 8 win or 8 loss this could be one 
reason why it is still unclear whether wins or losses are 
more important in influencing the changes in betting 
behavi our. Subjects could very well be, and probably are, 
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influenced by both outcomes which makes it difficult to 
assess the contribution of each type of outcome. The 
available evidence seems to suggest that previous losses play 
a more important role than previous wins in gambling 
decisions (Edwards, 1954; McGlothlin 1956; Myers 8. Fort, 
1963). This is not to be confused with the influence of the 
probability of losing or perceived risk in making gambling 
decisions (Slovic, 1967; Nygren, 1977; Coombs et al., 1978). 
The ratio of the previous number of wins and losses probably 
alters the subjective probability of winning and losing thus 
changing the perceived risk of the gambling decisions. 
Greenberg 8. Weiner (1966) found that high risk gambles 
were preferred by subjects who have received high or low 
reinforcement ratios rather than those who received an equal 
number of wins and losses. Positive and negative recency 
effects respectively, were used to account for the 
differential effects of the high and low reinforcement 
ratios. In Leopard's (1978) study, the majority of her 
subjects took more risks when they had lost than when they 
had won and subjects were also influenced by run patterns of 
wins and losses in the amount of risk they took. One 
explanation given was that the subjective evaluations of the 
likelihood of winning change with the outcome history as the 
subject plays. This, in turn, is affected by the individual 
belief in the gambler's fallacy (negative recency effect in 
our terminology) or belief in runs of luck (positive recency 
effect) . Both attempts to account for the differences in 
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betting strategy emphasised the positive and negative recency 
effects within a group of subjects. 
The major weakness in the proposed interpretation is 
that there is no explanation of why some subjects are 
influenced by the positive recency effect and others by the 
negative recency effect. There is some evidence that 
personality factors may be involved. Hatano & Inagaki (1977) 
showed that extraverts tended to make 'riskier' choices more 
in and after prolonged favourability of reinforcement but 
made 'less risky' ones significantly more in unfavourable 
reinforcement sequences than introverts. 
In the present experiment, there was an interaction 
between the reinforcement history experienced and runs of 
wins or losses. Regardless of wins or losses in the outcome 
of the previous wager the amount of money bet was lower 
following an unfavourable reinforcement history while the 
reverse was true following the experience of a favourable 
reinforcement history. There were a number of interactions 
between the reinforcement history and the other manipulated 
variables on the betting strategy of social gamblers and 
non-gamblers, providing further evidence that there may be 
some effect of personality factors. The present results 
could be summarised in the following manner. In the presence 
of gambling cues, having runs of 1, 2, or 3 wins encouraged 
higher risk-taking in social gamblers following a history of 
a greater number of wins to losses while non-gamblers 
decreased their stakes under similar conditions. Immedi ate 
losses increased the effect of a poor reinforcement history 
by increasing risking in social gamblers and decreasing 
risking in non-gamblers compared to the risk that would have 
been taken when the immediate previous outcomes were wins. 
Combining all the available evidence, losses are 
probably more important than wins, in affecting future 
gambling decisions. It is suggested that this provides 
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further information to the person in a gambling situation for 
decision-making in addition to that of the attractiveness of 
the gamble in terms of payoffs and the probability of winning 
or losing. As in the case of adopting strategies which are 
based on objectively fallacious reasoning, in a gambling 
situation, any extra information which will reduce the 
uncertainty (even if it only amounts to a subjective 
reduction) will help in speeding up the decision-making 
process although not necessarily beneficial for the 
decision-maker. 
When relatively fast decisions are required such as 
those in roulette (about 2-3 minutes between each spin of the 
wheel) the staking behaviour may be more influenced by 
immediate outcomes and in situations where the interval 
between gambles is longer, for example horse-racing (about 
30-40 minutes), the effect of ratios of previous outcomes may 
be more dominant. This hypothesis may be tested by exposing 
subjects to both gambling situations with accompanying 
questionnaires and a recording of their gambling decisions. 
The betting strategy was not the only gambling decision 
that was altered by the reinforcement history. Both social 
gamblers and non-gamblers were nearly always subjectively 
more confident of their chances of winning than in making a 
correct choice after a good reinforcement history. A bad 
reinforcement history only seems to affect non-gamblers, 
improving their accuracy, assigning more equivalent values to 
both these subjective measures since, objectively these 
values are the same. Interpreting the data another way, one 
can say that the biases in gambling responses of social 
gamblers are more ingrained and are less subjected to 
environmental influences. Even though there was a constant 
difference between the two measures for social gamblers the 
general trend for both social gamblers and non-gamblers was 
for a lower rating for both measures following a poor 
reinforcement history, 
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One relatively unexplored area in gambling research has 
been the effect of the physical surroundings on the gambling 
behaviour of those indulging in the activity, The potential 
influence of these physical cues has not escaped the 
attention of entrepreneurs in the gambling industry, 
Dickerson (1977b; 1979) noted that commentaries and the 
changes marked upon the price board in the betting shop 
represented important changes in the environment which may be 
identified as discriminative stimuli for race-betting 
behavi our. Other organised gambling establishments have 
their own style of 'persuasion' to indulge in the gambling 
activity, The flashing lights, loud ringing of bells and 
other bU22ing noises associated with winning money at the 
fruit-machine and, at times, the announcements over the 
public address system of machines paying jackpots are 
examples of the methods to draw attention to the games and 
especially the payouts (Hess 8. Diller, 1969). For many 
patrons these stimuli add to the excitement of the activity. 
From the author's observation, in many South-East-Asian 
countries, wherever a si2eable community of Chinese exists, a 
number of gambling houses can usually be found. These can 
roughly be equated to a poor man's casino. These houses 
usually contain one big barren room, undecorated and 
unfurnished except for 1-metre square tables accompanied by 
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four wooden chairs. The ar ra ngeme nt is, of cours e, pe rfec t 
for the game of mahjong which is commonly played by a large 
section of the Chinese population. For every table in the 
gambling house there are probably one thousand other ones 
that are being used for the same purpose in the private home. 
Another common game is zua pai' which is a card game derived 
from the pieces in the Chinese chess game. other card games 
can be played but the main mode of gambling in these gambling 
houses is mahj ong. Mahjong need not be the noisy game that 
it is, but many players have commented that half the fun is 
in banging the tiles heavily against the table when drawing a 
tile from the wall or when discarding unwanted cards, and in 
between these proceedings most players usually click the 
tiles against each other further adding to the din. (Olmsted 
(1962) in her analysis of a pack of cards would have found 
mahjong a game rich in connotations. Together with the 
mannerisms often expressed at a mahjong gambling session 
there is probably more than enough evidence to enable a 
Freudian interpretation of masturbatory substitution (Freud, 
1953) and beyond). The sounds associated with 
mahjong-playing and the spartanly furnished surroundings 
could be identified as the discriminative stimuli in a 
mahjong gambling setting. Similar analysis of other forms of 
gambling will probably reveal such stimuli characteristics 
that are associated with the individual game. 
Another related area is the effect of stimuli associated 
with gambling such as flashy advertisements about a gambling 
event (for example, annual horse race-meetings such as the 
New Zealand Cup and the Melbourne Cup) or the recently very 
popular New Zealand $20 lottery tickets. From the crowds at 
the race meetings (cleverly promoted by associating it with a 
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carnival) and the quick sale of the lottery tickets the 
advertisers have achieved their aim remarkably well. As was 
suggested earlier, once gamblers have been attracted to the 
gambling activity it is a relatively easy task to encourage 
gambling by 'setting the occasion' and 'putting them in the 
mood' or using other methods mentioned above. There is no 
doubt that gambling is an exciting activity but it seems that 
the perceived excitement can be increased by introducing cues 
(usually artificially created) which are present during 
gambli ng. This testifies to the importance of excitement as 
reinforcement for gambling both in initiating and maintaining 
the activity. 
The experiment described in chapter five attempted to 
assess the effect of simple gambling cues on the gambling 
behaviour of social gamblers and non-gamblers. A number of 
interesting differences between the two groups were evident 
even in the introduction of relatively' mild' gambling cues. 
Only betting behaviour was affected by gambling cues with the 
other measures of gambling activity such as the expectation 
of winning and making the right prediction unaffected. Boyd 
(1976) proposed that excitement can be seen as the gambler's 
drug. From the results obtained there may be some truth to 
the s tat e me n t . Gambling cues were shown to have opposite 
effects on social gamblers and non-gamblers. Risk-taking was 
amplified in social gamblers but diminished in non-gamblers 
in the presence of gambling cues. It was suggested that 
gambling cues help to create a more realistic gambling 
atmosphere which is conducive to gambling for social gamblers 
but inhibits risk-taking in non-gamblers. One of the reasons 
for this difference may be due to the experience of social 
gamblers who interpret the situation as arousing and 
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enjoyable but for non-gamblers who have less or no experience 
of gambling the increased realism may be aversive. Perhaps 
non-gamblers do not gamble because they are put off by the 
excitement of the gambling atmosphere. 
Why gambling is more exciting and enjoyable for social 
gamblers compared to non-gamblers is still unresolved but 
there is no doubt that differences between these two groups 
exist. One logical reason for the preference for greater 
excitement and risk-taking (arousal) is that gamblers are 
under-aroused individuals with a higher arousal threshold. 
This hypothesis was indirectly tested although the experiment 
was designed to assess the effect of different kinds of 
arousal. The relevance of the U-shaped arousal function in 
explaining gambling behaviour has been already discussed. 
Ritchie (1984) asserted that an analysis of gambling 
behaviour must include emotional components which influence 
patterns of thinking and attention allocation associated with 
the gambling situation. That is to say even if the arousal 
level is not important in determining arousal-seeking by 
gambling different emotional states <correlated with 
differing levels of arousal) would still influence the 
risk-seeking behaviour at the cognitive level. Further 
mention of arousal in relation to gambling came from Anderson 
& Brown (1984) who concluded that gambling behaviour may be 
related to individual differences in sensation-seeking. But 
they also cautioned that the association between arousal and 
high sensation-seekers in gambling situations having large 
bets at stake was only evident in a real gambling situation. 
The major weakness of the experiment under discussion is 
that there was no measurement of the two types of arousal 
induced. The inclusion of a control group which did not 
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receive any arousing stimulus offsets the above criticism to 
a certain extent although the ideal situation would include a 
control group and continuous measurements of an index of 
arousal. One of the reasons why heart-rate was not used as 
an index of arousal was the lack of reliable measuring 
equipment especially in experiments which involve body 
movements. In any case, heart rate is not a satisfactory 
measure of arousal. Hasset (1978) concluded that tonic 
measurements of heart-rate and blood pressure give an overall 
picture of the body's state of mobilisation but heart-rate is 
a relatively insensitive measure of 'psychological 
discomfort' (Festinger, 1957). Lacey (1967) argued that 
physiological and behavioural arousal are not necessarily 
related and that increases in psychological arousal will not 
necessarily be reflected in physiological change. However, 
recently Croyle & Cooper (1983) was able to demonstrate that 
electrodermal activity (skin conductance> provided a robust 
index of psychological discomfort. Barabasz (1977) argued 
that in measuring electrodermal activity skin conductance is 
a better measure than skin resistance. Even when a good 
measurement of psychological arousal is objectively possible, 
qualifying the arousal is still difficult especially in a 
gambling situation where a number of emotions (such as 
excitement, apprehension, pleasure, depression and joy) have 
been suggested to operate. From available evidence skin 
conductance measurements should be encouraged in future 
studies in gambling research rather than the more popular but 
dubious heart-rate measure. 
Although the manipulations of arousal showed that 
exercise-arousal and video-arousal have different effects on 
the gambling behaviour of both social gamblers and 
non-gamblers, it cannot be claimed that social gamblers are 
under-aroused. Video-arousal also appeared to be the more 
potent of the two arousals introduced in its effects on 
staking behaviour, ratings of luck and expectations of 
wi nni ng. Both arousals also alter the perception of the 
skilll chance nature of the game, rating of chances of 
winning, making the right prediction and the desire to 
gamble. The emotional stimulus that was presented was an 
unpleasant one. It would be interesting to see the effects 
of positive arousal on the various measures of gambling 
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behaviour used in this study. Ri tchie (1984) presented some 
evidence to show that emotional states affect the early 
allocation of attention about the visual field. 
Extrapolating from Ritchie's results it is quite possible 
that the presentation of a positive arousing stimulus would 
have different effects on the gambling responses in the 
present game. 
In Rule et aI's (1971) study the differential use of 
betting strategies was taken to reflect the amount of risk 
taken. This was influenced by the manipulation of arousal; 
subjects in the high and low arousal conditions exhibited the 
gambler's fallacy (negative recency effect) by increasing 
bets after each loss, whereas subjects in the moderate 
arousal condition did not use this strategy. The results 
were interpreted in terms of arousal affecting the 
rationality of the subjects. When subjects are bored or 
threatened, they play their hunches, not being rationally 
motivated but when mildly frustrated, not needing more 
excitement nor being cognitively disrupted by threat, 
subjects exhibit a more rational strategy. Overall the 
results of the ratings support a hypothesis in which states 
of high arousal are predicted to be associated with low 
levels of risk-taking. 
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A significant negative correlation between 
Sensation-Seeking Scale and anxiety was obtained by Zuckerman 
et al., (1964) lending support to their hypothesised 
construct of 'optimal stimulation level'. In a study of 
betting behaviour in response to hypothetical situations, for 
females, high sensation-seekers took more risks than low 
sensation seekers but this relationship was not evident in 
the male subjects (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 1978). Further 
support for the optimal stimulation construct, in terms of 
gambling decisions, was provided by Kozlowski (1977). His 
subjects, who were characterised by a strong demand for 
stimulation, were found to prefer low probabilities (high 
risk), and subjects with a weak demand for stimUlation 
preferred high probabilities (low risk). In these studies 
the demand for stimulation or the preference for higher 
arousal was ascribed to individual differences in arousal or 
sensation-seeking. Similarly, the present results confirm 
the viability of such a construct. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that arousal has different effects on social 
gamblers and non gamblers indicating that there are 
individual differences in the optimal stimUlation level or 
demand in sensation-seeking. Lieblich's (1968) finding that 
greater monetary risks were taken under higher stress than 
when under no stress condition and Rule et aI's (1971) 
finding of subjects taking high risks under a high arousal 
condition could be explained by the existence of a 
two-arousal regulating mechanisms. Recent theoretical 
propositions in the field of arousal have favoured a 
multi-dimensional model (Corcoran, 1981; Eysenck, 1982). The 
different arousal mechanisms may also account for the 
different effects produced by the various types of arousal. 
Rule et a!. (1971) concluded that the effects of different 
types and level of arousal on decision strstegies remain to 
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be explicated. The present study represents an attempt to do 
so. 
A number of years ago Cohen (1972) hinted that a 
possible cause of gambling in gamblers might be an attempt to 
obtain arousal although in a more hedonistic sense akin to a 
rat stimulating the pleasure centres of its hypothalamus. 
From the research available, it is proposed that the 
intra individual differences in arousal level or 
sensation-seeking may be an important determinant of gambling 
behaviour in gamblers. Anderson 8. Brown (1984) concurrently 
suggested that individual differences in sensation-seeking 
may be involved in both the repeated seeking of the state and 
in the capacity to experience it. Although not completely 
novel, the notion of an arousal-seeking motivation for 
gambling has been neglected. T his iss t ran g e sin c e mo s t , i f 
not all, researchers agree on the fact that excitement is one 
of the main reinforcing qualities in gambling. Boyd (1976) 
went as far as to say that excitement constitutes the 
gambler's drug. 
There has been no completely satisfactory theory of the 
motivation to initiate and maintain gambling behaviour. One 
reason may be that many investigators operate within an 
overly narrow framework, examples of such are; those 
advocating economic motives with their mathematical models, 
proponents of learning models, pathological, personality and 
last but not least psychoanalytic models. It is hoped that 
the present research into the differences between social 
gamblers and non-gamblers and the proposed model of the 
sub-aroused. sensation seeking gambler may have heuristic 
value and lead to improved explanations of gambling 
behaviour. 
The repertory grid technique - an alternative method 
in the study of social gamblers and gambling. 
On the whole, the repertory grid technique is shown to 
be a useful tool for research. From the analyses of the 
repertory grid data. further differences between social 
gamblers and non-gamblers becomes evident. A number of 
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common claims about the characteristics of gamblers were 
confirmed but the technique provided extra information which 
qualified these characteristics. Social gamblers are shown 
to be interested in gambling and to be aware of their 
involvement in the activity. Luck is seen as part of 
gambling and excitement. From other experiments in this 
study it was possible to infer that social gamblers are 
willing to take risks. The present grid results give a 
probable reason for this propensity for risk-taking, one of 
which is that risk-taking is construed as a positive, 
socially admired behaviour. being associated with high 
self-esteem, unconcerned with failure and as a gregarious 
activity. Losing money is associated with negative emotions 
for social gamblers showing that the value of money may be 
more important to them than previously acknowledged by other 
researchers who have suggested that money is merely a means 
by which gamblers can indulge in gambling. However, it must 
be remembered that most of the descriptions of gamblers refer 
to compulsive or pathological gamblers. With regards to the 
attitude towards money in the present study social gamblers 
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appear to view winning money as an accomplishment - having 
beaten the system. Social gamblers do not appear to describe 
gambling as superstitious behaviour but seem to appreciate 
me r i tin the act i vi t y. 
It may be appropriate here to mention that not every 
investigator regards gambling as a deviant behaviour. 
Li vi ngston (1974, ci ted by Ashton, 1979) noted that gamblers 
may be just as healthy as non-gamblers, scoring highly on 
measures of self-control and keeping control of emotions, 
especially hostility (which they are more likely to direct 
toward themselves rather than against others). Dickerson 
(1984) observed that there are no data to suggest that 
pathological gamblers are different to other high frequency 
gamblers who do not seem to experience problems. The less 
acceptable personality characteristics may just as likely be 
a result of recent life events as it is a cause of them. 
External forces may be important determinants of gambling 
behaviour. The need to see oneself as a winner may encourage 
the gambler to bet again if he/she loses. Livingston 
suggested that the gambler has a narrower time and 
environmental perspective than others, especially where 
gambling is concerned, which may have presented a deviant 
picture to the non-gambler. The present study also gives 
support to McGlothlin's (1954) assertion that gamblers do not 
gambl e for money, but ra t he r to comba t boredom. 
The major proponent of the positive aspects of gambling 
is undoubtly Kusys2yn. Kusyszyn 8. Kallai (1976) found that 
gamblers were lower on hostility, family discord and anxiety. 
Other measures of feelings showed that active gamblers are 
more likely to indicate excitement, power, confidence of 
winning, feeling like a hero and feeling in control of the 
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situation, states which are common to Maslow's (1974) 
descriptions of peak experiences in self-actualised persons. 
Kusyszyn (1977) further asserted that gambling can be 
interpreted as self-regulated play within a pleasantly safe 
fantasy mood. Gambling can be viewed as providing for 
physical and psychological needs, in that it can lead to an 
increase in muscle tension and heart-rate, and provide an 
easy release from reality through activity. Thus, gambl i ng 
is conceptualised as a behaviour whose goals are increasing 
arousal and providing self-expression. In other words, 
gambling allows an easy means of obtaining an optimal level 
of stimulation and arousal, providing an escape from a 
humdrum existence, and giving opportunities for gamblers to 
have an effect on their environment. Kusyszyn (1978, ci ted 
in Ashton, 1979) argued that the motive for gambling may have 
similarities to White's (1959) effectance motivation. In 
short, when one becomes aroused by effectance, one's 
existence is confirmed and one also has a sense of worth and 
an affirmation of ones self. Regardless of the evidence to 
support the interpretation of gambling as a healthy activity 
it is, nevertheless, refreshing to view gambling from a 
perspective different from the prevaling negative, disease 
model or explanations in terms of indulgence or 
over-indulgence. 
An important exercise in this experiment was a 
comparison of the self and the ideal self of both the social 
gamblers and non-gamblers along a range of constructs. 
Compared to non-gamblers, social gamblers like gambling more, 
take more risks, do things better in a group, show a greater 
need for achievement, are more superstitious, have a greater 
preference for uncertain outcomes, a higher belief in luck 
and perceived to have a higher self-esteem. Of the 
significant differences listed above the only one which 
appears out of place is a higher perceived self-esteem in 
social gamblers. This could simply reflect a greater need 
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for self-esteem or a greater preoccupation with the construct 
in their judgements and decisions. This would certainly 
explain the association of the self-esteem construct with 
other gambling studies. Some indirect support comes from a 
recent study by Wolfgang & Zenker (1982) who showed that 
subjects who scored high on the Desirability of Control Scale 
bet significantly more 'money' as represented by poker chips 
than subjects who scored low on the same scale. A similar 
study produced the same results (Wolfgang, Zenker & Viscusi, 
1984) but no evidence of subjects high in control motivation 
being more susceptible than others to the illusion of 
control. 
A separate comparison of the ideal self of both social 
gamblers and non-gamblers provided interesting information. 
Even in the ideal situation, social gamblers still like to 
gamble more, take more risks, like more excitement and need 
achievement more than non-gamblers. This may provide 
indirect support for Atkinson's (1960) hypothesis that need 
for achievement (nAch) influences gambling behaviour. From 
the associations of the constructs discussed above, it is 
tempting to speculate that this need for achievement may be 
construed as one of 'maintaining' ones self-esteem, that is, 
frequent achievements are required to support the feeling of 
high self-esteem. Further research will be necessary to 
clarify the relationship of the need for achievement and 
self-esteem to gambling behaviour. 
However, not all the characteristics that were compared 
were rated significantly different by social gamblers and 
non-gamblers. The ratings on the outlook in life, 
arousability, feelings about failure, calmnessl worry and 
pessimisml optimism attitude were similar in the two 
criterion groups. A relatively similar rating on these 
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constructs especially arousability and optimism could be due 
to a difference in the appraisal of the quality of these 
characteristics. In other words, the apparent similarity in 
rating could be due to a bias in the perception of these 
constructs, that is, a gambler may feel optimistic about 
winning when the probability of the event occurring is .5, 
but .8 for the non-gambler. When an unqualified rating of 
optimism is required the rating by the two groups will be 
similar if such a bias exists. The other explanation which 
was mentioned earlier was that the difference in arousability 
and optimism may only become evident in gambling situations. 
A number of the socially desirable characteristics that 
were associated with gambling and risk-taking by social 
gamblers were only associated with risk-taking by 
non-gamblers indicating that while risk-taking is construed 
as a positive behaviour, gambling is not construed as such 
where non-gamblers are concerned. In fact, gambling was 
construed by them as a socially undesirable behaviour being 
associated with not liking excitement, being conservative and 
superstitious. other grid results showed that gambling is 
associated with a threatening person giving the impression 
that gambling is a negative activity which is disapproved by 
the non-gambler. 
Most of the subjects were young university students so 
the association of beating the system, monetary gain, 
challenging and testing predictions with risk-taking was not 
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surprising for both the social gambler and non-gambler 
groups. However, it was quite clear that only the social 
gamblers included having a bet among these positive 
situations. The other major difference is in the 
construction of luck. Social gamblers generally associated 
it with gambling while non-gamblers seemed to associate it 
with social and personal events. The notions of a close link 
between luck and superstition often assumed when referring to 
gamblers and gambling may not be justified from the 
constructions derived from the grid. Neither social gamblers 
nor non-gamblers associated luck with superstition in any 
situation. The only connection between these two constructs 
was that luck was associated with gambling by social gamblers 
and superstition associated with gambling by non-gamblers. 
Briefly summarising the non-gamblers construing of gambling, 
the grid data showed that it is largely perceived as a 
superstitious behaviour indulged in for monetary gain. 
When alternatives are given as reasons for gambling, all 
the reasons provided will be used by Bome people (see Smith & 
Preston, 1984). Put another way, alternatives may be used 
for explaining gambling behaviour simply because they are 
present. In the case of the repertory grid technique how the 
more unusual elements are construed and what constructs are 
available will have a great influence on the overall 
construing of the situation. It is quite a serious drawback 
of the grid technique if the elements and constructs are 
indiscriminately included since the responses to these 
operands and operators are all taken into account in the 
statistical analysis. Any unreasonable inclusion will 
undoubtedly result in an erroneous interpretation of the 
subject. In this instance, when motivational factors are 
being investigated it may be more useful to resort to 
studying individual construing of gambling, eliciting both 
constructs and elements and interpreting the resultant 
construct-construct, element-element and construct-element 
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correlations. Much information may be obtained which is not 
biased by the results of previous work in the area. 
The present practice of providing or partially providing 
constructs and elements is justified on the grounds that the 
object of the exercise was more to explore how various 
gambling and gambling related situations were interpreted by 
a group of social gamblers and non-gamblers. The underlying 
motivation was a secondary concern. Thus, dependi ng on what 
is. required the repertory grid technique can be easily 
adapted to suit the requirements of the study, It is 
concluded that the grid is a useful in gambling research and 
its use should be extended in future studies especially in 
the earlier stages of the investigation. 
CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Personality characteristics of gamblers. 
In the few investigations into the personality of 
gamblers the traits of an external locus of control and high 
neuroticism are the only ones that have been consistently 
identified in compulsive gamblers. The external locus of 
control orientation only appears to characterise compulsive 
gamblers but not social or other types of gamblers. It was 
observed that a very limited range of personality tests have 
been administered to gamblers which may explain why so few 
characteristics are associated with individuals who are 
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involved with gambling. Futhermore, the multi-dimensionality 
of risk-taking and the existence of different types of 
gamblers have not been agreed on which makes the mapping of 
their characteristics and comparison between studies 
difficult. The study of social gamblers was argued to be 
important in formulating the theoretical nature of gambling 
and gamblers and the ignoration of this group seems to 
highlight weaknesses in some of the present theories of 
gambling, especially in terms of the motivational aspects, 
the reinforcing nature of the activity and why many members 
of this group never progress to become problematic gamblers. 
Gambl i ng, recall and 1 oc us of control 
Monetary risk-taking has commonly been associated with 
an external control orientation. Pres umably, gambl i ng is 
largely a chance-determined activity which would be preferred 
by individuals with an external rather than internal control 
orientation. To partially test this assumption, the 
risk-taking propensity of internal and external persons was 
investigated. In this study externals did not take higher 
risks than internals. The transitivity of gamblers being 
more external than non-gamblers and externals having a 
greater susceptibility to gambling than internals was 
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questioned. From the available evidence it was proposed that 
pathological gamblers have a passive external orientation 
while social gamblers have a defensive external orientation. 
Occasional gamblers were suggested to be similar to 
non-gamblers except for a greater belief in chance and luck 
and non-gamblers to have a predominantly internal control 
orientation. The failure in recognising differences in these 
types of gamblers may have contributed to the 
inconclusiveness of the relationship between an affinity for 
gambling and an external locus of control. 
The training and shaping of gamblers may be partly due 
to a selective encoding of winning compared to losing 
experiences in gambling. This was suggested to be related to 
a basic preservation of and/or an increase in self esteem. 
The unusually high optimism of social gamblers could also 
have arisen from having a memory base which is 
over-represented with winning events. Losses in gambling 
could have been discounted by social gamblers by treating 
them as a fee for participating in an enjoyable activity,J 
The recall data gave support to the fairly well 
established finding of over-estimating occurrences of 
infrequent events and under-estimating occurrences of 
frequent events. In this study, rather than the usual result 
of internals being more accurate than externals in recall 
tasks, both internals and externals were shown to be 
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inaccurate in estimating the appearances of dice numbers. 
Externals tended to over-estimate occurrences of infrequent 
events more than internals while both internals and externals 
tended to under-estimate occurrences of frequent events. In 
general, internals were more accurate in estimating the 
amount of money staked during the gambling session compared 
to externals but a sex interaction showed external males as 
being most accurate and external females least accurate with 
internal males and females in between. The differences in 
the socialisation of the two sexes and the greater experience 
in gambling matters were proposed to explain the disparity in 
the estimation performance. 
Gambling and stimulus-binding 
It was originally thought that the responses of 
gamblers, in general, may be stimulus bound in a manner 
similar to the eating responses of obese individuals. The 
results of this study did not support such a hypothesis. The 
subjects not being heavy gamblers may have influenced the 
results. The other possible reason for the lack of 
stimulus-binding characteristics is that gamblers may not 
demonstrate complete stimulus-binding but only to stimuli 
that are related to gambling. It was suggested that if that 
was the case it would be more appropriate to use conditioning 
concepts, particularly discriminative stimuli and their 
properties of setting the occasion on which operant responses 
are re i nforce d and, at the same time, s ervi ng as re i nforce rs 
in a chain of events. This is most relevant considering 
that, in practice, the majority of gambling activities 
represent a series of repetitive sequential responses. It 
was also noted that cognitive factors should be included when 
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discussing gambling responses to get a more complete picture. 
The probability. skill and chance perception and 
preferences of gamblers and non-gamblers. 
Although risk is one of the most important aspects of 
gambling, frequently measured by the amount of money that is 
staked on a gamble, probability of payoffs and the amount of 
money to be won or lost, another interesting feature of 
gambling is the perception and the confidence of the chances 
of wi nni ng. Social gamblers were found to be consistent and 
non-gamblers inconsistent in their gambling decisions. The 
amount of money staked did not correspond to the perceived 
chances of winning for non-gamblers whereas the two measures 
matched fairly well for social gamblers which is to be 
expected if a rational strategy is employed. Rather than 
branding non gamblers as irrational it was explained that 
non-gamblers were inconsistent due to a lack of experience in 
gambl i ng. 
In this study, social gamblers perceived that more skill 
was involved in a chance game than non-gamblers. Social 
gamblers preferred a more uncertain alternative than 
non-gamblers when there was a possibility of greater gain or 
loss. For choices with the same expected value social 
gamblers selected a lower probability of winning a bigger 
amount while non-gamblers chose those of a higher probability 
of winning a smaller amount of money. Social gamblers were 
also found to be more optimistic about their chances of 
winning in an on-coming gambling event than non-gamblers. 
All these findings were explained in terms of a faulty 
encoding system whereby in gamblers more winning than losing 
events were encoded over a period of time thus making success 
subjectively more likely and also inducing a greater skill 
i nvol vement. 
The outcomes of previous bets have been shown to be 
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influential in determining future gambling decisions. It was 
also mentioned that because winning and losing outcomes are 
closely associated the identification of the dominant control 
of either outcome is difficult. Related to the proposed 
explanation of a biased encoding system it was surmised that 
another difference between gamblers and non-gamblers may be 
that losses are more salient for non-gamblers while for 
gamblers wins are more influential. 
Luck and superstition and gambling 
One consistent finding in the present research is that 
social gamblers have a greater belief in luck than 
non-gamblers. Cohen's research showed that belief in luck 
decreases with age which implies that those who belief in 
luck may be less mature than those who do not. There was 
some support for the proposition that gamblers are less 
mature people from the constructions of gambling derived from 
the repertory grid technique. There was no difference in 
superstitious behaviour and attitudes about superstitions 
between social gamblers and non-gamblers. People tend to 
rate themselves as being luckier when they have experienced 
some positive events immediately prior to the time when the 
rating is made than when the positive events occurred some 
time before the rating. Females tended to rate themselves as 
being more unlucky than males when engaging in a chance game. 
Information on the status of luck that the individual may 
experience was shown to be influential in altering recall and 
estimation tasks and also in the amount of risk taken. 
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The main factor that associates gambling with luck and 
superstition is the uncertainty of the gambling situation. 
The many individual mannerisms which are performed by 
gamblers have probably evolved from associations with 
previous successes while other more common ones are probably 
transmitted from generation to generation. Some of the 
suggested functions of a belief in luck and superstition are: 
an aid in the decision-making process, a confidence booster, 
a reduction of cognitive dissonance and last but not least. a 
scapegoat for misfortune. 
Reinforcement history. gambling cues and arousal. 
The use of the terms gambler's fallacy and negative 
recency are discussed and it is suggested that in order to 
avoid confusion the following nomenclature be adopted. To 
reduce further ambiguity Jarvik' s original use of the term 
gambler's fallacy is preserved. In the present 
classification when the choice of alternative is changed it 
is a fallacy. When it is the confidence that an event is 
going to have a particular outcome, that is altered as shown 
by the amount of money staked - large amount reflecting 
greater confidence and small amount reflecting lesser 
confidence - it is referred to as a recency effect. These 
two biases are further divided into the gambler's fallacy and 
the non-gambIer's fallacy. and in the latter case, the 
negative recency effect and the positive recency effect. 
Since adopting any of these strategies for a period of time 
during a gambling session constitutes fallacious reasoning, 
all these four gambling decisions are considered to be 
gambling fallacies. These biases in responding were 
suggested to arise from a poor understanding of probability 
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and randomness of events. 
Both the outcome of the preceding gambles and the ratio 
of the number of wins and losses have been shown to playa 
part in determining the betting strategy of people. The 
present results suggest that the ratio of wins and losses 
encountered interacts with the effect of preceding wins or 
losses, The gambling decisions of gamblers tended to be 
subjected to the negative recency effect while that of 
non-gamblers tended to be susceptible to the positive recency 
effect. RUns of either wins or losses increased the strength 
of the influence more than just individual winning or losing 
outcomes. The amount of money in hand and the amount of 
money won or lost do not seem to be important in the 
risk-taking decisions. In general, losses appear to be more 
influential in changing gambling decisions than wins. A 
distinction was drawn between the ratio of wins and losses 
and the probability of losing and perceived risk although the 
three are acknowledged to be closely related. The ratio of 
wins and losses probably alters the subjective probability of 
winning or losing thus changing the perceived risk of the 
gambling decisions. It was also asserted that using the 
gambling fallacies and recency effects to explain the 
behaviour of certain subjects was incomplete since one is 
still left with the question of why some subjects adopt the 
gambling fallacy strategy or are biased by recency effects. 
In this regard it was suggested that personality factors may 
be involved. The differences between social gamblers and 
non-gamblers in the amount of risk taken in gambling 
decisions provide further support to the influence of 
personality factors. 
The reinforcement history affected more than just the 
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risk-taking behaviour of subjects. The trend was for a poor 
reinforcement schedule to lower the confidence of winning 
future gambles and in correctly predicting future outcomes 
but runs of payoffs and non-payoff gambles were also shown to 
be influential on such ratings. Generally, losing gambles 
decreased confidence while winning gambles increased 
confidence. 
The use of gambling cues in many gambling situations by 
gambling establishments was shown to be pervasive although it 
may not be consciously noticed by others not involved in 
gambli ng. On the whole these attractions cater for the 
gambling fraternity but the novice who is interested may be 
enticed by these stimuli. In an experimental gambling 
situation social gamblers increased their risk-taking in the 
presence of gambling cues while the risk-taking was decreased 
in non-gamblers. The interpretion given was that gambling 
cues created a more realistic atmosphere for gamblers, 
setting the occasion for gambling, while for non-gamblers who 
have no experience of such situations, the increased realism 
may be aversi ve. 
It has been shown, in many instances, that gamblers find 
gambling more exciting and enjoyable than non-gamblers. The 
reasons for such differences are yet unknown. It was 
suggested that part of the differences may have been a result 
of previous learning, with positive emotions such as thrill, 
excitement and, at times, monetary reinforcements associated 
with gambling. However, this still does not explain why some 
individuals are more inclined to participate in gambling to 
obtain these pleasures than others. The i ndi vi dual 
differences in the tonus level of arousal, the arousal 
threshold and the sensation-seeking propensity and the 
associated U-shaped arousal curve were considered to be 
important factors in the acquisition of the interest in 
gambli ng. An indirect attempt was made to investigate the 
plausibility of such a hypothesis. 
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Different forms of arousal were found to have different 
effects on the gambling decisions of gamblers and 
non-gamblers with physical arousal having a lower potency 
than emotional arousal. The results must be treated with 
caution because there was no measure of how successful the 
arousal was induced in the subjects. In this vein, it was 
maintained that present measures of arousal only quantify the 
construct, and even then with difficulty - the most promising 
technique being the skin conductance measure. The robustness 
of the commonly used measure of arousal, heart-rate, was 
questioned. Qualifying arousal is still not feasible 
especially where such varied emotions have been known to be 
elicited in the gambler, from the placing of the stakes (for 
example, excitement and apprehension) and outcomes of gambles 
(for example, depression and joy). The evidence showed some 
support for the notion of the under-aroused gambler but much 
more research will be required to clarify the situation. 
The repertory grid technique for studying gamblers 
and gambl i ng. 
Using the repertory grid technique, a number of previous 
results were supported and some new insights were provided. 
Social gamblers are interested in gambling and are aware of 
their involvement in the activity. It seems that social 
gamblers are willing to take monetary risks for a number of 
reasons. Monetary risk-taking is construed as a positive, 
socially admired behaviour, being associated with high 
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self-esteem, unconcerned with failure and as a gregarious 
activity. Money is not merely a means of gambli ng, as 
suggested by some investigators, but is important to social 
gamblers although only as a sign of successful confrontation 
against the system. Luck is seen as part of gambling and 
excitement but superstition is not at all associated with 
gambli ng. 
It was noted that gambling need not necessarily be 
interpreted as a deviant behaviour and that there may be some 
merit in decribing gambling in positive terms. This is 
especially relevant since the majority of gamblers who engage 
in gambling for social reasons derive pleasure from their 
participation and do not suffer any negative consequences. 
The disadvantage is usually losing money which can be 
regarded as a payment for the entertainment although on some 
occasions more money is lost than was planned. There are a 
few positive aspects of gambling but these are usually 
overshadowed by the more negative consequences of 
over-indulgence in the activity. 
As a bonus it was possible to compare the self and ideal 
self constructions of both the social gamblers and 
non-gamblers. For the self constructions, compared to 
non-gamblers, social gamblers like gambling more, take more 
risks, like excitement more, do things better in a group, 
show a greater need for achievement, are more superstitious, 
have a greater preference for uncertain outcomes, a higher 
belief in luck and are perceived to have a higher 
self-esteem. The remaining six constructs were rated 
similarly for the two groups. These are usually calm/ tends 
to worry, not concerned about failure/ fears failure, not 
aroused easily/ easily aroused, has a liberal/ conservative 
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outlook and is pessimistic! is optimistic. 
In the ideal self comparison of gamblers and 
non-gamblers, gamblers still prefer to gamble more, take more 
risks, like more excitement and need achievement more than 
non-gamblers. This shows that there may be some evidence of 
personality factors between the two groups since some of the 
differences are evident in both the self and ideal self 
constructions. 
Overall, the repertory grid technique was useful in 
clarifying some features of gamblers and in providing some 
further insights into the construing of gamblers and gambling 
acti vi ty. 
A sketch of the social gambler and proposals of some 
motivations for gambling. 
Throughout the thesis the general concern has been to 
delineate the characteristics of mainly social gamblers in 
their personality and their behavioural and cognitive 
responses to gambling situations. On most occasions a 
control group of non-gamblers was given the same stimuli and 
performed the same tasks. As a consequence a number of 
interesting observations concerning the non-gambler subjects' 
attitudes towards and responses towards gamblers and gambling 
situations were noted. 
Differences in personality and behavioural 
characteristics have already been discussed in the last 
chapter. The next task is to put together the results from 
this and other studies, to create a picture of the 'average' 
social gambler, since most of the data obtained came from the 
subjects who only gamble 'socially'. 
In many respects the gambler is not very different from 
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the non-gambler and for that matter fairly similar to the 
pathological gambler as well. The social gambler enjoys 
gambling, and generally risks more than the non-gambler. In 
a gambling situation these gamblers are likely to be 
influenced to take more risks when gambling cues are present, 
as if they act like a catalyst. In this instance the 
catalyst may be more appropriately referred to as the 
discriminatory stimulus with its properties of initiating a 
response chain and providing reinforcements in the chain. 
Generally, social gamblers risk more money after a loss 
but decrease their stakes when the previous outcome is a win, 
following the commonly named gambler's fallacy strategy of 
betting. It is suggested that the term negative recency 
effect is more unambiguous in describing such a pattern of 
responding although it is acknowledged that in a mainly 
chance-determined activity the strategy is also fallacious. 
The effect may reach its peak following a run of 3 similar 
outcomes whether favourable or unfavourable. The history of 
the number of wins and losses encountered as well as that of 
the immediately previous outcome or runs of the same outcome 
have a great influence on the staking behaviour of social 
gamblers and their confidence in their decisions. I t seems 
that outcomes of gambles are taken as indicators of the 
future success as if having a favourable or unfavourable 
gambling session is, in a way, similar to experiencing runs 
of good or bad luck. Perhaps when social gamblers are unsure 
of the direction of luck previous outcomes may playa larger 
part in the gambling decisions. Some form of rationality is 
implied in that social gamblers are assumed to be searching 
for information so that they can be more successful in their 
gambling performance. 
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One striking characteristic of social gamblers is their 
confidence or optimism in gambling either in rating their 
chances of winning or in deciding the size of the stakes 
placed, perhaps because of the greater skill element 
perceived in the game. There is a large belief in luck but 
superstition is not associated with gambling. Having a bet 
or risk-taking is associated with socially desirable 
behaviours possibly as a means of gaining self-esteem. 
Related to this, associations of gambling with other social 
qualities valued by adolescents seem to present social 
gamblers as immature persons. 
Social gamblers display more experience in the gambling 
task uniformly varying the amount of money bet, rating of the 
chances of winning and predicting the correct outcome. The 
acknowledgement of the greater influence of cues may also be 
a function of experience in gambling, associating it with 
feelings of thrill, joy, excitement and perhaps a sense of 
control over the environment felt on previous gambling 
occasions. 
An integral part of the discussion of gambling should be 
some explanation of why people gamble. As has been mentioned 
before, there has been little success in attempting to 
explain gambling by one or two motivational drives. The 
approach should take into account as many aspects of the 
gambling behaviour as possible. Personal or situational 
factors, initiation or maintenance of gambling and the type 
and intensity of gambling are some of the areas which should 
be accounted for by any good explanation. Most of the 
existing theories of gambling have focussed on only limited 
aspects of gambling. At present it appears that an eclectic 
approach may be most successful in providing a comprehensive 
theory of gambling. 
It is reiterated that the gamblers described here are 
individuals who gamble occasionally, mainly for social 
purposes. It is tempting to suggest that part of the 
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motivation of gambling for social gamblers is the pure joy of 
gambli ng. Many forms of gambling involve being in the 
company of people and a strange sort of unspoken comradeship 
often develops especially when the betting is primarily 
against the' system', as in horse race betting. Being a 
winner boosts ones ego. There will not be many greater 
pleasures in everyday activities than in imparting this 
ability to those around and being applauded at the same time 
(Zola, 1963). Similarly, in the present study, an increase 
in self-esteem, derived from beating the system and being 
able to influence the environment in some way, appears to be 
another likely motivation. The other equally important 
reason for gambling includes the desire for thrill and 
excitement, and as a corollary, the avoidance of boredom. 
Most of the motivational factors mentioned above seem to 
involve a change in the level of arousal, usually an 
increase. From this observation it was proposed that 
gamblers are under-aroused individuals: sensation-seekers 
whose preferred form of arousal is gambling. Furt he rmore, 
the greater risks often taken by gamblers may be due to a 
hi gher t hres hoI d for arous al and, more obvi ous I y, tot he 
learned effect of tolerance. 
It is not the purpose of this study to discredit the 
role of learning theories or mathematical models in 
explaining gambling behaviour because once in the gambling 
situation, gambling decisions have been shown to have some 
consistency in responding, influenced by stimuli present. In 
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this vein, the importance of gambling cues functioning as 
discriminatory stimuli is emphasised. Other data showed that 
there may also be personality factors involved in explaining 
some of the gambling patterns. There is also little 
disagreement that different forms of gambling activities do 
not have the same risk factor or chance/skill involvement; 
thus different strategies are required in each case. Taking 
the variety of gambling activities and the diversity of 
decisions that are required into account it becomes clear 
that none of the existing theories is adequate in fully 
explaining gambling behaviour. This is especially obvious in 
the search for the motivational aspects of gambling and, at 
times, the maintenance of gambling. The proposed importance 
of social factors such as self-esteem, sense of well-being 
and achievement, and the attainment of physiological 
equilibrium suggests that an existential, hedonistic model of 
gambling may have merit. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Gambling has been studied from many perspectives and 
there seems to be some merit in interpreting the behaviour in 
phenomenological terms. One way of doing this is by the use 
of the repertory grid technique where a large amount of data 
may be collected from an individual within a relatively short 
time. It is also adaptable for use in many varied 
si tuati ons. The ot her ad vant age, al t hough one whi c h may be 
queried by some investigators, stems from the freedom in 
interpretation of the data. In the face of its great 
versatility, supported by the present study, the use of the 
grid technique in the study of gambling behaviour should be 
further explored. 
The present series of studies raise a number of 
interesting questions. The results of the arousal experiment 
indicated that arousal has some influence in the gambling 
behaviour of both social gamblers and non-gamblers. 
Different types of arousal were shown to have different 
effects. The two different forms of arousals induced were 
assumed to have different intensities of arousal. This meant 
that the differences could have arisen from either the type 
or the intensity of arousal that were induced or both. Thus 
it would be interesting to further investigate the effects of 
di fferent forms of arous aI, t ha tis, emot i onal 
(psychological) and physiological, induced by either natural 
or chemical means. The measurement of arousal needs to be 
improvedi the most satisfactory method, at present, seems to 
be a measurement of galvanic skin responses (Croyle & Cooper, 
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1983) and specifically skin conductance response (Barabasz, 
1977). These arousal measurement techniques require the 
person to keep relatively stationary, so the nature of the 
gambling game would need to be modified accordingly such that 
the person making the gambling responses requires little 
bodily movement. Verbal responses such as those used in 
Ritchie's (1984) study would be an improvement over manual 
typing or even written responses. 
We do not conclude that a jogger or squash player enjoys 
the activity because of the heightened arousal experienced 
during the event, so by the same token we should not too 
readily assume that the gambler gambles for the excitement 
because he/she is observed to be excited during gambling. In 
the jogger or squash player the motivations may include: 
getting fit for health, shaping up for cosmetic appeal, 
simply enjoying the activity, or obtaining the 'runner's 
high' . Another motive may be to improve ones ability to win, 
gaining the admiration of others and increasing ones own 
self-esteem and self-efficacy. Similar motivations are 
suggested to be important in explaining the participation in 
gambling, especially for social gamblers. Although it is 
difficult to 'prove' that these factors are relevant it is, 
nevertheless, important to follow up the possibility. Most 
of the existing descriptions of motivational and decisional 
aspects of gambling behaviour do not take these social 
factors into account and their inclusion will no doubt 
increase the predictive power of the more eclectic 
explanation of gambling behaviour. The ones that deserve 
further study includej self esteem from beating the system or 
being a winner or being able to influence the situation, the 
pure joy of gambling and the role of the gambling activity as 
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a recreation. 
On a more empirical level, the hypothesis that gamblers 
encode more success events than failure events should be 
tested. This proposition is interpreted as being related to 
the above constructs in that the bias towards retaining 
positive events may possibly reflect a deeper psychological 
state of insecurity, low self-esteem or low self-efficacy. A 
selective encoding system would therefore help to improve the 
existing psychological composure. 
The relationship between social gamblers and locus of 
control is still unclear. Similarly, the significance of the 
need for achievement, sensation-seeking propensity and other 
personality factors in the gambling behaviour of social 
gamblers needs to be clarified. The present studies on the 
belief in luck, perceptions of skill and chance involvement 
in a situation and the amount of risk taken show fairly 
consistent inter-group differences indicating some stability 
in respondi ng. 
The relative importance of immediate reinforcements, 
that is, receiving payoffs from previous outcomes and that of 
the ratio of wins and losses encountered over a series of 
trials merits further investigation. Whether winning or 
losing is more influential in determining future staking 
behaviour and the eagerness for continued and/or future 
participation is also an interesting question. 
Phenomenological explanations would predict that winning is 
more important than losing because winning is reassurring for 
the self image. However, winning is important in economic 
theory because man is assumed to be rational and it would be 
logical to maximise utility. I n a sense, losi ng may be more 
important from a learning theory perspective in that it is 
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intermittent reinforcements (which make up the number of 
non-reinforced gambles and their positions of occurrences) 
that encourage and maintain maximum participation in gambling 
activity. Losing may also be interpreted to have effects 
which are different from simple punishment. 
From a cognitive perspective, losing money can induce a 
strong determination in the individual to recoup losses. 
Similarly, runs of good luck may create a sense of 
omnipotence leading to more and more unreasonable 
risk-taking, when unrestrained, inevitably leads to financial 
disaster. Few economic or any other accounts of gambling 
take these probable influences into consideration. Inclusion 
of such cognitive influences into a theory of gambling 
behaviour will improve its predictive properties. 
Finally, the contribution of the environment and the 
influence of situational factors to gambling behaviour is 
also acknowledged. It was shown that gambling behaviour is 
not completely stimulus-bound but is affected by gambling 
related cues. Gambling cues or situational cues that are 
associated with gambling activity seem to influence the 
betting behaviour of social gamblers and non-gamblers in 
different ways. It may be illuminating (for gambling 
enterpreneurs) to chart the specific influences of different 
media of presentation of rewards and stimulus cues which are 
associated with payoffs in the gambling sequence. 
Like many research projects more questions are generated 
by this thesis than answers provided. The search for a 
better description and explanation of gambling behaviour by 
social gamblers and non-gamblers will hopefully lead to a 
better understanding of the factors involved in the activity 
and the reasons the individual may have for engaging in it. 
Like most other behaviours. it is becoming clearer that a 
more eclectic approach to the study of gambling may be the 
most fruitful course to take. 
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APPENDIX 1 
-Name: Score 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON GAMBLING BEHAVIOUR 
Gamblers Anonymous Gambling Questionnaire 
1. Do you lose time from work due to gambling? 
2. Is gambling making your home life unhappy? 
3. Is gambling affecting your reputation? 
4. Have you ever felt remorse after gambling? 
5. Do you ever gamble to get money with which to pay debts or to 
otherwise solve financial difficulties? 
6. Does gambling cause a decrease in your ambition or efficiency? 
7. After losing do you feel you must return as soon as possible 
and win back your losses? 
8. After a win do you have a strong urge to return and win more? 
9. Do you often gamble until your last dollar is gone? 
10. Do you ever borrow to finance your gambling? 
11. Have you ever sold any real or personal property to finance 
gambling? 
12. Are you reluctant to use ugambling money" for normal 
expenditures? 
13. Does gambling make you careless of the welfare of your family? 
14. Do you ever gamble longer than you had planned? 
15. Do you ever gamble to escape worry or trouble? 
16. Have you ever committed, or considered committing, an illegal 
act to finance gambling? 
17. Does gambling cause you to have difficulty in sleeping? 
18. Do arguments, disappointments or frustrations create within 
you an urge to gamble? 
19. Do you have an urge to celebrate any good fortune by a few 
hours of gambling? 
20. Have you ever considered self destruction as a result of your 
gambling? 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
(Yes-No) 
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APPENDIX 2 
UNIVERSITY OF CMNTERBURY 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON GAMBL ING BEHAVIOUR 
332 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to survey the gambling activities of students 
and non-students to enable the selection of subjects for experiments which will study 
the personality charactedstics of different groups of people. The information given 
here will be consi'dered confidential. Please be as accurate as possible and answer 
every question, as an incomplete form is useless for scientific purposes. If you 
have any questions, please ask the person admintstering the questionnaire. 
Sex: Age: ___ Ethnic Background: ________ _ 
Nationality: 
For non-students. Occupatfon· 
-------
Sa 1 a ry (p. a . ) 
------
1. How long was it since you last gambled (betted)? 
months days 
------
weeks hours 
------ ~----
2. How much money did you gamble (bet) in total? 
3. Where did you gamble (place your ~ets)? (Circle one) 
(a) At home (e) At a TAB 
(b) At a friend's place (f) Using a telephone account 
(c) At a race-course (g) Other 
(d) At a race-course away from Specify 
res ident city. 
4. Would you gamble (bet) the above amount of money 
(a) Nearly every time 
(b) More than half the time 
(c) Less than ha 1 f the time 
(d) Once in a while 
5. How long was it since you last gambled (betted) previous to the last 
time (the occasion referred to above)? 
_____ months _____ days 
weeks hours 
----- -----
6. How much money did you gamble (bet) in total? $ 
7. Where did you gamble (place your bets)? 
(a) At home (e) At a TAB 
(b) At a friend's place (f) Using a telephone account 
(c) At a race-course (g) Other 
(d) At a race-course away from Specify 
resident city. 
P.T.O. 
- 2 -
8. Would you gamble (bet) the above amount of money 
(a) Nearly every time 
(b) More than half the time 
(c) Less than half the time 
(d) Once in a while 
9. How frequently do you gamble (bet)? 
(a) Two or more times a day 
(b) Every day or nearly every day 
(c) Three or four times a week 
(d) Two or three times a month 
10. In the spaces provided please fill (betted) over the past week? 
SUNDAY Lottery (specify) 
Cards (poker ·etc) 
Others (specify) 
MONDAY Racing (horses,dogs 
Cards (poker etc.) 
Lottery (specify) 
Others (specify) 
TUESDAY Racing (horses,dogs) 
Cards (poker etc.) 
Lottery (specify) 
Others (specify) 
WEDNESDAY Racing (horses,dogs) 
Cards (poker etc.) 
Lottery (specify) 
Others (specify) 
(f) About once a month 
(g) At least once a year 
(h) Less than once a year 
in the amounts of money gambled 
THURSDAY Racing (horses,dogs) 
Cards (poker etc.) 
Lottery (specify) 
Others (specify) 
FRIDAY Racing (horses,dogs) 
Cards (poker etc.) 
Lottery (specify) 
Others (specifY) 
SATURDAY Racing (horses,dogs) 
Cards (poker etc.) 
Lottery (specifY) 
Others (specify) 
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Thank you for your help. If you would like to take part in some experiments and 
complete a few questionnaires studying the personality characteristics of different 
groups of people, would you please write your name and telephone number. 
Name: Telephone No. 
-------------------------- -----------
Suitable times: (List) 
------------------------------------
APPENDIX 3 334 
The univariate F-tests of the factors in the 16 PF, 
EPQ and the Rotter's I-E Scale. 
VARIABLE DF HS F P= 
A - Reserved/Outgoing 2,42 2. 14 e. 85 e. 437 
B - Less/Hore intelligent 2,42 3. 44 1. 13 e. 333 
C - Aff by feelings/E stable 2,42 4. 19 1. 26 e. 295 
E - Humble/Assertive 2,42 2. 15 e. 44 e. 649 
F - Sober/Happy-go-lucky 2, 42 5. 313 1. 46 13.244 
. . 
G - Expedient/Conscientious 2, 42 13.132 e. 1313 e. 996 
H - Shy/Venturesome 2, 42 2. 79 e. 71 13.499 
I - Tough-/Tender-minded 2,42 e. 39 e. 14 e. 868 
L - Trusting/Suspicious 2,42 1. 17 13.31 13.733 
H - Practical/Imaginative 2,42 3, 43 13.77 0, 471 
N - Forthright/Astute 2, 42 e. 613 13, 15 13.864 
0 - Self-assured/Apprehensive 2, 42 4. 34 e. 98 e. 385 
Q1 - Conservat. /Experimenting 2,42 12, 16 2. 76 e. 1375 
Q2- Group-depend. /Self-suff. 2,42 3. 42 0. 99 13.3813 
Q3- Self-conflict/Controlled 2,42 7.213 2.135 e. 141 
Q4- Relaxed/Tense 2, 42 6.76 1. 82 e. 174 
P - Psychoticism 2,47 15. 54 1. 813 e. 177 
E - Introversion/Extraversion 2, 47 10. 21 0. 47 0. 628 
N - Neuroticism 2, 47 127. 56 4. 50 0. 1316 
L - Lie 2,47 36. 29 1. 49 e. 237 
R - Rotter's I-E 2, 46 54. 47 2. 99 e. 13613 
APPENDIX 4 
MANOVA output table for the EPQ data and ONEWAY ANOVA output table for 
the Ro r's I-E Scale data. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Payoff schedules in the 1 blocks of trials 
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APPENDIX 6 
Choice of stakes and numbers. 
Trial BLOCK 1 BLOCK 2 BLOCK 3 BLOCK 4 
STAKE NO. STAKE NO. STAKE NO. STAKE NO. 
1 14 -18 5 -1 1 - 5 6-4 7-11 6-3 6- 2 2-6 
2 13 -17 4 -1 12 -16 5-2 6-10 2-4 1 - 5 6-4 
3 9-13 4-3 8- 4 3-5 15 -19 6-1 11 -1 5 6-3 
4 15-19 4-6 3- 7 6-5 17-13 6-3 18-14 3-5 
5 14 -10 3-6 14-10 6-5 4- 8 4-2 1 3-17 3-1 
6 8- 4 1 - 4 14 -18 6-4 11 -1 5 6-2 1 2-16 6-3 
7 6- 2 5-2 9-13 1 -3 6- 2 2-4 5- 9 6-3 
8 6-10 4-3 7 -11 4-2 1 4 -18 5-6 8- 4 6-3 
9 5- 1 1 -5 12- 8 6-5 14 -10 6 1 9-13 4-6 
1 0 3- 7 6-5 17-13 3-4 16-12 5-2 1" -1 4 1-4 
1 1 11 - 7 6-5 9- 5 3-1 3- 7 6-2 8-12 5-2 
12 9- 5 3-4 1 5 19 4-5 5- 1 4-1 3- 7 1-3 
1 3 12':'16 2-6 11 -1 5 2-4 9-13 2-5 7 -11 4-2 
1 4 8-12 5-4 10- 6 3-2 12- 8 5-3 1 5 -19 2-4 
1 5 1 5 -11 2 -1 6- 2 4-6 9- 5 6-5 6-10 3-4 
------------------------------------------------------
Trial BLOCK 5 BLOCK 6 BLOCK 7 
STAKE NO. STAKE NO. STAKE NO. 
1 5- 1 4-6 13-17 1 -4 1" -14 6-2 
2 10-14 1-5 15-11 6-5 10- 6 4-3 
3 2- 6 3-6 18 -1 4 3-4 13- 9 1-2 
4 11 - 7 3-5 12-16 1-3 15-11 3-6 
5 1 5 -11 2-5 12- 8 1 -6 13-17 2-5 
6 7- 3 1-5 2- 6 3-6 8-12 2-5 
7 1 2-16 2-4 1 - 5 1 -6 12-16 6-4 
8 4- 8 1-6 19-1 5 6-3 2- 6 1 - 5 
9 1 3-17 4 5 3- 7 5-3 11 - 7 6 -1 
10 13- 9 3-6 9- 5 3-2 1 - 5 2-3 
1 1 5- 9 2-4 1 1 - 7 3-5 5- 9 4-6 
12 6- 2 5-6 6-H~ 5-6 18-14 4-2 
13 1 4 -18 6-3 1 4 -10 5-3 13- 9 2-6 
14 8-12 1-4 8- 4 3-2 8- 4 2-4 
1 5 6-10 6-5 9-13 5-1 3- 7 4-5 
APPENDIX 7 
Response sheet for the choice of numbers and the total amount staked in 
blocks of 5 trials 
List the 5 numbers that ~ou think you chose in each of the 
338 
block segments of the sheet below (if you are uncertain, guess). 
Underneath, list the total amount of money that you think you 
bet on the ndmbers in those 5 trials. 
1st 5 choices 2nd 5 choices 3rd 5 choices 
BLOCK 1 
cents cents cents 
BLOCK 2 
cents cents cents 
BLOCK 3 
cents cents cents 
BLOCK 4 
cents cents cents 
BLOCK 5 
cents cents cents 
BLOCK 6 
cents cents cents 
BLOCK 7 
cents cents cents 
APPENDIX 8 
Response sheet for the estimated number of throws of dice, 
amount of money won/lost and replies to probe questions. 
Subject's name _________________________ I-E score 
Estimated number of throws of dice 
339 
BLOCK-1 BLOCK-2 BLOCK-3 BLOCK-4 BLOCK-5 BLOCK-6 BLOCK-7 
1 
-----
----- ----- - ---- ----- ----- -----
2 
----- - ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
3 
----- -----
-_-..- ...... - ---_ ...... 
----- ----- -----
4 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
-----
5 
----- ----- -----
...----- -_ ............. -
----- -----
6 
----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
Estimated amount of money won/lost (cents) 
BLOCK-1 BLOCK-2 BLOCK-3 BLOCK-4 BLOCK-5 BLOCK-6 BLOCK-7 
Answers to probe questions. 
1. _____ _ 
2. _____ _ 
3. _____ _ 
4. _____ _ 
5. _____ _ 
6. _____ _ 
Further comments. 
APPENDIX 9 340 
Post-experiment questionnaire (verbal administration) 
1.Do you consider this a skill game or a chance game? 
chance 1 --------------- 10 .skill 
2.Do you think you were lucky or unlucky? 
unlucky 1 -------------- 10 lucky 
3.Do you think there was any change in the probability of 
ea.ch outcome? 
yes/ no 
4.Do you think you could win more given more time? 
yes/ no 
5.Are you satisfied with the game as a game? 
very dissatisfied 1 10 very satisfied 
6.Did you enjoy the game? 
not at alII ---------- 10 very much 
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APPENDI X 10 
ANOVA output table of the higher stakes chosen. 
SOURCE DEGREES OF MEAN F P = 
FREEDOM SQUARE 
LOC 1 85. 71 2.38 B. 136 
SEX 1 97.52 2. 71 B. 113 
L x S 1 0. 02 B. BB 0. 98B 
ERROR 24 36. BB 
INFORMATION 1 0. 6B 0. 18 0.678 
I x L 1 B. 10 0. 03 B. 868 
I x S 1 3. 43 1.02 0. 323 
I x L x S 1 0. 02 0. B1 0. 934 
ERROR 24 3. 37 
FORTUNE 2 40. B4 10. 49 B. 00B2 
F x L 2 21. 13 5.53 0. 0B7 
F x S 2 B. 11 0. 03 B. 971 
F x L x S 2 B.08 0. B2 B. 980 
ERROR 48 3. 82 
I x F 2 33. 15 5. 92 B. 005 
I x F x L 2 5. 90 1 . 05 B. 357 
I x F x S 2 0. 55 B. 10 0. 906 
I x F x L x S 2 9. 04 1. 62 0,210 
ERROR 48 5. 60 
SDUf'Cl. SUM OF DEGHEES OF 111~AN F TAIL I~ )::> SQUARES Ff<EErIOi'l SQUARE PROBe :z 0 
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APPENDIX 15 
ANOVA output table of the accuracy of estimation 
of the amount of money won/lost. 
SOURCE DEGREES OF MEAN F 
FREEDOM SQUARE 
LOCUS 1 255. 1 e. 11 
SEX 1 4641.13 2.133 
L x S 1 113355. 7 4. 53 
ERROR 24 2287.8 
I NF ORMA TI ON 1 51327. 1 5.53 
I x L 1 255. 1 e. 28 
I x S 1 226. 3 e. 25 
I x L x S 1 621.13 e. 68 
ERROR 24 9138. 7 
FORTUNE 2 212139.2 17. 94 
F x L 2 21395.1 1. 77 
F x S 2 21313. 5 e. 17 
F x L x S 2 371.5 e. 31 
ERROR 48 1182.1 
I x F 2 51364. 9 5. 213 
I x F x L 2 153. 5 13, 16 
I x F x S 2 1233. 9 1. 27 
I x F x L x S 2 11387.6 1. 12 
ERROR 48 973. 6 
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P = 
e. 741 
e. 167 
e. 1344 
e. 1327 
13,6131 
e. 622 
13.417 
e. 131313 
e. 181 
13, 845 
13.732 
e. 13139 
e. 855 
13.291 
e. 336 
0* * ~ • * * * * * * * • • • * * * * C R ° SST ABU L A T rON ° F Q3 BY LOC 
* • • * • * * • * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * • • • * * • • * * • * * * * 
n'~ 
','oJ 
:_OC 
COUNT 1 
ROW FCT jJ::LGh LOW 
COL PCT 1 
TOT r'CT :::: :;:: 
- ------- I --.------ .-- ._---,-., 1 
1 I 6 5 I 
2 
COLU~lN 
TOTAL 
:;: 34.3 I 43.S ~ , 
1 42. s· I 35.7 1 
I 2.L.4 I l7.9 I 
-1--------1--------1 
I 8 9 I 
I 47.::. I e-..., 0-....J..:- • ') 1 
I "'.., , ..J J' • .1. I 64.3 I 
~ 2e .. 6 I uo:.;. ..... . l 
.-
-I--------I-------·-I 
14 
50.0 
14 
30.0 
I,OW 
TOT;~:" 
'39.3 
l7 
60.7 
28 
100.0 
COImLCTF.!I Cli I Stml\l~r:: 0.00000 W::-TII 1 DI:GRlT or FRIE DDt-i. 
RAW c:n: SQUAR:: 0 .14973 WITH 1 D::::GRC;: 'OC FRr:::r::D0i1. 
O**~ * * * 'ii,,*"** * * It * • li,·if'.'c R'-O'S-S'T"'A au L AT Q3 . "', . , , ' , BY 
S;GiHIO'ICANCF 
SIGNlf"ICANC;: 
ION 0 F 
S::X 
;( It 
* * 
'* * *' ,r 
::'.0000 
0.6988 
l! It * * * 
* * * • * * * * * * * • * * * • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * 
03 
SEX 
COUNT 1 
ROW PCT IFEMALf MALE ROW 
COL PCT I __ .JOTAL 
TOT rCT I ::. I 2 I 
--------1 -----1----- ~I 
1 I 7 1 4 I 
I 63.6 I 36.4 ( 39.3 
I 50.0 I 28.6i 
I 23.0 I l4.3 I 
-1--------I--------l 
2 I 7 I 10 I 17 
COLUMN 
TOT(-~L 
I 4l.2 I 58.8 I 60.7 
I 50.0 I 71.4 ! 
I 25.0 I 35.7 J 
-I--------I--~-----i 
14 14 
50.0 30.0 
28 
100.0 
COiml.-cn:D CIII SQU(':.j'::E 
RAW C: IT. SQUAR;: 
0.5'78S'3 WITi: 1 DFGr~n:: Ol~ FRE[Dmi. S~.GNIF:::CANCr:· 
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94 BY LOC 
* n ~ * • • * * * * • * fi * * * • • * • * * • * • * * * • * * • * * * * * • • • * * * * • 
Q4 
LOC 
COUNT I 
ROW PCT I1-1IG1'; LOW '"(oW 
COL PCT I TOTAL 
TOT rCT I 1 I 2 I 
--------1--------;--------1 
1 I 4 I 5 I 9 
I '44.4 1 53_~ I' 32.~ 
I 28.6 I ~5.7 I 
I 14.:' ; L7.7 I 
-1--------I--------I 
2 I LO T ? I L9 
COLUm-i 
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-I----·----I ------I 
14 14 2D 
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MINIMUM EXP~CTED CELL FREQUCNCY ~ 
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0* ')( 'if if * * * * * -it it * * U L A T ION 0 r *. * * * • * * 
Q4 BY s::x 
* * * • * • • • * * * • • ')( • • * • * • • • * * • y • • ~ * • * * * * * * * ~ • * • • • 
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COUNT I 
ROW PCT rrrMALE MALE ROW 
COL PCT I TOTAL 
TOT rCT I 1 I 2 I 
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i I 5 I 419 
I r 44.4J 1 
I I 
! ~7.7 
-I----
2 I i9 
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I I 71.4 I . 
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-I--------I~~~-----I 
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TOTAL 50.0 50.0 100.0 
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0* M ~ ~ * * * ~ * * A N A l Y SIS 
Q1 
D r V A RIA N C [ ~ * 
BY LOC 
srx 
* * * * * * * * * 7( * * * * * * * M * ~ 7( * * M I 
0 
r;OUf~C[ OF VPd:..::r.tl T I ON 
OHt-,IN ;:;::- i:: i::C: T E; 
LOG 
::~;::x 
02· .. W{iY :;. NTLI~(\CT IONS 
L.DC B::::X 
O[XF'LAINLII 
om:!3IIIUAL 
OTOTAL 
Q~I 
.:.. 
'BY LOC 
sex 
?~ ~~ ~( ~( 7t. 
* 
7: ,t i\ 
* 
o 
SOU~Cl OF VARIATION 
Oi'it:IIN r:::;:~;::-:CTS 
LOC 
02-WAY INT[RACT:ONS 
LOC !:lex 
OTD!' (.:\L 
o 
Q5 
BY LOC 
t;OUF~C[ or W:J~J.{.IT ION 
OHAIN r::;:-r-:::CTS 
L.OC 
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LOC SE:X 
O[XF'L/'.INI:·D 
ORS~3IDUI!:tL. 
OTOTAL 
Q6 
BY I .• OC 
::>Ui'l 0'" ," 
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0., 3~?1 
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2.Wr3 
4.107 
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5(, •• {,79 
')~l .. ii i( 1(' it 
SUf1 0;= 
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S CW r:;.r~ [S 
3.7G6 
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2 .. 8 i)/3 
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67.143 
?t.,. <)'64 
sex 
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SDUI:~C[ DI:- VAr~ J: f.l T I (IN E;CW(.lnU;; 
OI'iA:::N :::':i7 F;:CTB 0.:1.43 
I. .. DC 0 .. 000 
f:)~:X 0 .. 143 
02"Wf:iY INT[r\I:~CTJ DN~; 2 ,I ;:.(JI.. 
UJC ~:)::x 2.2a6 
OE:XPI..AII-lED 2.4~?S' 
." 
r1:::.r.'1l\j. 
Dr SQu.(.\r~E 
., 0.b07 "-
1 o ·x,," .. .....,.;:.,.J.. 
.L 0 .. ~l?3 
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'1 2.2B6 .1. 
. ." 
,j !::i .. 381 
24 0 .. "129 
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.)(. 1~ ~: ~! .): ~( 'll 
* * 
l'l:::'r~N 
" Dr SQUAr~E 
2 1.893 
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., 2.8?3 .1. 
., 6. 03~") .1. 
1 .S u 036 
3 3.274 
24 2 .. 798 
27 2.8!::il 
,'\E(')N 
rtF SCWAr.:E 
'I 0~07:L "'-
., 0 .. 000 ... 
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3 0.f.Jl0 
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~(. ~~ ~i ~( it 'lr i(' * 
SIGNIr-
r OF F 
0.277 0 .. 760 
0.147 0.705 
0.408 0.52(;> 
:1. u 321 0.2c,2 
1 -,.,., 
'" ';'..,:.. J. 0.262 
O. c,25 0.606 
~ ~" 
-
.. 
*. .)~ 
* 
1r 
* * '" 
SIGtUF' 
F OF r 
7 .. 4,S2 0.003 
2.4.62 0.130 
.1.2~4b2 0 .. 002 
2"462 0.:t.:?:0 
2p462 0 .. 1:30 
::';.795 0 .. 004 
i( ')i .)!- *. -)( 
* * 
SIGNIF 
F or r 
OR677 0.518 
0.319 0.577 
1,,034 0.319 
2.1.57 0.155 
2 .. :1.57 O. :1.53 
:: ... 170 0.342 
SIGNIF 
r .. or r 
0.Ot7 0.984 
0 .. 000 :t u 000 
0.033 OuB57 
0.530 0.473 
0 .. 53() 0.473 
0.::'D8 O. <»)04 
Random alphabet matrix. 
Name: 
APPENDIX 19 
-----------------------
CCXGAGHRPAJVICAOBWXWJXCDXEINLY 
UXONLMUUDNTZNPPRYYZMUYKBNZUUDL 
UXVTBAIZZJDCYZADBQMUQFZTRPXYOX 
EBNXBANSKVMVJKMGWKTNTAOHFACYMT 
UKURWETWTCVMJYKSVAZGZZZDAHODHY 
WSGKHCDRITHRAAUJHIRHIUVXPWHLZN 
HXNEPACOVCKCNJNDNYWZHVJJNZUPKB 
ESLQSLKXIGDAYYIBWJUDOFUJINCEMZ 
RNDXMKNOVEODJSJNQJIRFBXFRTVGIB 
HLCXEVQGAXQLWFSXVCSOEFFXJXFOXL 
YAGQRDOHLQUOJSNYXTPPGIXLOHGVHP 
DEPLCPEMSSBSQJBHALJSFCJMNCKBAD 
KVKFUVYFRAUIVJVDBMGWFEBOTKKORZ 
AUMNLRHBWTDWNSDPWFWIXBDBZXRFNB 
KBCBXETHUXIOXSGTZLYYAJBIDCYPYW 
ZKMSONTUXUWSICELSDGQUIYAGTSUNA 
OOEKCLGBWYJOHNDHYL TNWNDPFTKVNM 
UNRRNVHCAFCNRSCFUQMZUFSUBSZFRB 
STQMDLACNFDMJRXMNQUVGBFMXYNTGZ 
XTESEHNOJYTIJKBJRYMJVFQQEGKOGL 
VDFUGHJ RVFLSMBMWM V ROCQWt~STMR IA 
NXGSRNVTFPDSCGAYTQOSRKTDINKEAW 
VMOOMVCPYBGBYHEWHYFWIT~ENMRVJU 
OLRJMZUCMEJYDEYHHYFZCRWDMBOKPA 
OKQARABVXOAMZSUPYWPSZOAFRUFLMZ 
KSICUXKPRDXFOXYWUTOIPLSLSQNIHJ 
CRXCGPZXDKQFKJQSWYMDFPMCDWXFRB 
FRCSTGWPEDHDJQKMJINMXLGKHQAEBL 
UJUHSDGUFQBJBUULHMYDAPWLQXTQPX 
HMYBKXGUIOEMYWKLMQJZXCIZOKCMSR 
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APPENDIX 22 353 
The STIMULUS GRID 
Name: Age: 
---------------------------------------
Sex: M F 
This rating form is a way of assessing how you perceive certain character-
istics in other individuals. You are asked to rate a range of these descriptions 
against a number of people who are influential in your life. 
Rate the individuals on a scale of 1 - 7, a 1 indicating that the des-
cription of the left-hand side is most appropriate and a 7 indicating that the 
description on the right-hand side is most appropriate. A 4 would mean that 
the person is neither one nor the other or that you don't know. If possible, 
try to avoid rating 4s. 
Please work across each row before moving on to the next row. Work 
quickly as it is best to go by the firs't feeling you have in each case. 
(Before you start it is easiest to decide on the persons you want to refer to 
and use the same person consistently throughout the whole column. Do not 
choose the same person twice except for the first four.) 
Please turn over and have a look at the grid. Make sure you know what to 
do before you begin. 
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F has high self-esteem - has low self-esteem 
G does not need achievement - needs achievement 
H is not aroused easily - is easily aroused 
I does things better alone - does thi ngs better ina group 
J has a liberal outlook - has a conservative outlook 
K does not believe in luck - believes in luck 
L prefers known outcomes - prefers uncerta in outcomes 
M is not superstitious - is superstitious 
N is pessimist; - is optimistic 
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APPENDIX 23 
ANOVA summary table of the performance of gamblers 
and non-gamblers in the three externality tasks. 
SOURCE DEGREES OF MEAN 
FREEDOM SQUARES 
ITEM RECALL 
Sex 
Gam 
Sex x Gam 
EXPLAINED 
RESIDUAL 
TOTAL 
1 
1 
1 
3 
36 
39 
LETTER 
Sex 
Gam 
IDENTIFICATION 
1 
Sex x Gam 
EXPLAINED 
RESIDUAL 
TOTAL 
1 
1 
3 
36 
39 
DIFFERENCE DETECTION 
Sex 1 
Gam 1 
Sex x Gam 
EXPLAI NED 
RESIDUAL 
TOTAL 
1 
3 
36 
39 
0. 02 
15. 35 
15. 06 
10. 14 
4. 17 
4. 63 
30. 50 
58. 47 
6. 07 
31. 08 
32. 29 
32. 20 
1.25 
14. 54 
1. 55 
5.72 
5. 71 
5. 71 
F 
0.01 
3. 69 
3. 62 
2. 43 
0. 95 
1 . 81 
0. 19 
0. 96 
0. 22 
2.55 
0, 27 
1. 00 
P = 
0. 942 
0. 063 
0. 065 
0. 081 
0. 338 
0. 187 
0. 667 
0. 421 
0. 643 
0. 119 
0. 606 
0.403 
355 
APPENDIX 24 
Gambling Assessment Questionnaire 
Name: ________________ Sex: _____ Age: ___ _ 
1. Do you sometimes gamble or take risks with money? 
How often do you do that? (circle one) 
a. Two or more times a day 
b. Every day or nearly every day 
c. Three or four times a week 
d. Once a week 
e. Two or three times a month 
How much do you usually risk? 
. (Quote a figure, e.g. about $5) 
f. About once a month 
g. About six times a year 
h. At least once a year 
i. Less than once a year 
j. Never 
2. Have you ever staked any money on the outcome of an event? 
How often have you done that? (circle one) 
a. Two or more times a day f. About once a month 
b. Everyday or nearly every day g. About six times a year 
c. Three or four times a week 
d. Once a week 
e. Two or three times a month 
How much did you stake? 
(Quote a figure, e.g. about $8) 
3. Do you enjoy gambling? Why? 
h. At least once a year 
i. Less than once a year 
j. Never 
356 
2. 
4. What is/are your preferred formes} of gambling? 
(e.g. poker, horse-racing, etc.) 
5. Do you usually gamble or stake money: (circle one) 
a. Hoping to win money? 
b. For the fun of it? 
c. Both? 
d. Other reasons (state) ___________________ _ 
6. In your opinion what is gambling7 
7. How do you feel about gambling? 
8. How do you feel about people who gamble? 
357 
3. 
9. Is playing space-invaders a form of gambling? Why? Why not? 
10. Is gambling an addiction? 
11. Do you possess any item that you think brings you luck? 
12. Do you think there is any difference between luck and fate? If so, what? 
13. Are you superstitious? (circle one) 
not at all 
1 234 
14. Do you believe in luck? (circle one) 
not at all 
1 234 
5 
5 
6 
6 
very much 
7 
very much 
7 
358 
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AROUSAL GRID 
NAME: 
This form is a way of recording how you feel about certain situations. 
You are asked to rate a number of emotions against a range of situations. 
These situations are ones that you may encounter in your daily routine. 
When rating use these numbers as follows: 
NEVER 
1 2 3 
HALF THE rH1E 
4 
AL~IAYS 
5 6 7 
359 
Please work across each row before moving on to the next row. Work quickly 
as it is best to go by the first feeling you have in each case. 
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! i 1. anxiety 
i i 
2. thrill 
3. anger 
4. frustration 
i I 
5. interest 
6. joy 
7. excitement 
i 
8. determination 
9. depression 
10. elation i 
11. remorse 
12. optimi sm 
i 
APPENDIX 26 
PRE-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
360 
1. If you are given the choice of game to gamble against us, would you select 
one which is (circle one) 
(a) totally determined by chance alone 
(b) largely determined by chance 
(c) equally determined by chance and sk ill 
(d) largely determined by sk; 11 
(e) totally determined by sk; 11 alone 
2. Do you think there is any skill involved in correctly predicting the outcome 
of a tossed coin? (circle one) 
not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
a lot 
7 
3. If you have to, woul d you rather ,(circle one) 
4. 
5. 
(a) roll a marble into one of five different sized holes with the 
biggest hole paying the least and the smallest hole paying the 
most, or 
(b) draw one out of five coloured marbles from a bag to decide the 
same reward? 
Would you prefer the chance of winning (circle one) 
(a) $3.00 with a probabil ; ty of .1 
(b) $1. 20 with a proba b il i ty of .25 
(c) $0.60 with a probabil ity of .5 
(d) $0.40 with a probabi 1 ity of .75 
(e) $0.30 with a probabi 1 ity of 1 
Do you think you are likely to win in the game you are 
very unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 
going 
6 
to play? (circle one) 
very 1 ikely 
7 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Did you enjoy the game? (circle one) 
not at all very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Do you think the game involves mainly chance or skill on your part? (circle one) 
chance ski 11 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Do you think that you were 1 ucky or unl ucky during the game? (circle one) 
unlucky 1 ucky 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. What do you think is the most important factor contributing to your overall 
win or loss? (circle one) 
(a) chance 
(b) 1 uck 
(c) ski 11 in playing 
(d) knowledge of odds 
(e) other (please specify) 
5. Do you think the game was fair (not rigged)? (circle one) 
(a) yes 
(b) coul d be 
(c) no 
(d) probably not 
(e) don't know 
6. Were there any cues which may have influenced the way you bet? 
(Please elaborate) 
APPENDIX 28 
The payoff schedule of the 30 gambling trials. 
Trial 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Payoff 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
o 
1 
o 
1 
T5 = after-2-win trial 
T7 = after-1-win trial 
T9 = after-a-double-win trial 
T12 = a double-win followed by 3 losses 
T15 after-3-wins 
T21 = 1-wi n followed by 3 losses 
T23 = after-1-10ss 
T26 = after-2-10sses 
Trials 31 - 35 are optional gambles 
(not included in the analysis) 
o denotes a loss, 
denotes a win, 
2 denotes winning twice the amount staked and, 
Tx denotes trials singled out for in-depth analyses 
(on an a priori basis). 
362 
APPENDIX 29 
Instructions of how the game was to be played that were 
presented to the subjects on the computer monitor. 
Welcome to the experiment. In a moment you will be 
363 
playing a simple game against us, that is, the computer and 
the experimenter. When you are using this computer, press 
the RETURN key if you want to proceed with the instructions 
and also after you have made an entry. 
Now, what do you do if you want to go on? 
RETURN 
That's right! 
If you want to erase something you have typed, press the key 
with the arrow pointing towards your left as many times as 
required, then type in your new response. 
RETURN 
If you encounter any difficulty at any time, call the 
exper i menter. Please don't feel embarrassed about asking 
since it is probably due to the ambiguity of the instructions 
rather than a lack of understanding on your part. 
RETURN 
I shall now proceed to explain the rules of the game. A box 
containing six numbers, corresponding to the sides of a die, 
will appear on the screen. Your task is to predict which 
number(s) will come up, You are only allowed to choose one 
number each time. First, you indicate the chance of you 
winning in the gamble. Then you type in the amount of money 
you want to bet that the number you have chosen will turn up. 
364 
Finally. you type in the chance that you think that you will 
make the correct prediction. 
RETURN 
Next. the result of your decision will appear on the screen. 
RETURN 
If the number that you choose turns up once you will be paid 
the amount you staked. If your number turns up on two dice 
then you will be paid twice the amount you staked. and i.f all 
three dice turn up the number you staked then you get paid 
three times the amount. 
Your current total sum of money you have in your possession 
will be displayed after each trial. 
RETURN 
You will be given a sum of $3. BB to play against us. You get 
to keep an unknown percentage of the balance after the 
gambling session is over so it would be to your advantage to 
try to win as much as you can. 
RETURN 
However, if you lose more than the initial amount given to 
you, you will be obliged to pay us the money in terms of time 
to participate in another experiment. 
After a certain number of trials you will be asked whether 
you want to stop. 
the session. 
RETURN 
Your response will influence the length of 
During the session you will be required to answer a few 
questions and your heart-rate will be monitored at specific 
intervals using a very simple and conveneint gadget. 
Before you start the game proper you are given two practice 
trials to familiarise you to the situation. 
RETURN 
Practice trials. 
365 
Are you ready to commence the actual gambling session? 
(Press 'Y' for yes and 'N' for no. From now on, just press 
'yl or 'N' when you have to answer yes or no respectively. 
RETURN 
Do you want (A): To go through the instructions again? or, 
(B): Have one more practice trial? 
Type in your choice, A or B. 
RESPONSE 
Good, we shall now begin. 
(No response required) 
Good 1 uck! 
The sequence of events that takes place during a single trial 
is listed earlier in the method section. 
After the last trial is played (either 3e or 35 trials in 
all) the final statement comes on the screen. 
Thank you for taking part in the experiment. I hope you ha ve 
enjoyed yourself. Please fill in the short questionnaire 
sheet contained in the folder on your right. 
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APPENDIX 33 
The effect of arousal, having.JLQood or bed reinforcement 
schedule first end gembllng cues on the betting beheviour 
of gemblers and non-gamblers after eXReriencing a double 
win and after eXReriencing a double win followed byl 
losses. 
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GI'i!'~ 
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GCU;: 
:",r\DU::~(iL 
Gt;l" BY I.,IJLO 
Gfli1 BY l11;U:: 
Groi'; BY r'\!,:DUS(~! 
WILO BY (3C11:: 
WILIJ BY 11;~OUS{',L 
GCU':: BY {)fWUE!'lL 
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GAM BY W:LO BY AROUSAL 
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GAM BY aCUE AND ourCOMC 
GAM BY ARousnL AND OU1COM[ 
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WILD BY nRousnL nNU OUTCOME 
GCU~ BY ~ROUSAL AND QUTCO~C 
GAM DY WILD BY GeUE AND OUTCOME 
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APPENDIX 36 
ANOVA output tables of estimates of the chances of winning and 
making correct predictions. 
1. Estimates of chances of winning. 
SUI1 Dr 
BOUHt::1 m W\F:l ~TlDN st1UM~ES [IF 
1'lAIN EFFECTS 3;;;13. f.l()~' '.:; 
f'ifW, j'~'16.n.f:l 1 
WILD t 9~:j to <1}l3(~ 1. 
GCUF ;:: .. <"}t;19 1 
(\f\OU~;AL HW?~lB.3 2 
;}··~Jr".Y :1 I,n 1':!·:(.[;'1 :! UI-IB :'5:~ :: .. ~I:B~J S' 
G(,N l..Il!.,.O l',~:::S. '{fm 1 
10 !,; V: hCU!· 1 ~) .. ::.~ ~~; ~.:, 
l:;r\l~ (li'(OIJ~'(11 2B .(.;;'1. :~ 
\~II n I:,CU!:. '1~? " '~)E!6 :1 
~) !i .. D MW \J ~:;.")!. Bl.;Wl :'~ 
CiC\J! (\I:l.ltJUI'iI. ·1 :! .. 9B6 .., 
;5, .. ~J(\,( rNf'Uu'lC1IIlNE 51~j .. :·,~()6 
[:;(H'! t.n·ul (,;CU! 1: .. [1:3::: :l 
OMI \·J.l! .. U fliWW';{IL :!..'i3. 63~j :~ 
Gf',t-·, {,CUL t,I:UlJEi{\L 3~:~:l t> ~.:l f.; 2 
WILD Geu:.: fl:mUl,ltlL (j/ . .,22 ~ 
EXPL(;)l-!UI '1:~9:l. O()() ~):I 
~\!.::~} !:DU{)L ::':'661 • '?:~6 7'1 
TI:rl t,l. ~~7052 .. 9'26 Ii"" "J
2. Estimates of making correct prediction. 
SOURCE ur Vt.RJ(;110N 
t'lA[1'! :C.:::TTClS 
OfW: 
WT' .. O 
GCUI'. 
IiHOUf;AL 
2~WriY ].~·1[.~~C1JONS 
[;)A('1 lHLll 
GU", m:u!' 
13A[,\ A!(oUH.,,)L 
W:! I U CCUi 
W I!.D ARDUSAI .. 
GCLlE fil:om.r"J 
.3-WAY Il'!feRnCTIUNS 
Ef'd', \.rJ I D 
GM\ WH.n 
GI',h HCUi, 
WI; .. !) GCUE 
[',CUi 
nr,(iUHI')L 
1~IW'I~)I'iL 
ttfmUS(li ... 
96 C~SE8 WER~ F'ROCf~S8!::I)p 
tj\')1'~ lJIe 
!J(IUIiI":ES 
28B9.500 
1 :~~j:; Of ~jB" 
130.'f03 
:l:~I~.'1B'1 
1.:36;>. ~j:~H 
j '1:'.<". ~/O'l 
69 .. ?::jB 
:!,HI .. ()O::'. 
156. t1~7 
::?'Bl .. '12'~ 
'1~3.03:t 
~;HI. O'll:l 
~;H?9 to 'l :·.~7 
167.~Jbt-l 
1.51. .. 71~:j 
-1::6 .. ~j~,6 
:~53 .. 3~i8 
~:j~~:~J .. t:.;:~7 
22'729.027 
::n:':J'r • 66,1 
o CI',Bl.f:i ( 0.0 PC'l) \..IU~E 1·\]U~nNG .. 
lit" 
,:: 
"J 
1 
1 
~: 
'1 
1 
:~ 
1 
:~ 
,., 
.c 
7 
1 
2 
" 
:2 
::: 1 
]t; 
95 
MEAN 
S f.HJ (If': E. r-
'lOB, 7t):~ :!.:3L '\ 
:! ,1,16.9:':B ., .. 7:?~:,j 
1 <;>:5. 9B'? 0.61() 
:.999 0.0)0 
9'\8.9'11 ~~. 09';> 
~\6. BEl7 0.:1 :':0 
:I. 2.:1. s'ml O.t)O\; 
1 ~~ .. :'!~~'J 0.0'10 
1. '\ • ~\:~~'j (). () 'I 
·13.7!~6 () 1<:1 -1:3 
10.b~5() 0.1;3,1 
;CO. '193 O.Ob'! 
'nl .. 6()1 O.:!IJO 
1:::. ~1:',3 0.0-1;' 
66.B:!.:' O.:?!.B 
1t..O.65B 0 .. ::'~~j 
23.'711 O.O7? 
20'1.()'1~ O.6!:!;'" 
~'iOb.21:>' 
::''!H.76B 
Mf,,()N 
BIW(',f,a:: F 
~j'7l .. 900 1. 86~i 
12~j2. ~j(H '1.0'13 
130. 9()~~ (L,1f2~~ 
:l3B. "81 ().,~ '~7 
6B3.76~ 2.2()? 
1 ~;~t tt b3" O .. S:! ~:j 
6~) • nit:? o ''l''l!;':'' .. ",-, ..... ,) 
2'1fJ. O()3 O.BO() 
7B.:!2'l 0 .. 2:'5:~ 
:~\3l ... ,:~" O.90B 
~:'~1 .. 5l~ O.713 
:l19. ()2'\ O. 3l~'1 
1 ,,") .., .. 7 1 , 
l ....... 01 I I \J O,'1bl 
167.:"68 o II ~j'11 
?~.873 O.:!'!;) 
::'13. :~7!:! 0.61:lB 
126. '7';'9 O. fj O't 
:tJ:'~! .. 60::·: O.8J8 
30S'.8:':;:! 
2't'7. -,:1 7 
372 
SIG~I [F 
OF F 
o. (n:! 
0.033 
(). ~;)6 
o.9n 
(). ()~i 1 
(). ')'9'1 
o"ei27 
O.U1:! 
(). ~';'j4 
O. 70{~ 
O.8?6 
0.93'\ 
0.9:'4 
0.1031'1 
O.B()4 
(). ~)9 '1 
O. 9~!6 
o. B:~6 
SJ:GNIF 
01- F 
O. n,l 
0.O'1B 
0.:518 
(). ~Ob 
0.117 
() .. B~.;9 
0.637 () .. :~:"'1 
(l.77a 
().:~'H 
0.~?3 
0.682 
0.860 
o. ·16'1 
(). 'lIB 
O.Ci06 
0.666 
0.61:19 
* * • * • • • * • • * * • • • * * * C R 0 SST ABU L A T GAM GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER BY 
* * * * ~ ~ * • • • * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * • 
PAY 
COUNT I 
F~DW I'CT :l.HAL.F MPIHBI...L NOT Ir'llT[ I~(]W 
COL peT I F~[!:)TE[I rcn AI... 
TD'T I'CT 1 1 I 2 I :-5 J 
GAM --------1--------1--------1--------1 
1 1 ~ I 38 I 1 1 48 
GAMBLER r 18.8 I 79.2 1 2.1 J 50.0 
1 32.1 1 67.9 1 8.3 1 
I 9.4 I 39.6 I 1.0 I 
-1--------1--------1--------1 
2 I 19 I 18 I 11 I 48 
NDN-GAMBI...LR :I. 3V.6 I 37.5 I 22.9 I 50.0 
I 67.9 I 32.1 I 91.7 I 
I 19.8 I 18.8 I 11.5 1 
-1--------1--------1--------1 
COLUMN 
TOTAL 
RAW elll SQUAh:E :::: 
I...AMBDA (ASYMMETRIC) 
LAMBDA (SYMMETRIC) = 
2B 
2f}.2 
5(, 
:58.3 
It},.047f..2 wrn: 2 
:::: 0.41667 WITI" GA!"l 
o. 22~B64 
12 
j ") '"' 
. ..:.. .. ,J 
96 
100.0 
DLGHI..ES m FRE.EDOM. 
D[Y'[NDENT. 
I o N o F • * * • • * * * * * * • • * 
PAY SELECTION OF Types OF PAYMENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
PAGE 
~JI IFICANCE = 0.0001 
- . 0.025()0 WITH. DEPENDENT. 
);:. 
" 
" rn :z 
o 
>-f 
x 
W 
-.J 
W 
-.J 
W 
'* * * * * * * * * * A N 
INVOLVE 
BY GAM 
WI 
GCUE 
AROUSAL 
A L Y SIS 0 F V A R I A N C E 
CHANCE-SKILL INVOLVEMENT CHANCEl TO 
GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
WINFIRST OR LOSEFIRST 
GAMBLING CUES OR NO GAMBLING CUES 
EXER VIDEO READ 
'* * '* * * * * * * * 
SKIL 
* '* * * * * '* * * * * '* * '* * * * '* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * '* '* * * '* * '* * 
SUM OF MEAN SIGNIF 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SQUAI:':ES [IF SOUARE F OF F 
MAIN EFFECTS 23.844 5 4.769 3.094 0.014 
GAM 10.010 1 10.010 6.494 0.013 
WILO 3.010 1 3.010 1.953 0.166 
GCUE 0.260 1 0.260 0.169 0.682 
AROUSAL 10.562 2, 5 .. 281 3.426 0.038 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS 18n885 9 2.098 1.361 0.221 
GA1'\ WILD 4.594 1 4.594 2.980 0.088 
GAM GCUE 1.260 1 1.260 0.818 0.369 
GAM AROUSAL 6.521 2 3.260 2.115 0.128 
WILO GCUE 0.844 1 0.844 0.547 0.462 
WILO AFWUSAL 4.771 2 2.385 1.548 0.220 
GCUE AROUSAL 0.896 2 0.448 0.291 0.749 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 10.365 7 1.481 0.961 0 .. 466 
GAM WILO GCUE 0.094 1 0.094 0.061 0.806 
GAM WILD AROUSAL 4.563 2 2 .. 281 1.480 0.234 
GAM GCUE AROUSAL 3.771 "J .... 1.885 1.223 0.300 
WILD GCUE AROUSAL 1.937 2 0.969 0 .. 628 0.536 
EXPLAINED 53.094 21 2.528 1.640 0.063 
RESIDUAL 114.062 74 1 .. 541 
TOTAL 167.156 95 1.760 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
o CASES ( 0.0 peT) WERE MISSING. 
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* * * * * * * * * * A N A L Y SIS OF V ARIA N C E * * * * * * * * * * 
PREDICT SKILL IN PREDICTION NONEl TO A LOT7 
BY GAM GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ~ * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SUM OF MEAN SIGNIF 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SQUARES rtF SQUARE F OF F 
MAIN EFFECTS 1.760 :I. 1.760 0.908 0.343 
GAM 1.760 1 1.760 0.908 0.343 
EXPLAINED 1.760 1 1.760 0.908 0.343 
RESIDUAL 182.229 94 1 .. 939 
TOTAL 183.1"/89 95 1.937 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
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* * * * * * * * * * A N A L Y SIS 
PREFER PREFERENCE 
BY GAM GAMBLER 
o F V A R I A N C E * * * * * * * * * * 
PROB LOWl TO HIGH5 
NON-GAMBLER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SUM OF MEAN SIGNIF 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SQUARES DF Sl~UARE F OF F 
MAIN EFFECTS 8.760 1 8.760 5.274 0.024 
GAM 8.760 1 8.760 5.274 0.024 
EXPLAINED 8.760 1 8.760 5.274 0.024 
RESIDUAL 156.145 94 1.661 
TOTAL 164.906 ("}5 1.736 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
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* * * * * * * * * * A N A L Y SIS 0 F V A R I A N C E * * * * * * * * * * 
BELIEF BELIEF IN LUCK NOT AT ALL1 TO VERY MUCH 
BY GAM GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SOURCE OF VARIATI 
MAIN EFFECTS 
GAM 
EXPLAINED 
Ii:ESIDUAL 
TOTAL 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
SUM OF 
SQUARES 
29.260 
29.260 
29.260 
236.478 
265.738 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
DF 
1 
1 
1 
94 
95 
MEAN SIGNIF 
SQUARE F OF F 
29.260 11.631 0.001 
29.260 11.631 0.001 
29.260 11.631 0.001 
2 .. 516 
2.797 
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* * * * * * * * * * A N LUCK 
BY GAM 
WILD 
GCUE 
AROUSAL 
A L Y SIS 0 F V A R I A N C E * * * 
LUCKY-UNLUCKY IN GAME UNLUCKY1 TO LUCKY 
GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
WINFIRST OR LOSEFIRST 
GAMBLING CUES OR NO GAMBLING CUES 
EXER VIDEO READ 
* * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * • • • * * * * * * * * * * * • * 
SUM OF MEAN SIGNIF 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SQUARES DF SQUARE F OF F 
MAIN EFFECTS :l3.:729 ~-;J 2 .. 746 2.947 0.018 
GAM 1 .. 042 1 1.042 1.118 0.294 
WILO 8.167 1 8.167 8.766 0.004 
GCUE 0.375 l. 0.375 0.403 0.528 
AROUSAL 4.146 ") .:. 2.073 2.225 0.115 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS 12.396 9 1.377 1.478 0.172 
GAM WILD 2.042 1 2.042 2.192 0.143 
GAM GCUE 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1.000 
GAM AROUSAL 0.271 2 0.135 0.145 0.865 
WILO GCUE 0.375 1 0 .. 375 0.403 0.528 
WILD AROUSAL 7.021 2 3.510 3.768 0.028 
GCUE AROUSAL 2.688 2 1.344 1.442 0.243 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 10.271 7 1.467 1.575 0.156 
GAM WILD GCUE 0.000 1 0 .. 000 0.000 1.000 
GA~1 WILO AROUSAL 3.396 2 1.698 1.823 0.169 
GAM GCUE AROUSAL 3.062 2 1.531 1.644 0.200 
WILD GCUE AROUSAL 3.812 2 1.906 2.046 0.136 
EXPLAINED 36.396 21 1.733 1.860 0.027 
RESIDUAL. 68.937 74 0.932 
TOTAL 105.333 95 1.109 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
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* * * * * * * * * * A N A L Y SIS o F V A R I A N C E * * * * * * * * * * 
LH,ELY LIKELIHOOD OF WINNING NOT LIKELY1 TO VER 
BY GAM GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SUM OF r1EAN SIGNIF )::> 
SOURCE OF VARIATION S(mARES DF SQUARE F OF F -0 -0 
f"T1 
z 
t1AIN EFFECTS 18.375 1 18.375 11.916 0.001 0 
GAM 18.375 1 18.375 11.916 0.001 x 
..s;::,. 
w 
EXPLAINED 18.375 1 18.375 11.916 0 .. 001 
RESIDUAL 144.958 94 1.542 
TOTAL 163.333 95 1.719 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
* * * * * * * * * * A ENJOY 
N A L Y SIS 0 F V A R I A N C E 
ENJOYMENT OF GAME NONEl TO A LOT7 
GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
* * * * * * * * * * 
BY GAM 
WILO 
GCUE 
AROUSAL 
WINFIRST OR LOSEFIRST 
GAMBLING CUES OR NO GAMBLING CUES 
EXER VIDEO READ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SOURCE OF VARIATI 
I"IAIN EFFECTS 
GAM 
WILO 
GCUE 
AROUSAL 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS 
GAM WILD 
GAM GCUE 
GAM AROUSAL 
WILO GCUE 
WILO AROUSAL 
GCUE AROUSAL 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 
GAM WILO 
GAM WI 
GAM GCUE 
WILD GCUE 
EXPLAINED 
I,ESIDUAL 
TOTAL 
GCUE 
AROUSAL 
AROUSAL 
AROUSAL 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
SUM OF 
Sl~UARES 
35.604 
20.167 
3.375 
1.500 
10.563 
25.396 
:;! .. 042 
0.167 
to.396 
1 .. 042 
4.938 
6 .. 813 
~?:l. 312 
0.375 
15.771 
4.396 
0.771 
82.313 
162.186 
244.499 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
5 
1 
1 
:L 
'") 
.::.. 
9 
:L 
1 
2 
1 
'") 
.::.. 
2 
7 
1 
2 
2 
2 
21 
74 
95 
MEAN 
SQUARE 
7.121 
20.167 
3.375 
1.500 
5.281 
2.822 
2.042 
0.167 
5.198 
1.042 
2.469 
3.406 
3.045 
0.375 
7.885 
2.198 
0.385 
3.920 
2 .. 192 
2.574 
F 
3.249 
9.201 
1.540 
0.684 
2.410 
1.287 
0.932 
0.076 
2.372 
0.475 
1 .. 126 
1.554 
1.389 
0.171 
3.598 
1.003 
0.176 
SIGNIF 
OF F 
0.010 
0.003 
0.219 
0.411 
0.097 
0 .. 258 
0 .. 338 
0.784 
0 .. 100 
0.493 
0 .. 330 
0.218 
0.223 
0.680 
0 .. 032 
0 .. 372 
0.839 
1.788 0.036 
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* * * * '* *' * * *' * A TRIALS 
N A L Y SIS 0 F V A R I A N C E * * * * * * * * * * 
BY GAM 
WILO 
GCUE 
AROUSAL 
NUMBER OF TRIALS 
GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
WINFIRST OR LOSEFIRST 
GAMBLING CUES OR NO GAMBLING CUES 
EXER VIDEO READ 
* * * * ~ * * * * * '* * * * * * * * * * * * *' * * * * * *' * * *' *' * * *' *' *' * *' 
SUM OF MEAN SIGNIF 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SQUARES rtF SQUARE F OF F 
MAIN EFFECTS 2492.313 5 498.462 7.227 0.000 
GAM 2053 n ::iOO 1 2053.500 29.772 0.000 
WILO 40.042 1 40.042 0.581 0.449 
GCUE 360.3"75 1 360.375 5 .. 225 0.025 
AROUSAL 38.396 2 19.198 0.278 0.758 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS 619.729 9 68 .. 859 0.998 0.449 
GAM WILO 204.167 1 204.167 2.960 0 .. 090 
GAM GCUE 1.500 1. 1.500 0.022 0 .. 883 
GAM Ar,OUSAL 42.438 2 21.219 0.308 0.736 
WILD GCUE 1.042 1 1.042 0.015 0.903 
WILD AROUSAL 17.271 2 8.635 0.125 0.883 
GCUE AROUSAL 353.313 2 176.656 2.561 0.OB4 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 691.771 7 9B.824 1.433 0.205 
GAM WILD GCUE 16.667 1 16.667 0.242 0.624 
GAM WILO AFWUSAL 97.896 2 48.948 0.710 0.495 
GAM GCUE AF<OUSAL 492.437 2 246.219 3.570 0 .. 033 
WILO GCUE AROUSAL 84.771 2 42.385 0.615 0.544 
EXPLAINED 3803.813 21 181.134 2.626 0.001 
RESI[lUAL 5104.109 74 68.974 
TOTAL 8907.922 95 93.768 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
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* * * * * * * * * * A N TOTAL 
A L Y SIS 0 F V A R I A N C E 
* * * * * * * * * * 
BY GAM 
WILO 
GCUE 
AHOUSAL 
SUM ENDED UP WITH IN THE END 
GAMBLER OR NON-GAMBLER 
WINFIRST OR LOSEFIRST 
GAMBLING CUES OR NO GAMBLING CUES 
EXER VIDEO READ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SUM OF MEAN SIGNIF 
SOURCE OF VARIATION SOUARES DF SQUARE F OF F 
MAIN EFFECTS 2"7103.301 5 5420.660 1.528 0.192 
GAM 508.760 1 508.760 0.143 0.706 
WILD 6353.760 1 6353.760 1. 791 0.185 
GCUE 2233.0:l0 1 2233.010 0.629 0.430 
AROUSAL 18007.770 ? .... , 9003.885 2.537 0.086 
2-WAY INTERACTIONS. 82195.047 9 9132.781 2 .. 574 0~012 
GAM WILD 5135.094 1 585.094 0.165 0.686 
GAM GeUE 1953.0:1.0 :L 1953.010 0.550 0 .. 461 
GAM AROUSAL 38240.766 '") .:.. 19120.383 5 .. 388 0.007 
WILO GCUE 931.260 1 93:1..260 0.262 0.61.0 
WILD AROUSAL 31.792.020 2 15896.010 4.480 0.015 
GCUE AROUSAL 8692 .. 895 2 4346.447 1.225 0.300 
3-WAY INTERACTIONS 20210 .. 070 7 2887.153 0 .. 814 0.579 
GAM WILO GCUE 348.844 1 348.844 0.098 0.755 
GAM WILD AROUSAL 19287.438 2 9643.719 2.718 0 .. 073 
GAM GCUE AROUSAL 193 .. 146 2 96.573 0.027 0.973 
WILD GCUE AROUSAL 380.646 'j .:.. 190 • 0.054 0.948 
EXPLAINED :1.29508.438 21 6167.068 1 .. 738 0.043 
HESIDUAL 262582.563 74 3548.413 
TOTAL 392091.000 95 4:1.27.273 
96 CASES WERE PROCESSED. 
o CASES ( 0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING. 
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APPENDIX 47 
The polar co-ordinates of the constructs and projections 
for elements for the gambler STIMULUS GRID. 
Polar co-ordinates 
Constructs H V R 
1 -124.4 -10. 4 0. 88 
2 -155.0 2. 7 0. 92 
3 -15. 4 9. 3 0. 99 
4 -166.7 4. 8 0. 99 
5 -20. 0 -13. 4 0.75 
6 -24. 2 13. 3 0. 98 
7 -147.7 -13. 3 0. 66 
8 -65. 4 11. 2 0. 70 
9 47. 2 55.7 0. 92 
10 -8. 4 0. 1 0. 99 
11 -141.3 -1 . 1 0. 79 
1 2 -160.6 55. 8 0. 86 
13 -0. 1 -15. 5 0.93 
14 167.7 3. 5 0. 99 
Projections for elements 
Elements H V R 
1 -1 13. 7 6. 0 0. 93 
2 167, 4 -10, 1 0. 94 
3 - 21. 1 -55.0 0. 76 
4 -163.8 -17.7 0. 89 
5 176. 5 -26.0 0, 82 
6 -4. 9 -5. 3 0. 98 
7 171. 1 -0. 3 0. 78 
8 1 9. 2 -0. 7 0. 93 
9 93. 0 9. 5 0,95 
10 41, 4 40. 8 0.84 
1 1 159. 2 52. 2 0. 97 
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The values of H and V (horizontal and vertical measurements 
in degrees) are the ones used for plotting the positions of 
the constructs. The convention for plotting is as follows: A 
point on the equator is selected as the origin, with H = 0 
degrees and V = 0 degrees. Positive values of H are reached 
by moving eastwards around the globe for the given number of 
degrees, and the negative values by moving westwards. 
Positive values of V are reached by moving northwards and 
negative ones southwards. 
The radial measurement, R, is not used in the mapping. A 
construct can only be located on the surface of the sphere if 
its value of R is 1.00, otherwise it should be located 
beneath the surface. R also defines the multiple coorelation 
between the construct and the first 3 components; and R 
squared is the proportion of its total variation they account 
for. 
APPENDIX 48 
The loadings of the first 3 components of the elements 
and constructs derived from the INGRID analysis of the 
gambler STIMULUS GRID. 
384 
COMPo 1 COMPo 2 COMPo 3 
ELEMENT The person LOADING LOADING LOADING 
1 I am -0. 75 -1.72 0. 20 
2 I would like to be -2. 38 0. 53 -0. 43 
3 I was 5 years ago 0. 42 -0. 16 -0. 64 
4 I will be in 10 years ti me -1.67 -0. 49 -0. 56 
5 I admire most -1. 66 0. 10 -0.81 
6 I dislike most 4.68 -0. 39 -0. 44 
7 I like most -1. 10 0. 17 -0. 01 
8 who usually upsets me 2. 75 0. 96 -0. 04 
9 whom I fi nd comforting -0. 07 1.35 0. 22 
10 whom I find threatening 0. 87 -0. 77 1.00 
1 1 whose company I enjoy -1. 08 0. 41 1.49 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 does not like! Ii kes to gamble -0. 92 -1. 34 -0. 30 
2 does not take! takes risks -2. 15 -1. 00 0. 11 
3 is usually calm! tends to worry 2. 89 -0. 80 0.49 
4 does not like! Ii kes exci tement -2. 54 -0. 60 0. 22 
5 is not concerned! fears failure 1, 15 -0. 42 -0. 29 
6 has hi gh! has low self-esteem 1. 81 -0. 81 0. 47 
7 does not need! needs achi evement -0. 85 -0. 54 -0. 23 
8 is not! is easily aroused 0. 32 - 0. 71 0, 15 
9 does better alone! in a group 0. 62 0. 66 1. 33 
10 has liberal! conservative outlook 2. 81 -0. 41 0. 01 
1 1 does not! believes in luck -1.06 -0. 85 -0. 03 
12 prefers known! uncertain outcomes-0.97 -0.34 1. 52 
13 is not! is superstitious 1. 57 -0. 00 -0. 44 
14 is pessimistic! is optimistic 2. 48 0. 54 0. 16 
APPENDIX 49 
The loadings of the first 3 components of the elements 
and constructs derived from the INGRID analysis of the 
non-gambler STIMULUS GRID. 
ELEMENT The person 
1 I am 
2 I would like to be 
3 I was 5 years ago 
4 I will be in 10 years time 
5 I admire most 
6 I dislike most 
7 I like most 
8 who usually upsets me 
9 whom I find comforting 
10 whom I find threatening 
11 whose company I enjoy 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 does not like/ likes to gamble 
2 does not take/ takes risks 
3 is usually calm/ tends to worry 
4 does not like/ likes excitement 
5 is not concerned/ fears failure 
6 has high/ has low self-esteem 
7 does not need/ needs achievement 
8 is not/ is easily aroused 
9 does better alone/ in a group 
10 has liberal/ conservative outlook 
11 does not/ believes in luck 
12 prefers known/ uncertain outcomes 
13 is not/ is superstitious 
14 is pessimistic/ is optimistic 
COMPo 1 
LOADING 
-0. 12 
-2. 55 
1. 36 
-0. 91 
- 2. 45 
3. 01 
-0. 54 
3. 01 
-0. 83 
1. 29 
-1. 27 
1. 85 
-0. 26 
2. 93 
-1 . 01 
1 . 45 
0.92 
1. 98 
2. 18 
0. 41 
1. 76 
0. 80 
-0. 45 
2. 18 
2. 00 
COMPo 2 
LOADING 
1. 26 
-0. 79 
2. 60 
0. 39 
-0.37 
-0. 66 
0. 24 
-0. 80 
-0. 09 
-1. 47 
-0. 30 
-1. 81 
-1. 01 
0. 37 
0. 66 
1. 25 
1. 58 
0. 16 
0.29 
-1 . 47 
-0. 18 
0. 29 
-0. 80 
-0. 77 
-0. 24 
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COMPo 3 
LOADING 
0. 60 
0. 28 
-0. 14 
0. 06 
-0. 58 
- 0, 1 5 
-0. 16 
-0. 06 
-0. 76 
0. 26 
0. 65 
0. 34 
0.47 
-0. 04 
0. 70 
0. 22 
-0. 12 
0.71 
-0. 25 
-0. 29 
-0. 54 
0. 09 
0. 13 
-0. 05 
-0. 19 
APPENDIX 50 
The inter-element relations of the gambler AROUSAL GRID 
expressed as cosines. 
ELEMENT 1 WITH ELEMENT 
386 
2 -13.22 3 13.58 4 13.27 5 -13.35 6 13.38 7 -13.64 8 -13.42 
9 13.34 HI 13.13 11 13.19 
ELEMENT 2 WITH ELEMENT 
3 -13.84 4 -13.97 5 13.95 6 -13.41 7 13.513 8 13.95 9 -13.71 
113 -13.91 11 -13.97 
ELEMENT 3 WITH ELEMENT 
4 e. 8 5 5·~ 0. 8 4 6 e. 3 5 7 - e. 8 3 8 - e. 9 5 9 e. 8 4 1 13 e. 7 3 
11 13.83 
ELEMENT 4 WITH ELEMENT 
5 -13.96 6 0.33 7 -13.54 8 -13,95 9 -13,67 113 0.89 11 13.99 
ELEMENT 5 WITH ELEMENT 
6 -13.51 7 13.50 8 13.94 9 -13.65 113 -13.93 11 -13.94 
ELEMENT 6 WITH ELEMENT 
7 -13.138 8 -13.45 9 13,31 113 13.48 11 0.25 
ELEMENT 7 WITH ELEMENT 
8 0.70 9 -0.84 10 -0.46 11 -0.55 
ELEMENT 8 WITH ELEMENT 
9 -13.83 10 13,8811 13.93 
ELEMENT 9 WITH ELEMENT 
113 0. '71 11 0. 69 
ELEMENT 10 WITH ELEMENT 
11 0.90 
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APPENDIX 51 
The loadings of the first 3 components of the elements and 
constructs derived from the INGRID analysis of the gambler 
AROUSAL GRI D. 
COMPo 1 
ELEMENT LOADING 
1 decision making -0.67 
2 uncertainty 3.60 
3 challenge -3.35 
4 monetary gain -5.07 
5 loss of control 6. 02 
6 testing predictions -0.41 
7 superstitious behaviour 2.09 
8 losing money in a bet 5.84 
9 risk-taking -1.70 
10 having a bet -2.26 
11 beating the system -4.08 
CONSTRUCT 
1 anxiety 
2 thrill 
3 anger 
4 frustration 
5 interest 
6 joy 
7 exci tement 
8 determination 
9 depression 
10 elation 
11 remorse 
12 optimism 
1. 33 
-4.24 
3. 10 
3. 38 
- 3. 71 
-4. 75 
-4. 38 
-2.41 
2. 99 
-4, 50 
3,09 
-3.04 
COMPo 2 
LOADING 
-1, 10 
-0, 60 
-1, 28 
0.74 
-0. 98 
0,10 
2. 40 
0.63 
-1.00 
0. 51 
0. 59 
-1. 47 
-0. 61 
-0. 65 
-1. 55 
-0. 51 
0. 03 
-0. 66 
-1. 87 
-1.40 
-0. 28 
-0. 63 
-0. 75 
COMP. 3 
LOADING 
1. 17 
0.30 
0. 17 
-0. 24 
-0. 92 
0, 60 
0, 35 
-0. 01 
-0. 57 
-0. 14 
-0. 70 
-0. 28 
-0. 76 
-0.59 
0.67 
0. 74 
-0. 35 
-0. 35 
0. 37 
-0.21 
-0. 48 
-0. 91 
0.50 
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APPENDIX 
The relations between elements and constructs expressed as 
cosines from the gambler AROUSAL GRID. 
CONSTRUCT 1 WITH ELEMENT 
1 e. 134 2 e. 65 3 -e. 35 4 -e. 72 5 e. 713 6 -e. 12 7 -e. 138 
8 e. 49 9 e. 132 113 -e. 58 1 1 -13.69 
CONSTRUCT 2 WITH ELEMENT 
1 e. 133 2 -e. 94 3 13.94 4 e. 93 5 -e. 913 6 13.33 7 -e. 73 
8 -e. 98 9 e. 87 113 13.87 11 e. 94 
CONSTRUCT 3 WITH ELEMENT 
1 -e. 35 2 e. 92 3 -13.77 4 -13.93 5 e. 98 6 -e. 55 7 e. 46 
8 e. 913 9 -e. 61 113 -e. 94 11 -e. 91 
CONSTRUCT 4 WITH ELEMENT 
1 e. 135 2 0. 95 3 -0. 66 4 -0. 93 5 0. 91 6 -0. 36 7 0. 28 
8 0. 84 9 -0.58 10 -0. 93 1 1 -0.94 
CONSTRUCT 5 WITH ELEMENT 
1 e. 55 2 -0.91 3 0. 95 4 e. 92 5 -0. 95 6 0. 54 7 0. 69 
8 -0. 98 9 0. 77 10 e. 84 1 1 0. 88 
CONSTRUCT 6 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0. 34 2 -0. 97 3 e. 913 4 e. 99 5 -0. 95 6 e. 33 7 -13.65 
8 0.97 9 0.75 10 0. 89 1 1 0. 98 
CONSTRUCT 7 WITH ELEMENT 
1 e. 39 2 -0.93 3 e. 95 4 0. 94 5 -0. 93 6 e. 36 7 -0.75 
8 -0. 99 9 e. 86 10 e. 89 1 1 0. 94 
CONSTRUCT 8 WITH ELEMENT 
1 e. 76 2 -e. 66 3 e. 94 4 e. 68 5 e. 67 6 0. 313 7 -e. 92 
8 -0. 83 9 13.82 113 13.54 1 1 e. 66 
CONSTRUCT 9 WITH ELEMENT 
1 -0. 139 2 0.94 3 -0. 68 4 -0. 91 5 0. 94 6 -0. 55 7 0. 24 
8 0. 84 9 -0. 54 113 -0.91 1 1 -0. 88 
CONSTRUCT 10 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0. 36 2 -0. 95 3 0. 93 4 0. 98 5 -e. 93 6 0. 26 7 -0. 70 
8 -e. 97 9 0. 77 10 0. 85 11 0. 97 
CONSTRUCT 1 1 WITH ELEMENT 
1 -0. 40 2 0.91 3 -13.81 4 -0. 93 5 0. 96 6 -0. 57 7 13.40 
8 13.91 9 -0. 55 10 -e. 82 1 1 -0. 88 
CONSTRUCT 12 WITH ELEMENT 
1 e. 55 2 -0.84 3 e. 92 4 0. 86 5 -13.91 6 0. 49 7 -e. 77 
8 -0. 94 9 0. 83 10 0. 87 1 1 0. 83 
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The i n t e r - e I e me n t relations of the non-gambler AROUSAL 
GRI D expressed as cosines. 
ELEMENT 1 WITH ELEMENT 
2 0. 16 3 0. 66 4 0. 20 5 -0. 11 6 0. 35 7 -0. 70 8 -0, 63 
9 0.27 10 -0. 79 1 1 0. 18 
ELEMENT 2 WITH ELEMENT 
3 -0.49 4 -0.87 5 0. 90 6 -0. 72 7 - e. 16 8 0. 55 9 -0. 27 
113 -0. 713 
ELEMENT 3 WITH ELEMENT 
4 0.78 5 -0. 63 6 0. 66 7 -0.68 8 -0. 99 9 e. 64 10 -0. 79 
1 1 0.137 
ELEMENT 4 WITH ELEMENT 
5 -0.90 6 0.75 7 -13.24 8 -0.83 9 0.43 10 -0.37 11 13.86 
ELEMENT 5 WITH ELEMENT 
6 -0.87 7 -0.03 8 0.70 9 -0.31 10 0.09 11 -0.72 
ELEMENT 6 WITH ELEMENT 
7 -0.131 8 -0.70 9 13.18 10 -0.23 11 0.52 
ELEMENT 7 WITH ELEMENT 
8 0.64 9 -0.67 113 0.87 11 -0.46 
ELEMENT 8 WITH ELEMENT 
9 -0.67 10 13.75 11 -0.81 
ELEMENT 9 WITH ELEMENT 
10 -0.56 11 0.59 
ELEMENT 10 WITH ELEMENT 
11 -13, 48 
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APPENDIX 54 
The loadings of the first 3 components of the elements and 
constructs derived from the INGRID analysis of the 
non-gambler AROUSAL GRID. 
ELEMENT 
1 decision making 
2 uncertainty 
3 challenge 
4 monetary gain 
5 loss of control 
6 testing predictions 
7 superstitious behaviour 
8 losing money in a bet 
9 risk-taking 
10 ha vi ng a bet 
11 beating the system 
CONSTRUCT 
1 anxiety 
2 thrill 
3 anger 
4 frustration 
5 interest 
6 joy 
7 excitement 
8 determination 
9 depression 
10 elation 
11 remorse 
12 opt i mi sm 
COMP. 1 
LOADING 
-1. 09 
1. 88 
-3.96 
-4.08 
3. 90 
-1. 22 
1. 39 
4. 62 
-1. 20 
1. 89 
- 2. 14 
0. 34 
-3. 63 
2. 10 
1. 72 
-3. 22 
-3.74 
-3. 52 
-2.25 
1. 35 
-3. 53 
1. 86 
-2. 53 
COMPo 2 
LOADING 
-1. 53 
-1. 73 
-1. 19 
1. 31 
-2.50 
0. 54 
2. 26 
1.00 
-0. 67 
2. 34 
0. 18 
-2. 17 
-0. 30 
-1. 66 
-2. 80 
-0. 94 
-0. 15 
-0.66 
-2.02 
-2. 06 
-0. 30 
-1. 25 
-0. 63 
COMPo 3 
LOADING 
1. 17 
0. 34 
0. 29 
-0.42 
-0. 55 
0. 71 
0. 60 
-0. 19 
-0. 96 
-0. 05 
-0. 94 
-0. 36 
-0. 86 
-0. 95 
0.79 
0. 95 
-0. 31 
- 0. 10 
0. 50 
-0.40 
-0.76 
-0. 45 
0.40 
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APPENDIX 55 
The relations between elements and constructs eX:Qressed 
as cosines from the non-gambler AROUSAL GRI D. 
CONSTRUCT 1 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0.45 2 0. 67 3 0. 11 4 -0. 45 5 0. 58 6 -0.42 7 -0. 67 
8 -0. 07 9 0. 48 10 -0. 55 1 1 -0. 16 
CONSTRUCT 2 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0. 39 2 -0. 66 3 0.93 4 0. 87 5 -0.74 6 0. 62 7 -0. 59 
8 -0. 95 9 0.75 10 -0.63 1 1 0. 92 
CONSTRUCT 3 WITH ELEMENT 
1 -0. 16 2 0.82 3 -0.53 4 -0. 78 5 -0. 96 6 -0. 88 7 -0. 15 
8 0. 60 9 -0. 15 10 -0. 02 1 1 -0. 56 
CONSTRUCT 4 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0.44 2 0. 95 3 -0. 24 4 -0.72 5 0. 82 6 -0. 58 7 -0. 38 
8 0. 32 9 -0.17 10 -0. 31 1 1 -0. 57 
CONSTRUCT 5 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0. 73 2 -0. 45 3 0.95 4 0. 75 5 -0. 62 6 0.74 7 -0. 56 
8 -0.95 9 0. 48 10 -0. 80 1 1 0. 65 
CONSTRUCT 6 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0.47 2 -0. 69 3 0. 93 4 0.94 5 -0. 77 6 0.70 7 -0. 55 
8 -0. 95 9 0. 56 10 -0. 65 1 1 0. 90 
CONSTRUCT 7 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0.56 2 -0. 56 3 0.96 4 0. 84 5 -0. 71 6 0. 66 7 -0.63 
8 -0. 99 9 0. 71 10 -0. 72 1 1 0.81 
CONSTRUCT 8 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0. 86 2 -0.10 3 0. 90 4 0.45 5 -0. 26 6 0. 40 7 -0. 85 
8 -0. 84 9 0. 56 10 -0.91 1 1 0. 52 
CONSTRUCT 9 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0.21 2 0. 89 3 -0. 29 4 -0. 68 5 0. 88 6 -0. 77 7 -0. 41 
8 0. 35 9 -0. 81 10 -0. 31 11 -0. 38 
CONSTRUCT 10 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0. 43 2 -0. 65 3 0. 91 4 0.91 5 -0. 73 6 0. 61 7 -0.60 
8 -0. 94 9 0.68 10 -0.66 1 1 0.93 
CONSTRUCT 11 WITH ELEMENT 
1 -0.09 2 0. 84 3 -0.60 4 -0. 85 5 0. 95 6 -0. 89 7 -0.08 
8 0. 66 9 -0.13 10 0. 10 11 -0.71 
CONSTRUCT 12 WITH ELEMENT 
1 0.70 2 -0.47 3 0. 95 4 0.78 5 -0. 69 6 0. 12 7 -0.66 
8 -0. 96 9 0.63 10 -0. 72 1 1 0.73 
APPENDIX 56 
*PROGRAM FOR PROJECTING A 3-D SPHERE ONTO A 2-D SURFACE 
*** seT PARAMETERS CO IS DISTANCE OF OBSERVER FROM SPHERE 
*** C IS D:STANCE FROM SPHERE TO PROJECTIVE SURFACE 
D!MENSION Xl(60),Yl(60) 
REAL SP,CP,CT vST,TPL,TL,Cl,SF r TD,Tl,T2 
OPEN (UNIT=8,FILE='CHECK') 
CALL MCOPENC'METAFILE',8) 
DATA PI/3.1415926535898 I ,CO/4.I,C/2.1 
CALL SETCO.,1.,O.,1. y -2.2,2.2,-2.2,2.2,1) 
~SET THE L!MITS OF THE OBSERVEABLE SPHERE 
CL_:::1/C 1+GO) 
BL =~3:r N ( n., ) 
SF=(C2+CO+C)/Cl+CO-CL» 
TD= TANCPI/2-TL)/6 
*PROGRAM SEGMENT FOR GOORDS OF LATITUDE LINES 
no 30 J"-" 1 ,1~; 
Tl=ATAN(ABS(FLOAT(J-7»*TD) 
IF (SIN(Tl)~.200) 4,5,5 
4 l'2=PI-ASINC(1+CO)*ST1) 
THETA=SIGNCPI-Tl-T2,FlOAT(J-7» 
CT=[:ot; (THETA) 
ST=SINCTH[TA) 
KF::." 0 [to 20 !<==1,3:1 
PHI=FLOATCK-17)*PI/32 
Si:'=SIN (PHI) 
Cp:::C[)S (F'HI ) 
:!. 7 I'~F'=KF+ 1 
CALL POINTS(CT,ST,CP,SP,CO,C,XrY) 
i<l(r<F-)::::X 
y 1 n(F ) ,-,::y 
13010 20 
18 IF(CP*CT-CL) 20,20,21 
21 CF'::::CljCT 
SP==SHH ACOS (CP) ) 
CALL POINTS(CT,ST,CP,SP,CO,C,X,V) 
Xl(l):.-"X 
X:l (KF+:i.) ::X 
Yl(1):::-p:·y 
Yl (KF+l) ::::y 
WRITE(B,34) CL,CT,ST,CP,SP 
20 CONTINUE 
CALL CURVE(Xl,Yl,KF) 
30 CONTINUE 
*PROGRAM SEGMENT FOR LONGITUDE LINES 
DO ~SO K==1,13 
Tl=ATAN(ABSCFLOAT(K-7)*TD» 
!F(STl .2(0)63,64,64 
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*PROGRAM FOR PRO~ECTING A 3-D SPHERE ONTO A 2-D SURFACE 
63 T :2 == F' I .-. A SIN ( ( 1 + C C) ) ~;; S T 1 ) 
PHI=SIGNCPI-Tl-T2,FLOAT(K-7» 
(1'8 f.)F'''':~) 1. N (PH I ) 
CP=::CD~) (PHI) 
...iF::: l. 
DO 40 J:::I.,34 
n- (~J-<34) 36 ~ 5\3, ~5r::: 
36 THETA=FLOATeJ-17)*PI/32 
CT::::COS (TH[H~) 
~;;T:::f:)I N (THETI~I) 
IF (CTHCP - CL) 40,38~38 
JF::::.JF -I- J. 
CALL POINTS(CT,ST,CPpSP,CO,C,X,Y) 
Xl(,)r),""x 
y]. (~.IF) "':Y 
GOlD 40 
58 IF(JF-l)40,40,41 
4]. CT::::CL./CP 
S;T:;::f:)J:N «(~CCJ~; (CT) ) 
CALL POINTS(CTyST,CP,SP,CO,C,X,Y) 
X 1. ( 1 ) ::= ( <I. " )-J~ X 
Xi (~.IF-I-J.) ::X 
'1'1(1.)=1' 
Yl(JF+J,)::::Y 
40 CONTINUE: 
IF(JF-l)50,50,42 
42 ~.IF'=,JF+l 
CALL CURV[(Xl,Yl,JF) 
50 CONTINUE: 
CAL..L.. 1~'F~Ar!E 
CAL.L MC:CLOS 
END 
**SUBROUTINE FOR PROJECTION OF CORDS ONTO SURFACE 
SUBROUTINE POINTS(CT,ST,CP,Al,CO,C,X,Y) 
DATA F'I/3.14l.::il 
1:::). ~-:: 1. ·_·Cp·)(·C T +CO 
C ~l :::Cp:Jf:ST 
F'T==ATAN (C1/H1) 
IF(F'T-PI/2) 82,82,81 
Bl PT::::PT'-'PI 
82 Dl=B1/COS(PT) 
F' F':: A TAN ( A 1.1 Ii 1 ) 
IF (PP-PI/2) 92,92,91 
9:1. PF'=F'P'-F'I 
92 J=<==CD+2+C 
F~Y::::FUCOS (F'T) 
f~X::::FUC()S e F'P) 
><:::'I:{X~('SI N (PT ) 
Y::::F~Y*BIN(PP) 
;;~[TUI:{N 
130 FORMAT(9(lX,F6.3» 
[1'-1[1 
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